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Foreword 
China has taken decisive steps to integrate to the world market since the 
late 1970s. While facing significant challenges, it reflects one of the most 
interesting and relevant socioeconomic and territorial success stories of the 
20th century in terms of growth, consumption, poverty alleviation and in-
dustrial upgrading, among other items. As a comparison, the economic 
performance of Latin America, Central America, and Mexico has been 
quite modest in the past 20 years. 
This study offers a basis for understanding China’s performance from a 
Latin American perspective, and stressing the massive economic opportu-
nities and challenges, and particularly for Central America and Mexico. 
Moreover, the document assesses in detail the macroeconomic, trade, and 
employment policy and institutional changes in China and its potential ef-
fects in Central America and Mexico. These effects are analyzed in the 
Chinese, Central American, Mexican and US market in general, but also 
for the value-added chains of electronics and yarn-textile-garment. The 
findings presented will be of value to all of those who are trying to under-
stand and learn from the extraordinary experience of China over the last 
decades. Bibliographical references and statistical information allows for 
subsequent detailed analysis and specific forms of cooperation and prepa-
ration between the considered countries. These countries have a significant 
economic and political potential, but will have to increase their mutual 
knowledge and increase efforts to do so. So far, China has displaced sig-
nificantly some major export products from Mexico and Central America 
in the US and in their domestic markets. 
A first draft of this paper was presented in the project “Economic 
Challenges Posed by China for Mexico and Central America,” of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
and published in Spanish in September 2004 by ECLAC and updated by 
the author at the end of 2004 at the German Development Institute in 
Bonn. This is part of an ongoing collaboration between both institutions. 
Dirk Messner 
Director 
German Development Institute 
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Executive summary 
From a Latin American perspective, what are the opportunities and eco-
nomic challenges posed by China for Mexico and Central America? Con-
sidering the spectacular socioeconomic performance of China, what les-
sons can be learned? Based on these questions, the study is divided in four 
parts. In the first section, a synthetic presentation will be made of some 
important conceptual antecedents for the understanding of value chains in 
the current context of globalization. The second part of the paper will ana-
lyze China’s socioeconomic performance and development strategy since 
1978, with emphasis in the most recent period. We will also delve into the 
issue of complementarity or competition between Central America, China, 
and Mexico in the U.S. market and Central America and Mexico’s trade 
relations with China. The third and fourth chapters will provide a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics of the yarn-textile-garment and PC/elec-
tronics value chains in China, considering both the policies Beijing has 
implemented in the past few decades as well as its performance in the 
United States. In both cases, detailed information will be presented in the 
two, six and 10 digits of the Harmonized System, depending on its avail-
ability. Chapter 5 concludes our analysis on the previous topics and ques-
tions linked with complementarity, opportunities, and challenges in the 
short, medium, and long term involving the economies in question.  
The respective chapters include several significant findings. The Chinese 
commercial structure, as well as its productive apparatus, reflect an 
important structural change: while in the early eighties raw materials and 
oil held a 50 % share of the exports, in the early nineties, garment pro-
duction, with massive investments in textile plants, became the motor for 
the growth of exports. Since the mid-nineties, however, the principal 
export chapters were auto parts and electronics. In addition, and con-
sidering the long-term strategies and programs of the central government, 
China has been increasingly a result of Asia’s integration process, also 
reflected in regional foreign direct investment flows and trade. This new 
trade pattern generates conflicts in the world market with several nation, 
including Central America and Mexico. 
 Enrique Dussel Peters 
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Based on the commercial analysis, the performance of Chinese, Central 
American, and Mexican exports in the United States market – a high 
priority for Central America and Mexico – reflects a high level of com-
petition. Even though they are not the only competitors, they are among 
the most dynamic of Mexico’s and Central America’s principal export 
categories: auto parts, electronics, and garments. With the exception of the 
automotive chapter – although it is also expected that China’s share in this 
category will continue to rise in the face of massive investments by foreign 
companies – the main chapters in the United States market appear to be 
affected. In the case of Mexico, companies formerly established in Mexico 
have made significant decisions to move to Asia and China. The big 
exceptions to this process of competition in the United States market are 
the agricultural, agro-industrial, and raw materials chapters. With regards 
to the domestic effects of the chain, China’s performance has been dyn-
amic in its exports to Central America and Mexico, considering that these 
countries don’t export products from the chain to China: in 2002, China 
and Hong Kong had a 9.71 % percentage share of Central America’s 
imports and 4.58 % of Mexico’s in 2003, although it is estimated that the 
percentages for illegal imports are higher. 
Based on detailed trade analysis and specifically in two value chains (elec-
tronics/PC and yarn-textile-garments), the document highlights several 
relevant short and medium-term aspects. China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the elimination of quotas in the yarn-
textile-garment chain permit assurances that these tendencies will deepen 
the significant productive and commercial shifts at the global level and in 
Latin America. China’s integration into the world market and its inten-
sification will also generate pressures towards lower prices and will affect 
most of the commodities exported by Central America and Mexico, 
particularly to the United States. The aggregated analysis, as well as of 
both commodity chains, reflect the increasing difficulties that Mexico and 
Central America will have if they continue to specialize in commodities 
and processes based on cheap labor power.  
Specific policies in Central America and Mexico should deepen the 
analysis of other value chains and the challenges or complementary 
aspects generated by China, with the aim of measuring short, medium, and 
long-term policies for enhancing competition in the productive apparatus 
Economic Opportunities and Challenges posed by China for Mexico and Central America 
German Development Institute 3 
and concretizing cooperative projects in the face of China’s demand for 
specific products.A first draft of this paper was presented in the project 
“Economic Challenges Posed by China for Mexico and Central America,” 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and published in Spanish in September 2004 by ECLAC and 
updated by the author at the end of 2004 at the German Development In-
stitute in Bonn. This is part of an ongoing collaboration between both in-
stitutions. 
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Introduction 
Since the end of the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China – henceforth to 
be referred to as China – has registered spectacular performance on a mac-
roeconomic level as well as in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
savings rates, and GDP growth, in addition to significant advances in the 
social sphere. In the 1990s, with the trade opening and the country’s mem-
bership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Beijing also no-
tably increased its share of international trade. In 2003 China boasts the 
world’s seventh largest economy – and is expected to become the 4th in the 
short term – and is in fourth place in world trade. As a comparison, the 
economic performance of Latin America, Central America, and Mexico 
has been quite modest in the past 20 years.  
China’s socioeconomic dynamic is real and not result of distorted statis-
tics. In many cases, the concepts and experiences of a large part of the de-
veloping countries do not seem sufficient – or even appear to be useful – 
in the face of China’s performance. Indeed, how can we explain the dy-
namics and transition of a socialist country – or of a “socialist market 
economy” – in which the economic and political activities of the state play 
a dominant role, with a high degree of government intervention? What are 
the reasons why the Chinese economy has resumed its growth and global 
presence, after several centuries?1 With more than 20 % of the world 
population – and considering its progress in its commercial integration into 
the world market, the changes in its rural and urban population, the 
achievements in terms of reducing poverty, and its respective internal 
challenges – the socioeconomic and political transition that China has and 
will continue to experience in the next few decades cannot be analyzed 
                                                          
1  It is of major importance to consider, including from an historical perspective, that until 
the 16th century China had been one of the international economic powers, if not the 
main power. The Yangzi Delta alone had a population of between 31 million and 37 
million inhabitants in 1750, similar to that of all Europe, with markets comparable to 
those of the old continent and important technological advances. However, intensive ag-
riculture and the use of certain crops such as the potato in Europe – with high caloric 
yields per area – the massive use of coal – as opposed to firewood in China – and the re-
sulting innovations such as the steam engine are particularly valuable in explaining 
China’s backwardness since that period. These contrasts excluded the country’s interna-
tional socioeconomic presence (Frank 1998; Pommeranz 2000). 
 Enrique Dussel Peters 
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and evaluated as one more such process, given its major global implica-
tions.2 According to different sources and their respective methodologies, 
China’s GDP will be higher than that of the United States between 2015 
and 2041.  
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, to offer a bibliographical 
review to deepen our knowledge of the Chinese economy in general, and 
specifically with regard to the yarn-textile-garment and personal com-
puters (or PCs)/electronics value chains, both of which have an economic 
importance for Central America and Mexico, respectively, in order to con-
cretize the opportunities or threats posed by the Chinese economy in the 
short, medium, and long term. Second, to analyze the issue of opportuni-
ties or challenges in general and specifically for the two chains in third 
markets – particularly the United States – as well as in their own domestic 
markets, including the potential effects of China’s entrance into the WTO 
in 2001.  
The study is divided in four parts. In the first section, a synthetic presenta-
tion will be made of some important conceptual antecedents for the under-
standing of value chains in the current context of globalization and politi-
cal questions derived from the international experience. The second part of 
the paper will analyze China’s socioeconomic performance and develop-
ment strategy since 1978, with emphasis in the most recent period. A de-
tailed exposition will be presented of China’s commercial structure and the 
benefits and commitments it acquired upon joining the WTO in 2001. We 
will also delve into the issue of complementarity or competition between 
Central America, China, and Mexico in the U.S. market and Central 
America and Mexico’s trade relations with China. In both cases, the coun-
try’s overall trade structure will be examined in line with the two-digit 
Harmonized System, in order to explicitly deal with the challenges and 
opportunities that China poses for Central America and Mexico. The third 
and fourth chapters will provide a detailed analysis of the characteristics of 
the yarn-textile-garment and PC/electronics value chains in China, consid-
ering both the policies Beijing has implemented in the past few decades as 
well as its performance in the United States. In both cases, detailed infor-
                                                          
2 Qian (2003, 331) concludes, following a meticulous analysis of the period of China’s 
socioeconomic transition since the end of the 1970s that: “... nothing on this scale and in 
so short a period of time has been attempted in world history.”  
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mation will be presented in the six and 10 digits of the Harmonized Sys-
tem, depending on its availability. Chapter 5 concludes our analysis on the 
previous topics and questions linked with complementarity, opportunities, 
and challenges in the short, medium, and long term involving the econo-
mies in question.  
The study offers a broad and detailed statistical appendix in an electronic 
format (see http://www.dusselpeters.com/dussel-tema-china.html) with gen-
eral commercial information and data on each of the value chains exam-
ined.3 The appendix consists of five sections. The first contains charts di-
rectly flowing from the text, while the following four sections include 
commercial information from Chinese, Mexican, Central American, and 
U.S. sources. Depending on its availability, the data will include imports 
and exports by country for the 1990–2003 period, on an overall level, by 
product categories of the Harmonized System, by segments of the chains 
to be examined, and by items at six and up to 10 digits.  
Liu Xue Dong’s many contributions and analysis were significant and 
valuable for the preparation of this study. By the same token, we would 
like to thank Lorena Cárdenas, Iván Darío Gutiérrez Bravo, and Luis 
Daniel Torres, who took responsibility for elaborating the Statistical Ap-
pendix and for reviewing several versions of the text. Claudia Schatán and 
René Hernández, officials at the ECLAC subregional headquarters in 
Mexico City, offered important commentaries and suggestions for their in-
corporation into the study, while many business associations, officials, 
academic specialists, and experts from China, Central America, the United 
States and Mexico provided us with valuable information and analysis to 
prepare the document.  
 
                                                          
3 The Statistical Appendix can be found at http://www.cepal.org.mx or at http://dusselpe-
ters.com. 
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1 Conceptual antecedents 
A thoroughgoing discussion and reflection has emerged at least since the 
1990s on the effects of the structural adjustments in Latin America. This 
debate has generated important macroeconomic consensus and agreements 
– and beyond macroeconomic stability understood as fiscal control and re-
strictive monetary policies, commercial and financial liberalization, as 
well as parallel privatization and deregulation processes (Williamson 
1990) – in relation to the relevance of the existence and/or creation of in-
stitutions and their financing, the fight against corruption and poverty, as 
well as social networks and instruments of corporate governance in institu-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (World 
Bank 1998; IMF 2003; Rodrick 2003a). Independently of this new consen-
sus, and beyond these “macroeconomic fundamentals”, significant differ-
ences still remain. While the IMF in particular insists on consolidating and 
deepening the macroeconomic strategy followed in the developing coun-
tries since the 1980s, several other institutions and authors have posed the 
need to reconsider such an approach. The Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), for example, recognizes different initiatives to promote in-
dustrial competitiveness in Latin America “to facilitate access to key re-
sources, develop new capacities, and exploit agglomeration economies” 
(IDB 2001, 249). Thus, it is important to move “beyond the Washington 
consensus” (World Bank 1998) and deal with the international and na-
tional volatility and uncertainty (ECLAC 2002), considering that Latin 
America has not resumed its economic growth since the 1980s, contrary to 
what occurred in a large part of Asia and particularly China. From this 
perspective, it is important not to succumb to orthodox and extreme mac-
roeconomic policies (Stiglitz 2002, xiii) – without conceptual justification 
– and, on the contrary, to implement mechanisms that allow and promote 
economic growth.  
Since the 1970s and particularly during the 1980s, detailed analysis have 
been made on the main reasons why transnational companies have trans-
ferred a growing part of the segments of their global commodity chains 
(Gereffi / Korzeniewicz 1994; Piore / Sabel 1984; UNCTAD 2001, 2003). 
The changes required by the global productive structure – known as flexi-
ble production – were implemented as a response to the growing flexibility 
in demand, particularly and initially in industrial sectors such as auto, elec-
tronics, and garment. In a context marked by the opening of the industrial-
 Enrique Dussel Peters 
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ized as well as developing countries – for goods in addition to capital and 
services – as well as the substantial improvement in shipping, the com-
puter revolution, and the electronic media, transnational companies were 
increasingly able to geographically transfer segments of the value added 
chain of their activities (Storper 1997). Contrary to previous periods, for 
example, with import substitution during the 1960s in Latin America, in 
which transnational companies either exported their products to the region 
or produced them locally, in 1980s and 1990s they were increasingly able 
to integrate these segments of the chain as part of the strategy and global 
network of end products.  
At least since the 1970s, and even more so since the 1980s, the globaliza-
tion process has allowed the transfer of segments of value chains in very 
different geographical regions. This process has generated a spectacular 
outsourcing process on a global level, initially led by the productive sector 
and subsequently by distribution and marketing companies. This has al-
lowed some regions to specialize in productive processes in specific seg-
ments of the value chain, such as growing and supplying raw materials, as-
sembling parts of or entire products, the production of parts and compo-
nents, research and development, marketing, after-sale services, etc., de-
pending on the particular activity. All these processes require different de-
grees of international trade in order to integrate these segments into an end 
product or service. Nevertheless, since the 1990s this situation has also re-
flected the requirement on the part of large clients – most involved in bulk 
sales – to integrate the transferred processes (Bair / Dussel Peters 2004); 
that is, contrary to the previous recent period, these companies demand 
those to whom they are outsourcing to become directly and fully responsi-
ble for the costs, inventories, financing, quality, quantity, inputs and the 
manufacturing process itself, packaging and shipment to the final con-
sumer. These processes – known as full packaging and which involve dif-
ferent characteristics depending on the specific sector – potentially allow for 
a greater degree of integration and the appropriation of value added on the 
part of the respective territories. But they also generate enormous new chal-
lenges for subcontractors and the areas in which these processes take place.  
Since the second half of the 1990s, a series of authors (Humphrey / 
Schmitz 2001) have analyzed the relevance of “collective efficiency” – 
understood as the competitive advantage resulting from the externalities of 
local economies and joint activities – for the respective regions and their 
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role for understanding the positive behavior of clusters. Schmitz (1997) 
argues that collective efficiency and the formation of interfirm networks in 
specific territories are one of the main characteristics for understanding 
their global competitiveness. Recent analysis (Humphrey / Schmitz 2000) 
indicate that integration into the world market depends on different types 
of chain governance. The greater the vertical nature and control of a re-
duced group of clients and/or buyers, less will be the potential for local 
upgrading and diffusion and learning.4 From this perspective, the genera-
tion of a process of “collective efficiency” is not a necessary part of the 
evolution of different clusters and industrial districts, as Rabellotti demon-
strates (1997) in comparing industrial districts in Italy and Mexico. On the 
contrary, the higher the number of clients and the more reduced the de-
pendence on standards imposed by leading companies, the greater will be 
the options for integration, coordination, cooperation, diffusion, learning, 
and local and interfirm upgrading, that is, the formation of a web of terri-
torial interfirm networks.  
The previous considerations are important from different vantage points. 
To begin with, they lead to questions being raised on the macroeconomic 
policies that have been implemented in most of Latin America since the 
1980s and their “economic fundamentals.” The debate on competitiveness 
and the generation of competitive conditions for the productive sector im-
plies a battery of instruments to achieve such goals, such as territorial and 
training policies, extending technology, creating skills, incentive systems 
in general, promoting the development of micro, small and medium-size 
companies, research and development, the regulatory framework and rules 
governing competition, the incorporation of suppliers, and public-private 
sector relations, among many others (Chang 2002; Katz / Stumpo 2001; 
Lall 1999).5 The challenges, from this perspective, are enormous. Thus, al-
                                                          
4 Based on a broad experience in the electronics industry, Ernst (2003, 2) points out that 
“defined as a shift to higher value-added products, services and production stages 
through increasing specialization and efficient domestic and international linkages … 
raises daunting challenges, chief among them are substantial investments in long-term 
assets, such as specialized skills and innovative and research capabilities. In countries 
where domestic industry structure provides only limited incentives for firms to invest in 
these long-term assets, upgrading prospects will remain limited.”  
5 Based on an exhaustive analysis of different countries and the sources of their growth, 
in addition to different previously published articles, Rodrick (2003b, 11) emphasizes 
the importance of the quality of the institutions, as long as “trade – or more specifically, 
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though the Central American countries, China and Mexico have signifi-
cantly increased the technological content of their exports (see graph 1), 
this trend does not necessarily reflect a greater complexity of the processes 
incorporated into these activities.6  
Graph 1:  Exports of medium and high technological level (share in total ex-
ports) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:: Self-compiled, based on TradeCan (ECLAC 2004a). 
In second place, it is important to go beyond merely macroeconomic con-
siderations for the development of competitiveness, but also of the micro-
economic determinants for competitiveness raised by Porter (1990) at the 
beginning of the 1990s. As has been pointed out by different authors, insti-
tutions, and conceptual currents as well as Porter (1998), at the present 
time, competitiveness should be understood in its territorial and systemic 
dimension (microeconomic, mesoeconomic, macroeconomic and meta-
economic). From this perspective, different authors have highlighted the 
importance of competitiveness in its systemic and territorial dimensions as 
well as in terms of segments of the value chain (Dussel Peters 2004; 
                                                                                                                         
government policy toward trade – does not play nearly as important a role as the institu-
tional setting.”  
6 The technological complexity, for example, of products does not necessarily coincide 
with the processes that are required for their production. Products based on high-
technology, for example, a PC, do not include technologically advanced processes in all 
their segments, for example, in assembling parts and components. As a result, the analy-
sis of the segments of the value chain is crucial. For a detailed analysis on the method-
ology of graph 1 and the differentiation between processes and products, see Dussel Pe-
ters (2003). 
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Messner 2002; Messner / Meyer-Stamer 1994) in order to understand the 
rationality of the global commodity chains and the growing productive 
flexibilization, intra and interfirm networks, requirements of competitive-
ness in the segments of the global chain, and institutional quality during 
periods of transition,7 particularly in relation to the respective territories 
and their population. What would be the use for competitive global chains 
and/or segments with territories without options for integration and up-
grading8 to the world market and with negative effects on job creation, real 
wages, consumption, and investment, as well as GDP and per capita GDP? 
In the globalization process being studied, different territorial-sectoral ex-
periences highlight the growing importance of the development of tech-
nology and product design capacities, more than specialization in their 
manufacturing and assembly (Ernst / Lüthje 2003).9  
From this perspective, the globalization process and its socioeconomic and 
territorial effects can generate processes of territorial endogeneity or, in 
other cases, a polarization process in both absolute as well as relative 
terms. The territories’ capacity to make the processes and segments of 
chains endogenous through those that become integrated into the world 
market are of importance in fields such as technological development and 
R&D, their expansion, the generation of value added, the creation and 
                                                          
7 Qian (2001, 2003, 305) emphasizes the importance of the specificity of transitional in-
stitutions: “The general principle of efficiency-improving and interest-compatible insti-
tutional change is simple, but the specific forms and mechanisms of transitional institu-
tions often are not. Successful institutional reforms usually are not a straightforward 
copy of best-practice institutions. They need not be and sometimes should not be. They 
not be because room exists for efficiency improvement that does not require fine tuning 
at the beginning. They should not be because the initial conditions are country –and 
context-specific, requiring special arrangements. Therefore, inevitably, transitional in-
stitutions display a variety of nonstandard forms.”  
8 From the perspective of segments of global business chains, the upgrading process – 
understood as the integration and appropriation of higher segments of the chain and, 
therefore, of greater value added – can occur on the level of products, processes, intra or 
inter-chains (Gereffi et al. 2001).  
9 In this regard, the authors indicate that at the present time there has been a growing dif-
ferentiation in product development and manufacturing. This has occurred simultane-
ously with a thoroughgoing verticalization in research and development, with signifi-
cant effects on the international division of labor and the transfer of segments of global 
chains, particularly in the production segment of value-added chains. The implications 
of these processes for territorial upgrading are of great importance.  
 Enrique Dussel Peters 
 German Development Institute 14
quality of jobs, the learning processes, and the population's living stan-
dards, as well as the required training and educational levels, among other 
socioeconomic variables.  
2 China: economic policy strategy, instruments and 
joining the WTO 
The first section part of this chapter will briefly examine the socioeco-
nomic performance of the Chinese economy since the 1980s and the main 
policies adopted by the country. Emphasis will be placed on the current 
conditions of the development strategy, its strengths and weaknesses, and 
details will be provided on the instruments presently being used to pro-
mote foreign development and FDI. This section is important for under-
standing the Chinese economy and the development strategy followed dur-
ing the past few decades. At the same time, it is essential to understand the 
depth, scope, and dynamics of China’s socio economic panorama, in order 
to avoid a simplistic vision based on an exclusive analysis of trade. The 
second section analyzes China’s overall trade structure in relation to its 
main trade partners based on the Harmonized System at the two digit 
level, while the third section discusses Beijing’s commitments, benefits, 
and the effects of joining the WTO since 2002 and some of its expected 
results. The third section will also examine in further detail and in relation 
to chapters of the Harmonized System, the United States’ trade relations 
with China, Central America, and Mexico, as well as direct commercial re-
lations between Central America, China, and Mexico.  
2.1 Socioeconomic performance 
China – even beyond considerations on the “East Asian miracle” (World 
Bank 1993) – is one of the cases of tremendous socioeconomic dynamism 
of the 20th century, a process that has continued into the beginning of the 
21st century. With almost 1.30 billion inhabitants in 2003 – or around 
20 % of the world’s population – average annual growth in per capita GDP 
has been 8.1 % during 1978–2003, even though the population rose by 
more than 310 million people during the same period. During this period, 
economic growth has been more than 16 times higher than that of Latin 
America as a whole (see chart 1). Although in absolute terms, the gap in 
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growth of per capita GDP with Latin America has narrowed, in 2003, 
China’s per capita GDP still only represented 28 % of that of the region.10  
In the context of the increase in China’s GDP and per capita GDP, a series 
of macroeconomic variables also reflects the dynamics and some of its 
characteristics since 1978 (see chart 2)11:  
Chart 1: GDP per capita growth rates of selected countries (1960–2003) 
(annual growth rates by decades, constant dollars of 1995) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on World Bank (2004a). 
a) Inflation, fiscal balance, and exchange rate 
China achieved major control of inflation during the 1990s and since 1997, 
growth in prices has been below 3 %. By the same token, and although 
there are limitations in terms of information, the fiscal deficit has not ex-
ceeded 3 % of GDP for 1990–1999. Given that since 1994, China has 
maintained its nominal exchange rate at a fixed level, accumulating more 
than 500 billion dollars in reserves through 2004, the real exchange rate 
has depreciated, with undervaluation levels of close to 20 % since 2001.  
 
 
                                                          
10 According to different sources and their respective methodologies (Maddison 1998a/b; 
Wilson/Purushothaman 2003) the GDP of the Chinese economy could be higher than 
that of the United States between 2015 and 2041.  
11 The information in this section, unless otherwise noted, was obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2004a).  
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 1978-2003
World 3.4 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.7 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.2
OECD 4.4 2.6 2.5 1.7 2.9 0.3 1.0 1.5 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 3.4 -0.8 1.6 2.2 -1.2 -2.2 -0.1 0.5
   Argentina 2.3 1.3 -2.9 3.5 -1.7 -5.2 -11.7 3.3 0.0
   Brazil 3.2 5.9 -0.4 1.3 3.1 0.1 0.3 -1.4 0.7
   Costa Rica 2.0 2.8 -0.5 2.9 -0.3 -0.6 1.2 3.9 1.1
   El Salvador 2.2 -0.2 -1.5 2.6 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.8 -0.4
   Guatemala 2.6 2.9 -1.6 1.4 0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.0
   Honduras 1.5 2.1 -0.7 0.4 3.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2
   Mexico 3.4 3.6 -0.3 1.8 5.0 -1.7 -0.8 -0.1 1.0
   Nicaragua 3.4 -2.8 -4.0 1.2 9.9 0.3 -1.5 -0.2 -2.5
China 1.5 4.3 7.7 8.9 7.2 6.7 7.3 8.4 8.1
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Despite significant pressures from the United States and multilateral fi-
nancial agencies, Chinese authorities had not shown an interest in revalu-
ating the Yuan until end-2004.12 
b) Changes in the composition of GDP and employment 
Agriculture has constantly declined within China’s GDP, falling from lev-
els above 30 % in the 1980s to less than 16 % since 2001. On the other 
side of the ledger, the services sector increased its weight in GDP, reach-
ing 32.28 % of the product in 2003. In industry – and particularly in its 
most significant subsector, manufacturing – two periods can be identified: 
a) 1978–1990, where its percentage share constantly fell and b) 1990–
2003, where a significant recovery was posted, with an average annual 
growth rate of 12.1 % and 12.9 % for manufacturing and industry, respec-
tively; in 2003 industry’s GDP accounted for 52.94 % of China’s total 
product. The employment structure also underwent significant changes 
during 1980–2003: the rural population has fallen from 80.4 % of the total 
population to 62.4 %, that is, the urban population increased during the 
same period by almost 290 million inhabitants. Considering the major 
weight of industry in GDP, its percentage share of employment has been 
very low and has even declined since the beginning of the 1990s, from 
levels above 21 % of total employment to 17.5 % in 2000 (see chart 3). 
Nevertheless, and given the growth in population and employment from 
1980–2000, it is very important to consider job creation during the period 
in general, and particularly in industry. Indeed, during the 1980–1987 pe-
riod, China generated around 53 million jobs in industry, higher than the 
economically active population of Mexico and above that of the total 
population of the five Central American countries. Since that time, em-
ployment in industry has diminished, although in 2000 it continued to  
                                                          
12 Inherent to the debate concerning the exchange rate and its level and flexibility is the is-
sue of the liberalization of the capital account, which China has thus far refused to do. 
For a debate on the topic, see: IMF (2003), Krueger (2003); Renqing (2003); Xiaochuan 
(2004); USTR (2004a). Despite the debate, the IMF itself estimates growth in GDP of 
8.5 % and 8 % for 2004 and 2005, respectively.  
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represent 145 million jobs, or 17.5 % of total employment.13 From this 
vantage point, China’s scope as the “global factory” takes on important 
dimensions and allows us to understand part of the structural changes under-
taken in the economy14: for the later 1987–2003 period neither industry nor 
the agricultural sector generated jobs, with sources of employment being 
found in services, peasants in search of work in the cities, and informal jobs. 
c)  Savings and investment 
Considering the dynamics of China’s GDP, gross domestic savings and 
gross fixed capital formation, both as a percentage of GDP, grew from 
levels below 30 % and 35 %, respectively, in the 1980s, to more than 40 % 
and 43 %, respectively, in 2003. Simultaneously with this spectacular per-
formance, of particular importance were the very low levels of real interest 
rates, which from 1980–2003 did not top 9 %, as well as the relatively 
high and growing level of domestic credit, with bank loans to the private 
sector representing 148 % of GDP in 2003. Both the levels as well as the 
dynamics have been significantly greater than that of Latin American 
countries and this explains one of the main differences in the dynamics of 
accumulation in the nations being analyzed.  
d) Foreign direct investment 
FDI in China grew substantially since 1993 and represented 11.9 % of 
gross fixed capital formation from 1991–2003. Since the mid-1990s, 
China has consolidated its position as the main recipient of FDI among the 
developing countries. Since 2002, China has become the main recipient of 
                                                          
13 The information obtained by the World Bank (2004a) is plagued by serious problems, 
considering that there is an “other” category – that the authors calculated – that repre-
sents 23.3 % of jobs in 2000. In this category, peasants in urban areas, rural enterprises, 
and informal employment could be included (Brooks 2004; Brooks / Tao 2003, 7; Gon-
zález García 2003; OECD 2002, 537). 
14 During the 1980–2001 period, employment in state-owned enterprises (SOES) fell by 
27.5 million to 38.5 million jobs. For the same period, employment in collective enter-
prises declined by more than 10 million jobs. These losses could be recovered by the 
jobs generated in joint ventures (limited corporations, jointly owned property and/or 
shareholder company), those companies with foreign and private financing, which in-
creased their employment in 1980 from 0 and 0.8 million jobs to 15.2 million, 6.7 mil-
lion, and 36.6 million jobs in 2001, respectively. That is, together, only these categories 
of companies generated 57.7 million jobs (Brooks / Tao 2003). 
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FDI on a global level, even overtaking the United States. While the per-
centage share represented by Latin America and the Caribbean in total 
FDIhas diminished during the 1990s, from 15.21 % to 8.6 % during the 
1997–2002 period, flows to China remained relatively stable and the cor-
responding figure for the country was 8.09 % in 2002, and 9.79 % if Hong 
Kong is included. The percentage share of FDI represented by mergers and 
acquisitions was barely 3.9 % in 2002, which compares with 40 % for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (UNCTAD 2004a/b; Woetzel 2004). Re-
cent surveys (Kearney 2003; McKinsey 2004; UNCTAD 2004d) indicate 
that FDI flows to China will continue, particularly in investments in assets 
(see chart 1 of Statistical Appendix 1). Furthermore, recent studies (Woet-
zel 2004) show that most of the foreign companies are currently posting 
earnings and that business operations in China are a significant source of 
profit for transnational companies. Indeed, the net earnings of U.S. sub-
sidiaries increased from 1 billion dollars in 1990 to 6 billion dollars in 
2002 and companies such as Volkswagen have registered higher profits in 
recent years in China than in Germany.  
e)  Foreign trade 
As is the case with a large part of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
China’s foreign trade has reflected a significant orientation toward exports, 
with overseas sales increasing from 4.6 % of GDP in 1978 to 33 % in 
2003. Nevertheless, the dynamism of Chinese export has been very much 
greater than in the case of Latin America, with Beijing’s share of global 
exports increasing – with Hong Kong factored in – from 1.86 % in 1980 to 
8.49 % in 2003, while the corresponding share for Latin America fell from 
4.88 % to 4.64 %. These trends became particularly pronounced for China 
as of 1990. Several aspects are important to consider (see chart 4)15: 1. Al-
though in 2003, China’s exports and import levels as a percentage of its 
GDP did not significantly differ from that of the Latin American countries, 
Beijing’s annual average growth in both categories from 1990–2003 was 
higher, with 15.5 % and 17.8 % increases, respectively. 2. The composition 
of Chinese exports reflects a thoroughgoing structural change, only com-
parable with similar modifications in Mexico. If up until the beginning of 
                                                          
15 In addition, in 1980, 75 % of exports corresponded to state owned enterprises, while in 
1998 the percentage had decreased to 25 %; while 39 %, 17 %, and 16 % involved col-
lective, individual and other enterprises (Anguiano 2004).  
Economic Opportunities and Challenges posed by China for Mexico and Central America 
German Development Institute  21
the 1980s, exports of raw materials and oil represented almost 50 % of 
overseas sales, in 2002, 89.84 % of exports corresponded to manufactured 
goods, and with an increasing share of high-technology products (see 
graph 1 and charts 2 and 3 of Statistical Appendix 1; Perkins 2001), 3. Al-
though from 1990–2003, average annual growth for China’s imports of 
goods and services was higher than that of its exports, the country tended 
to generate a surplus in the trade balance of goods and services equivalent 
to 2.46 % of GDP and an average surplus in the current account of 1.8 % 
of GDP, 4. In 2003, China’s imports topped 600 billion dollars, and they 
have been very dynamic since then. In fact, since the 1990s, China has be-
come one of the most attractive markets internationally. 
Chart 4: China and Latin American and Caribbean countries: export and 
import coefficients (percentages) (1978–2003) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on World Bank (2004a). 
f)  Household consumption 
The final household budget earmarked for consumption, measured in 1995 
dollars, increased considerably in China, as was the case for per capita 
GDP, with an average annual growth rate of 9 % during the 1978–2003 
period and 9.6 % from 1990–2003 (see graph 2).16 The high dynamism of 
                                                          
16 Nevertheless, the urban middle class with per capita income above 1,250 dollars only 
represents part of the top two 10 % income brackets and less than 100 million people 
(Nolan 2003,16–17). Woetzel (2004) estimates that 4 % of households or more than 50 
million people receive income above 20,000 dollars.  
1978 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
Exports of goods and services
Latin America and the Caribbean 10.20 14.80 14.08 14.90 17.07 17.55 21.09 --
Argentina 8.61 11.74 10.36 9.65 10.89 11.53 27.69 24.95
Brazil 6.68 12.25 8.20 7.72 10.66 13.21 14.49 --
Central America 29.95 20.81 27.10 30.81 31.98 29.48 29.12 29.86
Mexico 10.47 15.41 18.60 30.42 31.00 27.49 26.79 28.43
China 4.60 9.99 17.53 23.99 25.87 25.47 28.86 33.00
Imports of goods and services
Latin America and the Caribbean 11.11 10.04 11.98 15.86 18.11 18.54 18.31 --
Argentina 5.72 6.27 4.63 10.08 11.52 10.21 12.80 14.19
Brazil 7.86 7.10 6.96 9.49 12.18 14.20 13.41 --
Central America 34.87 25.41 36.71 42.33 44.25 43.85 43.63 44.21
Mexico 11.04 10.33 19.71 27.75 32.94 29.76 28.67 30.11
China 4.93 14.12 14.32 21.69 23.20 23.08 25.91 32.00
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per capita GDP, as with final houshold spending earmarked for consump-
tion during such a long period is of key importance for expectations of in-
dividuals and the population and the generation of political and social sta-
bility, despite the challenges indicated below.  
Graph 2: Selected countries: household final consumption expenditure 
(1978–2003) (constant 1995 US $, 1978 = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on World Bank (2004a). 
g)  Education 
The People’s Republic of China has carried out growing efforts in the field 
of education, both on a general level to provide higher education to a lar-
ger part of the population, as well as specialized endeavours and plans 
linked to some of the priority programs during the 1980s and 1990s, as 
will be seen later on. These policies have led to substantial increases in en-
rollment in primary and secondary schools and tertiary education. From 
1980 to 2000, the number of students enrolled in secondary schools in-
creased by more than 20 % with regard to the total, and, on the level of ter-
tiary education, gross school enrollment rose from 1.70 % to 12.68 %. This 
important increase in educational levels has been accompanied by an expan-
sion in R&D spending during the 1990s, rising from 0.6 % of GDP in 
1996 to 1.09 % in 2001, as well as a 27.2 % growth in the number of re-
searchers during the same period. Although income levels in higher educa-
tion in China are below those in Latin America and the Caribbean – 22.6 % 
less in 2000 – the growth dynamic in the field has been significantly 
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higher in China. The R&D spending to GDP ratio, as well as the number 
of researchers is higher in China (see chart 5).  
Chart 5: China: Education and Research and Development (1970–2001) 
  
1970 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
   School enrollment,  
   primary (% gross) 
90,94 112,60 125,15 117,53 119,80 123,03 119,53 116,06 113,87 --
   School enrollment,  
   secondary (% gross) 
24,27 45,92 48,69 65,77 68,94 58,95 -- 66,72 68,25 --
   School enrollment,  
   tertiary (% gross) 
0,07 1,70 2,97 5,25 5,65 6,09 7,39 9,70 12,68 --
   Research and devel                -- 
   opment expenditure  
   (% of GDP)-- 
-- -- -- 0,60 0,68 0,70 0,83 1,00 1,09
   Researches in R&D  
   (per million people) 
-- -- -- -- 459 479 391 424 551 584
                      
Source: Self-compiled, based on World Bank (2004a). 
h)  Reducing poverty and infrastructure development 
In both absolute and relative terms, China has been the most successful case 
study in reducing poverty in the 20th century. Both the existence of different 
policies oriented toward reducing poverty as well as the important economic 
growth achieved since the end of the 1970s allowed for a decline in the num-
ber of those living in poverty from 490 million in 1981 to 88 million in 2002 
or from 49 % to 6.9 % of the population. There is an important consensus 
(Sangui / Zhou / Yanshun 2004; World Bank 2004c/d/e) concerning the im-
pact of public investment in reducing poverty during the past 20 years – par-
ticularly during the 1978–1985 period of high growth – and in budget items 
such as general construction and highways in rural regions.17 These impor-
tant socioeconomic advances are also reflected in China’s higher ranking in 
the Human Development Index since the mid-1970s (UN 2004).  
                                                          
17 Without intending to exhaust the question, these studies emphasize that several of these 
programs, particularly the 8–7 National Program to Reduce Poverty since 1994, which 
was the first program to alleviate and reduce poverty with specific objectives, goals, and 
timeframes (World Bank 2004c, 2). Based on the instruments employed in this pro-
gram – subsidized credits, food in exchange for work, and budgetary allocations from 
the central government – Beijing launched the New Century Plan to Reduce Rural Pov-
erty for 2001–2010, focusing its efforts in 50,000 poor urban villages and seeking to in-
crease the program’s objectives, its transparency, and participation on a local level.  
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2.2 Strategies, policies and challenges 
“Truth is to be found in practice (shishi qiushi). If we can achieve an in-
crease in the average income of all Chinese people, then it will prove that 
our practice was correct. If our future experience proves that we have up-
held socialism and prevented the restoration of capitalism, then it will 
demonstrate that our political practice was correct” (Deng Xiaping 1979, 
in Nolan 2003, 7).  
The previous socioeconomic performance was the result of different ex-
ternal and internal factors. In relation to the first series of questions, sev-
eral studies have underlined both the positive global conditions of integra-
tion into the world market via exports as well as the interest of the OECD 
member countries, and particularly the United States, in integrating the 
Chinese economy into their respective markets, despite the major conflicts 
and ideological, political, and military differences (Cohen 2000; Nolan 
2003; Wang 1992). By the same token, it is important to emphasize that 
through formal and informal relations, the Chinese community on a global 
level, and particularly in Asia and the United States, has become a signifi-
cant base for increasing trade in the countries in which it resides. In coun-
tries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, where the Chinese com-
munity represents barely 2.5 %, 14 % and 30 % of the total population, re-
spectively, it accounts for 73 %, 80 % and 69 % of the respective national 
capital.  
The conditions and internal policy measures, however, would seem to 
have the dominant weight, particularly in order to understand the differ-
ences with other nations, among them Latin American countries. From the 
perspective of development strategy, the case of China stands out on dif-
ferent levels since the end of the 1970s.  
In the first place, a pragmatic long-term and dynamic vision, accompanied 
by instruments, mechanisms, resources, and the coordination of institu-
tions on a local, provincial and central level. A series of authors have em-
phasized the changes in “formulating objectives” (Fan / Zhang 2003, 13)18 
and the multiplicity of “transitional institutions” (Qian 2001, 2003) in this 
                                                          
18 The same authors point out, in synthesis, “that nothing was accidental in the constantly 
changing “formulation of objectives” and that the logic of the political economy pre-
vailed” (Fan / Zhang 2003, 13).  
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process, which has not been exempt from contradictions and difficulties. 
This process of reforms with a long-term vision – which began at the end 
of the 1970s and with important changes in 1993 – has explicitly sought to 
create domestic markets through policies that aim to diversify types of 
property ownership, particularly non-state, under the government's coordi-
nation in its diverse levels (Perkins 2001). The previous process culmi-
nated with the explicit invitation in 2001 to businessmen to join the Chi-
nese Communist Party.  
In second place, these reforms began in the agricultural sector with the ob-
jective of linking the system of responsibility with production and to reach 
levels of self-sufficiency, and establishing family units as basic units of 
production. With the experience of food shortages and massive famines 
during the 20th century, to date agriculture continues to be a top priority 
sector in the country’s economic policy (Nolan 2003, 12–13; Yifu Lin / 
Yao 2001).19 The success of the reforms in the agricultural sector until the 
mid-1980s, in terms of production, an increase in consumption, and a re-
duction in poverty, generated sociopolitical conditions to continue with the 
reforms in other fields (Nolan / Paine 1986).  
In third place, it should be emphasized that since the end of the 1970s, 
economic policies diminished the weight of the state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and collectively owned and local enterprises by allowing and ac-
tively promoting new forms of property ownership. As a result, the per-
centage share represented by the two above-mentioned categories fell from 
75 % and 24 % of industrial output in 1980 to 25 % and 21 % in 2002, re-
spectively. If in 1980 there were no additional important forms of property 
ownership, in 2002 companies with foreign investment and public and pri-
vate enterprises represented 18 %, 19 % and 17 % of industrial output 
(Woetzel 2004).20 Despite this important decrease in the weight of SOEs 
and collectively owned and local enterprises, and given a more than 20 
fold increase in output, even these segments achieved significant growth in 
their industrial production. The achievements obtained through these re-
forms – particularly in terms of investment, exports, employment and the 
creation of “special zones”– provided support to the reformist sectors of 
                                                          
19  For an excellent study on the issue, in which a comparison is made with Mexico, see: 
Liu Sun (1997).  
20  For a detailed analysis of this process, see: Qian (2003, 311) and OECD (2002, 132).  
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the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), which continued with the process in 
industrial enterprises and SOEs and in the cities.  
In fourth place, up to 2004, the reforms were based on a “double price 
principle”. In centralized planning, initially most products, and particularly 
those from SOEs, were subject to established prices. The principle, how-
ever, allowed for prices on a growing percentage of products to be deter-
mined by market conditions.21 Based on the previously established 
schema, during the 1980s, the “double price principle” allowed important 
incentives to be generated to develop market segments with an export ori-
entation (Fureng 1986). This principle, which encouraged production be-
yond what was formulated in the respective plans, in addition to allowing 
reforms that helped gradually increase efficiency and productivity, was 
implemented in the liberalization of the agricultural and labor markets, 
among others.22 However, and as we will see further on, the principle as a 
“transitional institution” (Qian 2003) was losing ground since the mid-
1990s,23 as well as through the massive privatization of the rural township-
village enterprises and different constitutional amendments introduced in 
1998 that recognized an important role for the private sector in the economy. 
Indeed, plan objectives in industrial and agricultural production represented 
14.7 % and 16.6 % of total output and only 7.2 % of sales of consumer 
goods, directly compensating companies potentially registering losses.  
Fifth, the reform project in China sought to actively promote companies, 
markets, and employment in the non-agricultural sectors and particularly 
in industrial branches. The creation and active support for large companies 
or industrial groups, known as “national champions”, was considered one 
                                                          
21  Qian (2003, 307) emphasized that this gradual implementation of the reforms allowed 
for the creation of markets, while simultaneously maintaining the quantities and prices 
of goods specified in the plan. Thus, the creation of markets becomes an incentive with-
out negatively affecting and even temporarily protecting, the status quo.  
22 As Qian points out (2003), for certain industrial products, the increase corresponding to 
rural township-village enterprises can be significantly higher than that of the plan. 
Bowles and Dong (1999) emphasize that although in general the township-village en-
terprises are considered to be counterposed to the SOESs and private ownership, in fact 
they are collective property, with important effects on company organization, commit-
ments by the workforce, and with a greater impact on its efficiency.  
23 By the same token, the principle allowed for greater opportunities for corruption given 
the differences in the prices of products as determined by the plan and the market. This 
was one of the causes of the sociopolitical disturbances at the end of the 1980s in China.  
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of the crucial aspects of the reforms. Based on several decades of intense 
industrial development (Perkins 2001), since the 1980s, industrial policy 
granted preferential credits, established tariff and non-tariff benefits, in 
many cases under monopolistic conditions, and provided access to interna-
tional financial and secondary markets in the case of the SOEs (OECD 
2002). At the same time, in sectors such as iron and steel, transportation 
equipment, and, in general, in heavy industry and the chemical sector, the 
SOEs had a dominant presence. Companies with foreign investment were 
particularly present in export-oriented sectors, such as clothing, leather, 
electronics, and telecommunications equipment, among others.  
Sixth, during this whole period and up to 2004, it is critically important to 
understand that the public sector, the government and the Chinese Com-
munist Party continue to play a fundamental role in the country’s socio-
economic life and the “real structure of the state” (Anguiano 2004; Nolan 
2003), for example, in controlling the SOEs.24 The pragmatism of the 
CPC, particularly since the mid-1990s, has relegated the debate on the re-
lationship between socialism and the market and/or the deepening of a sui 
generis socialism to the sidelines, and has placed emphasis on China’s 
special characteristics through a “planned market economy” or “market 
socialism.” It should be pointed out that from a quantitative perspective, 
budgetary income as a percentage of GDP declined from levels of above 
30 % in the 1970s to 22.9 % in 1982 and to 17.9 % in 2002.25 Simultane-
ously with this process, a decentralization was underway involving the to-
tal budget and new functions of local governments (Nolan 2003, 31). The 
latter currently represent around 64 % of the total budget.26  
                                                          
24 For some authors (Qian 2003, 328) this it is reason why, as opposed to other sectors and 
aspects of the economy, the SOESs have not become “transitional institutions”, since 
the CPC’s control of such companies – including the appointment of their top manage-
ment –has not allowed for incentives to improve their efficiency.  
25 For some authors the government has several additional “quasi-fiscal” sources of reve-
nue, and particularly through bank deposits, which provide it with around 2 % of GDP 
annually. Despite pressures from international financial institutions, thus far the local 
governments have refused to abandon generalized anonymous bank deposits, which are 
one of the main ways of guaranteeing private property (Qian 2003, 318.). It was not un-
til April 2000 that it was decreed that all the new bank deposits required identification.  
26 The process of decentralization, however, goes well beyond a process of functions and 
budget transfers. As was previously noted, local governments currently own an impor-
tant part of the companies in China and until the mid-1990s this led to considerable un-
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Seventh, since the beginning of the 1980s, China has implemented an in-
teresting and complex system of taxes and incentives involving the central 
and local governments and that on a provincial and local level compete 
with each other. In general, the central government's main source of tax 
income was direct taxes or earnings from SOEs and duties levied on inter-
national trade, while the rest of the tax revenue was collected by provincial 
or local governments. Local tax revenue was divided according to pre-
established budgetary allocations and, in real terms, at the beginning of the 
1990s, the provinces retained 90 % of the income obtained, while 70 % of 
the provinces obtained net income from the central government. This 
“contractual fiscal system” (Qian 2003, 316) allowed the central govern-
ment to obtain tax revenue and, at the same time, created incentives so that 
local and provincial governments promoted their economies and generated 
their own new tax revenue, which they could increasingly retain for their 
own uses. Since 1994, however, the fiscal relationship between the gov-
ernments were formalized through the creation of different local and na-
tional fiscal divisions, in which the decision was made, for example, that 
the value added would be divided 3:1 among the national and local gov-
ernments. However, regional unevenness in collecting different taxes has 
been enormous (Fedelino / Singh 2004).  
Eighth, to date, the policies, challenges, and efforts on the part of the pri-
vate sector and the government – on its different levels and institutions – 
should be understood in the framework of long-term and five-year plans. 
Currently, for example, there is the Socioeconomic Development Program 
for 2020, in which the central government establishes general objectives 
and specific goals. These are important, since they allow us to understand 
the Program’s orientation, strategies and priorities in its specific fields.27 
Among the most important points are: a) quadrupling GDP during the 
2000–2020 period, which implies an annual GDP growth rate of 7.2 %. 
This would bring per capita GDP to between 4,000 and 5,000 dollars, 
                                                                                                                         
certainty and inefficiency in relation to private property guarantees. Ownership of com-
panies by local governments, by the same token, allowed for an increase in tax revenue 
and the “township-village enterprises are an example of how existing institutions can be 
modified to serve the new development objective” (Qian 2003, 313–314). Initial results 
(Sonobe / Otsuka 2003) indicate that this process of change in ownership generated very 
high increases in regional productivity. 
27 Also see: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/2387506.html, consulted in July 
2004.  
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b) increasing the percentage share of high-technology exports from 25.2 % 
to 45 % in 2020, c) boosting the workforce in non-agricultural areas from 
50 % to 60 %, d) reducing the disparities between individual income in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, from 1:2.8 in 2000 to 1:2.5 in 
2020 and, e) raising educational levels from 6.4 to 12.1 years of schooling, 
in addition to multiple objectives tied to the environment and the country’s 
socioeconomic panorama.  
Ninth, at the present time, the Chinese authorities – particularly the central 
government – have sought to simplify incentives and make them more 
transparent for companies, sectors and regions, eliminating a large part of 
the direct subsidies. The main differences and tax benefits, as well as the 
treatment FDI receives in China, are as follows:28 
1. Since 1994, China has had 25 types and eight categories of local and 
central government taxes. Among the main taxes are the value added 
tax (17 % in general and 13 % for certain products), those placed on 
company revenue (33 %), and individual income (5–45 %), consump-
tion (3–30 %), companies (3 %), as well as on different other items 
(cars, boats, the agricultural sector, and foreign trade). In several of 
these cases, there can be significant reductions, depending on the re-
gion where the respective activities take place and the type of activity. 
The central government is responsible for collecting tax revenue from 
the VAT, consumption taxes, and tariffs, while the local and provin-
cial authorities are in charge of the rest.  
2. There are currently 13 types of taxes on foreign investment. Among 
the main ones are: a) income tax (30 % general and 3 % local tax) and 
b) VAT. Nevertheless, the current normative framework encourages 
new foreign investment in regions and sectors with a long-term pro-
ductive horizon, using a series of policy instruments, such as: a) 
Companies that are established for operations over a more than 10 
year period do not have to pay taxes in the first two years in which 
they post earnings and until the fifth year they will only pay 50 % of 
                                                          
28 For a detailed analysis, see: Baker & McKenzie (2003); CCPIT (2004); MOFCOM 
(2004); WTO (2001a). 
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the required taxes,29 b) In the Special Economic Zones and Sectors,30 
In these cases, a variety of incentives are offered, depending on the 
sector and the specific area, including reductions in income tax of 
from 15–30 % after the fifth year of the company’s operations, ex-
emptions if the investments are for more than 15 years or if Chinese 
co-investments are involved or if the amount exceeds a specific quan-
tity. In order to encourage foreign companies with technological de-
velopment, the current normative framework allows that as long as the 
company continues developing technology after the tax exemptions 
granted during the first five years, it will continue benefiting from 
later exemptions and can even deduct one year of losses for the fol-
lowing five years, as well as customs duties and tariffs required for 
their activities and the VAT on domestically produced inputs. Several 
of these programs will be in effect up to 2010 and they explicitly offer 
the company involved the option of national treatment with develop-
ment and commercial banks in China.  
3. At the present time there is a broad framework for the participation of 
FDI in the economy. Such investment falls into in four categories: 
promoted, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. In accordance with 
the commitments established with the WTO, China will promote the 
establishment of foreign companies to reform traditional agriculture 
and its industrialization; in infrastructure and in sectors such as en-
ergy; in sectors and development centers that use cutting edge com-
puter technology and electronics (new materials and aerospace indus-
try); and in the establishment of companies that improve industries 
such as tool and die and the upgrading of the textile industry with ad-
vanced technology. Other priorities include the efficient use of natural 
                                                          
29 These tax benefits are only granted to foreign companies in 10 sectors, including agri-
culture, textile and industrial packers, machinery and electronics, energy, construction 
and scientific and technological development, among others (CCPIT 2004).  
30 The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were the result of policies launched in 1978 and 
viewed as a laboratory and experiment for the trade opening and benefits granted to the 
private sector and foreign companies. After several decisions to expand the program in 
1984, 1985, 1990, and 1992, currently there are three SEZs in the province of Guang-
dong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou), one in Fujian (Xiamen), another in Hainan, 14 
coastal cities, the Changjian and Zhujiang deltas, the Pudong area in Shangai and sev-
eral cities along the Changjiang River, 15 tariff-free zones, 32 economic and techno-
logical development zones, and 53 high tech industry development zones.  
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and renewable resources, projects in western China, and exports. All 
the sectors being supported will at least be exempt from the payment 
of tariffs on imported equipment.  
4. Although the SEZs no longer offer tariff benefits and import duties 
have been evenly applied throughout China with the country’s entry 
into the WTO, activities that are intensive in technology and knowl-
edge will benefit from the SEZs, with income tax reduced from 33 % 
to 15 %.  
5. One of the most noteworthy aspects in the change in economic poli-
cies is the modification in the system of duty draw-backs. The draw-
back rate was reduced from 15.11 % to 12.11 % since January 2004, 
for example. For the textile and garment sector, the rate declined by 
4 %, decreasing from 17.0 % percent to 13.0 %.31 It is to be expected, 
according to official sources, that the reduction in the rate will affect 
future export performance.  
Despite the advances achieved in the People’s Republic of China, it is 
equally important to point out the different socioeconomic challenges that 
could arise in the short, medium, and long terms:  
First. Although absolute poverty has experienced an important decline, 
there has also been a significant increase in inequity, and particularly of 
the rural regions with regard to the urban centers and within the cities, as 
had been analyzed in the case of the 1980s (Knight / Song 1993).32 From 
1997–2002 per capita income in the country’s urban areas increased by 
57.6 %, while in the countryside the growth was only 15.2 % (Pitsilis et. 
al. 2004). The urban inequality and gini coefficients increased substan-
tially from 1992–2001 (Fedelino / Singh 2004; Nolan 2003, 16; The Eco-
nomist 2004). 
                                                          
31 http://www1.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsid=201140001836, con-
sulted in July 2004.  
32 The OECD (2002, 546) points out that during the 1980-1999 period, real wages in 
SOESs have remained at levels similar to urban salaries, although rural wages and those 
paid by urban collective enterprises were more than 30 % below urban wages in 1999. 
The study emphasizes that salaries paid in urban private activities are more than 20 % 
higher than urban wages.  
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Second, in the past two decades, Chinese society has experienced massive 
internal population movements from the countryside to urban areas and 
from agriculture to industry and services. In addition, the economically ac-
tive population is expected to grow between 10 and 13 million people an-
nually through 2010 and it is believed that in the short term massive 
movements in the workforce will continue from the agricultural sector to 
the rest of the economy (Mengkui / Zhongyuan 2003). The OECD (2002, 
13) emphasizes in this context that although the non-agricultural sectors 
have significantly increased their percentage share in GDP, their ability to  
 
Chart 6: China: duty draw-back of exported products (1985–2002) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Department of Statistics of China and General 
Customs of China. 
absorb the workforce has been very much below this level. The low use of 
installed capacity and a great number of companies in sectors such as the 
auto and auto parts industries, among others, lead to predictions of massive 
layoffs. It is to be expected that these trends will persist in the short and me-
dium term and that both the urban areas as well as industry will continue to 
generate jobs. As will be analyzed in the following section, these trends 
could worsen with the effects of the agreements with the WTO in the agri-
cultural and services sectors and given the complex situation of the SOEs. 
Although the government in its divisions has sought to coordinate and regu-
late the labor migration – Guangdong province along reported 5.3 million 
Duty draw-back Duty draw-back Exports Duty draw-back / exports 
(thousand of millions of yuans) (billions of $US) (billions of $US) (percentage)
 
1985 1.97 0.67 27.35 2.45
1986 4.4 1.27 30.94 4.12
1987 7.67 2.06 39.44 5.22
1988 11.3 3.04 47.52 6.39
1989 15.3 4.06 52.54 7.73
1990 18.5 3.87 62.09 6.23
1991 25.44 4.78 71.84 6.65
1992 28.5 5.17 84.94 6.08
1993 30.1 5.22 91.74 5.69
1994 45 5.22 121.01 4.31
1995 54.92 6.58 148.77 4.42
1996 82.6 9.93 151.05 6.58
1997 43.25 5.22 182.79 2.85
1998 43.7 5.28 183.71 2.87
1999 62.77 7.58 194.93 3.89
2000 81.04 9.79 249.2 3.93
2001 107.15 12.95 266.16 4.86
2002 125.92 15.21 325.6 4.67
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workers from other provinces in 2002 (Lüthje 2004) – the logistics of these 
processes are complex and social and politically problematic.  
Third, an important consensus exists that the reforms to the SOEs can gen-
erate enormous economic and sociopolitical difficulties.33 The number of 
companies operating in China is enormous. In the mid-1990s there were 
estimated to be almost 8.0 million industrial companies, 113,800 SOEs, 
and practically 1.60 million collective enterprises, among others (Perkins 
2001, 255). This dispersion and the size of the companies themselves also 
make it difficult to promote and implement industrial policies. In 2003, the 
SOEs represented around 30 % of GDP of the total 159,000 SOEs, the re-
forms were particularly oriented to the 2,696 largest such companies – and 
they are being attended to by commissions of the central, provincial and 
local governments through specific control and monitoring efforts.34 Con-
trary to the agricultural, industrial, and non-state services sectors, the 
SOEs have encountered different problems for their reform, particularly in 
the rigid control of the CPC (Qian 2003). Nevertheless, from 1996–2001, 
between 30 million and 48 million jobs were lost in the SOEs (Nolan 
2003, 14). At present, the SOEs represent around 25 % of industrial pro-
duction and are centered on activities such as services and the retail trade, 
                                                          
33 It is important not to resort to a simplistic approach with regard to the SOESs. That is, 
there are cases of successful reforms – as analyzed by Nolan / Yeung (2001) in Shou-
gang in steel and Saniu in pharmaceuticals – of SOESs that continue to experience a 
high degree of interference by the CPC and at the same time, are characterized by inno-
vations and adaptations in new forms of organization and technologies. Other analyses 
(Jefferson / Rawski 1999) conclude that the SOESs have undertaken a thoroughgoing 
restructuring at the end of the 1990s and with important advances in increased produc-
tivity and efficiency. While authors such as Sachs / Woo (1994) have an extreme vision 
of inefficiency and even the inability to reform these companies, Lo (1999) points out 
that the performance of the SOESs – and the fall in their percentage share of industrial 
output from 78 % to 47 % during the 1978–1993 period – has been much better than 
generally known and studied. In comparison with the collective enterprises and private 
companies, in many cases, the large SOESs have been able to increase their efficiency 
and take advantage of economies of scale, while the smaller-size SOESs have been the 
main losers (Mako / Zhang 2002; Nolan 1996). A brief analysis on the question in 2004 
(Orr 2004) indicates that the situation of the SOESs, which represent 17 % of GDP, is 
better than is generally accepted and that an important sector of these companies has 
been able to post significant earnings.  
34 See: http://www.drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=198337, 
consulted in July 2004.  
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transportation, communications, and banking. Although their presence has 
diminished during the past 20 years, they continue to be the backbone of 
the Chinese economy from multiple vantage points. The general situation 
of the SOEs is partially responsible for the weakness of the financial sec-
tor.35 Since 1999, the government has sought to reform the SOEs – of the 
non-financial companies around 60 % are owned by the central govern-
ment, the rest correspond to provincial and local governments – on three 
levels: a) a reduction in their activities, b) a diversification in SOEs own-
ership, whereby the state will only maintain 100 % ownership in some of 
the 500 to 1,000 large industrial groups and, c) the creation of the State 
Asset Management Corporation to absorb the debt of the four large state 
banks (Fan / Zhang 2003; Guonan / Fung 2002; Qian 2003). Finally, a sec-
tor of the SOEs, and this is particularly the case in the textile industry, has 
substantially increased the subsidies received by the central government, 
from 1.61 % of total central government subsidies in 1990 to 20.57 % in 
2000 (see chart 7). Local and provincial governments provide between 
20 % and 25 % of the subsidies to the SOEs, in 2000, the figure was 
22.4 %. Beijing and Shanghai pay out more than 42 % of these resources 
(WTO 2001a, 72).  
Chart 7: China: subsidies by sector to State-owned Enterprises (1990–1998) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on WTO (2001a, 68). 
                                                          
35 Lo (1999) indicates that central government subsidies to the SOESs have diminished 
from levels above 11 % of GDP in the 1980s to 3.2 % in 1994.  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Metallurgic industry 0.98 1.01 0.87 2.99 4.16 6.46 8.81 11.41 11.19
Ferrous-metal industry 0.53 0.59 0.83 1.44 5.92 12.53 8.36 6.87 6.23
Machinery industry 3.22 3.50 9.47 3.81 14.39 17.84 16.91 11.67 11.22
Coal industry 47.33 46.10 45.45 47.64 48.19 25.94 23.09 17.58 19.88
Oil industry 36.04 37.57 34.27 26.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.08 4.39
Chemical industry 3.25 2.79 2.40 3.93 7.05 7.42 7.45 5.56 6.64
Textile industry 1.61 1.65 1.34 2.96 2.71 7.23 12.19 17.14 20.57
Light industry 5.64 5.45 4.09 8.90 4.07 3.25 4.60 7.12 3.15
Tobacco industry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.25 18.43 16.19 10.71 11.82
Total of the nine sectors 98.60 98.66 98.71 98.54 98.73 99.10 97.76 95.17 95.09
Other sectors 1.40 1.34 1.29 1.46 1.27 0.90 2.24 4.83 4.91
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Fourth. A diverse and extensive debate is currently taking place in relation 
to territorial participation in the growth of the Chinese economy (Maddi-
son 1998b). Most of the authors agree that a polarization process emerged 
since the beginning of the 1990s, in which even during the period of high 
growth from 1985–1996, poverty increased in eight of the country’s 29 
provinces (González García 2001, 192 ff.; Nolan 2003, 13).36 The export 
orientation of the productive apparatus has deepened this process of terri-
torial polarization (Perkins 1999). This process could be exacerbated with 
the commitment to liberalize services acquired with the WTO (Mattoo 
2002). Without ignoring the disparities between the inland/western and 
coastal/eastern regions, some authors point out that since the 1970s and 
until the mid-1990s, all of the PRC’s provinces posted important growth in 
GDP (Qian 2003, 300). Job creation and the unemployment rate, mean-
while, reflect important differences since the 1990s, particularly between 
both the north – which includes Beijing – and the east – which includes 
Shanghai –, with the northwest (Brooks / Tao 2003; Zheng / Hu 2004).  
Fifth, if not the main point cited by numerous analysts, is the growing en-
vironmental degradation generated by both urbanization as well as indus-
trialization. A major factor is the continued use of coal as the main source 
of energy, with levels of efficiency below those of the industrialized coun-
tries in 1950 (Nolan 2003, 27 ff.; OECD 2002). This environmental degra-
dation not only diminishes fertile land for agriculture, but has also in-
creased all types of pollution. Chart 2 illustrates how from 1979–2002, the 
energy use per GDP unit is high if compared internationally, although with 
a falling tendency since the 1980s.  
Sixth. As a result, since the mid-1990s, China has become the nation with 
the greatest growth in demand for raw materials, from food to iron and 
steel, oil and gas, among many others (Newsweek 2004).37 Given the high 
and growing costs of raw materials and energy resources, international 
                                                          
36 The issue of the significant reduction in poverty in absolute terms, although inequality 
might increase, requires more analysis on a provincial level, since to date, discrepancies 
exist between these trends and national tendencies as recently documented by the World 
Bank (2004e).  
37 In 2004, China is expected to account for 7 % of world consumption of oil and 30 % of 
iron, with a high growth rate since the 1990s. It currently produces around 20 % of 
world steel and its consumption is higher than its output.  
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limitations on demand for such products could restrict this type of produc-
tive and commercial specialization.  
Seventh. Different sources and analysts agree that China currently faces 
important challenges in the financial sector and development banking, is-
sues linked with the already discussed question of the SOEs. Despite this 
consensus, different appreciations exist as to the depth of the problem. 
Some authors (Kang / Jones 2004; The Economist 2004) indicate that the 
situation is similar to that of East Asia before the 1997–1998 crisis and is 
the result of the overregulation of financial flows and capital markets, 
among others. China’s non-performing credits are estimated at between 
44 % and 68 % of GDP. Although the government injected 45 billion dol-
lars in the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank, it is estimated 
that the non-performing credit portfolio of the major banks involves an 
additional 300 billion dollars (Barnett 2004; Pitsilis et al. 2004). Another 
group of authors, however, feels that the conditions of the financial sector 
are manageable, especially as economic growth trends continue during the 
next few decades.38  
2.3 Trade structure 
For the 1990–2002 period, 12.4 % and 13.1 % of the increase in global 
imports and exports corresponded to China. In this context, what are the 
main characteristics of China’s international trade – on an aggregate level 
and in terms of the two digits of the Harmonized Tariff System according 
to its main commercial partners and the countries considered in the study – 
as well as Beijing’s advantages and commitments concomitant with its en-
tering the WTO?39  
                                                          
38 OECD (2000, 80) indicates a high degree of concentration of public, development, and 
commercial bank assets. In 1998 the SOESs concentrated between 75 % and 80 %, 
while less than 10 % of credit was earmarked for non-state run companies. The future of 
the banking sector, from this perspective, depends significantly on the SOESs and the 
reduction in non-performing credits, although not much detailed financial information 
for each company is available (Stallings 2003). Fan / Zhang (2003, 15), for example, 
point out that non-performing credits of the four main state banks decreased substan-
tially in 2002 to 26.1 % of their portfolio. Also see: Orr (2004).  
39 The trade data was obtained by the UNCTAD for the 1992–2002 period (see Statistical 
Appendix 2). While there are other sources with longer time-series, the UNCTAD data 
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China’s foreign trade reflects the high degree of commercial integration 
with Asia, and particularly with a first circle of countries such as Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong40 and, as a second circle, with Sin-
gapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, which in 2002 represented 
41.86 % and 7.22 % of Beijing’s total trade, respectively. Although the 
percentage share represented by this group of countries has diminished 
slightly since 1992, particularly due to the substantial fall in imports from 
Hong Kong –which, in fact, can be attributed to the specificities of their 
registration, in addition to the former British colony being the intermedi-
ary for around 22 % of China’s trade (Rumbaugh / Blancher 2004) – in 
addition, of particular importance is the significant weight of Beijing’s ex-
ports to the United States, which represented 25.55 % of the increase in 
overseas sales from 1992–2002. The Latin American countries considered 
in the statistics represented less than 2 % of Chinese imports and 1.5 % of 
its exports in 2002, although they were quite dynamic during the period. 
Special note should be made of the performance of Brazil and Argentina’s 
exports, and to a lesser extent those of Mexico, and the minimum amount 
of trade with each of the Central American countries.41  
Most of China’s important trade surplus corresponds to the United States, 
the European Union, and the Latin American countries considered in the 
statistics, particularly Mexico. At the same time, Beijing’s trade balance 
with the first and second circles of Asian countries is negative, and par-
ticularly so with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, with which it has accu-
mulated a high deficit. On the other side of the ledger, the accumulated 
trade surplus from 1992–2002 with the United States alone represented 
                                                                                                                         
was selected because it is the only one that includes disaggregated data at the six level 
digit of the Harmonized Tariff System for 1996–2002. It is important to point out that 
this section will exclusively use trade registered by China as a source, while in the fol-
lowing sections of this study, data from other sources will be included. As will be seen, 
the differences in the information can be very considerable.  
40 In part because it has different tariff treatment and import duty payments than China, 
Hong Kong has historically been Beijing’s main intermediary in international trade and 
particularly for Chinese exports. Indeed, 53 % of Chinese exports was re-exported from 
Hong Kong from 1988-1998 (Hanson / Feenstra 2001).  
41 The Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2004b) has 
conducted an initial valuable analysis of the bilateral trade relations between Latin 
America and the Caribbean and China, highlighting the growing exports from the erco-
sur – particularly Argentina and Brazil – and Chile of agricultural products.  
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89.27 % of the total surplus during the period (see graph 3 and Statistical 
Appendix 2).  
The itemized structure of Chinese foreign trade (see chart 8) reflects a 
relatively high and growing degree of concentration. The five main items 
represent 50.40 % and 59.48 % of exports and imports in 2002, respec-
tively. Several points should be emphasized (see Statistical Appendix 2): 
Graph 3: China: contribution to growth of imports and exports by selected 
countries (1992–2002) (percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Chart 3 of Statistical Annex 2. 
1. Exports using more intensive labor – clothing, shoes, and toys – have 
increased their absolute value, but with much less dynamism than 
Chinese overseas sales as a whole. The percentage share of total ex-
ports represented by the first three categories of products (see chart 8; 
Yin 2003) fell from 18.65 % in 1996 to 14.79 % in 2002 or almost 
48.17 billion dollars. Meanwhile, the export performance of electron-
ics (category 85) and auto parts (category 84) has been spectacular in 
absolute and relative terms. In 2002, these items generated 35.60 % of 
all overseas sales or 115.92 billion dollars.  
2. In the case of imports, the itemized structure on the level of product 
categories reflects, on the one hand, high purchases of electronic 
products and auto parts, which have increased their percentage share 
from 35.31 % in 1996 to 42.48 % in 2002. On the other hand, the raw 
materials – oil and plastics, among others – represented more than 
12 % of total imports in 2002.  
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3. China’s commercial structure is experiencing an important transition. 
Products that use intensive labor continue to have a dominant weight, 
and they currently allow the country to generate a trade surplus. Of 
the five main product categories based on trade surplus, all use 
intensive labor – although export strength is greater in electronic items 
and auto parts. 
4. There are a significant number of product categories with a much 
greater dynamic than the average annual growth rate for total imports, 
and even above the main items indicated above. It is in these items 
where the Latin American countries seemed to have a significant po-
tential for exporting to China in the short term. The main product 
categories here would be foods, beverages, and raw materials (see 
graph 4).42 
Graph 4: China: most dynamic imports (1996–2002) (average annual 
growth rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on WITS (2004). 
                                                          
42 This question will be analyzed in further detail –in accordance with the 6 digits of the 
Harmonized System and by country – in the following phase of the study and based on 
the appended statistical information and the company interviews  
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5. As can be seen in the charts in Statistical Appendix 2, at the present 
time, a significant part of Chinese exports are shipped via Hong Kong, 
and particularly electronic products and auto parts. In 2002, such ex-
ports generated a trade surplus of more than 20 billion dollars. At the 
same time, imports of items in these product categories were mini-
mum. In the case of the United States, the main recipient of Chinese 
exports, the changes are also reflected in the total export structure, 
with a gradual but major decrease in exports using intensive labor – 
particularly yarn-textile-garment, toys and footwear, among others – 
and considerable strength in sales of auto parts and electronics, which 
represented 37.47 % of exports to the United States in 2002. More 
than 35 % of China’s growing trade surplus with the United States, 
which was almost 42.79 billion dollars in 2002, can be attributed to 
these two product categories, while toys, furniture, clothing, and 
leather, among others, generate most of the current surplus.  
6. At the same time, Chinese trade with Asian countries and particularly 
Japan and Taiwan has very different characteristics. In the case of 
Taiwan, for example, China posts a high and growing trade deficit 
that reached almost 31.48 billion dollars, corresponding to exports and 
imports for 6.59 billion and 38.06 billion dollars in 2002, respectively. 
Just three product categories – electronics, auto parts, and optical in-
struments – accounted for 54.15 % of Chinese imports from Taiwan.  
2.4 China’s entry into the WTO: benefits and commitments  
After several years of arduous negotiations, on January 1, 2002, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China joined the WTO. In contrast to the membership of 
other socialist countries, China’s joining the WTO, due to its size and im-
plications, was not only a longer process, but in addition to the accession 
protocol, Beijing’s membership required bilateral negotiations with 37 
countries before it entered the international financial institution (Rodríguez 
y Rodríguez 2003; SE 2002). The Accession Protocol (WTO 2001a/b/c) of 
November 23, 2001 and China’s signing the agreement on December 11, 
2001, established detailed benefits and commitments. For China, the im-
mediate benefit is access to markets and permanently obtaining most-
favored-nation status and thereby not having to depend on annual reviews 
to have access to markets, such as with the United States (Wang 1992). 
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Along the same lines, future trade conflicts will be resolved multilaterally 
within the WTO. Finally, China’s joining the WTO can also be understood 
as an integral part of a long-term strategy, which was initiated several dec-
ades previously, in which Beijing seeks to substantially increase its pres-
ence and regional and global power (Businessweek 2002b; Medeiros / 
Fravel 2004; Moore 2004; Rosen 1999).  
Among the most important of China’s commitments are:  
1. Not to discriminate against foreign investments, granting national and 
most-favored-nation treatment to investments.  
2. Immediate implementation of the Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provi-
sions.  
3. Most tariffs will be eliminated or reduced in 2004, with import quotas 
following suit in 2005. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods 
will be cut 9 % and 15 % on average, respectively.  
4. With some exceptions – 134 products subject to state control (WTO 
2001a, Annex 2A2) – export taxes will be eliminated. In the case of 
imports, those subject to state control involve 84 products in the eight 
digit HS, including items such as wheat, raw and vegetable oil, as 
well as chemical fertilizers, and cotton.  
5. By 2005, China will eliminate a series of non-tariff measures, includ-
ing licenses, quotas and requirements, and limitations on participation 
in import bidding processes.  
6. Beijing will immediately restrict subsidies to the productive sector, 
particularly for agricultural products, to a maximum 8.5 % of the 
value of the output, as well as subsidies for agricultural exports.  
7. Elimination of quotas and requirements based on company perform-
ance, including requirements on the level of trade balance, national 
content, technology transfer, and R&D results. 
8. In 2005, all companies operating in China will be entitled to engage 
in trade, except for activities reserved for the state.  
9. The purchase and sale of services will undergo major changes, with 
foreign investment to be allowed in sectors such as financial services 
Economic Opportunities and Challenges posed by China for Mexico and Central America 
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and banking, insurance, legal and professional services, telecommu-
nications, and tourism.  
10. Despite Beijing’s entry into the WTO, several countries reserve the 
right to maintain their tariff restrictions on different Chinese products. 
The respective countries and groups of nations – Argentina, the 
European Community, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Repub-
lic, and Turkey – are mainly referring to textiles and clothing (WTO 
2001a, Annex 7). Mexico will maintain antidumping measures on 
imports coming from China – duties that in some cases are higher 
than 1,000 % – for six years, that is, up until December 31, 2007, and 
does not have to subordinate such policies to WTO dispositions.43  
11. Other WTO member countries will be able to employ antidumping 
measures for 15 years, based on the consideration of China as a non-
market economy, which allows them not to use domestic prices as a 
reference point and thus use a more lax standard in their investiga-
tions.  
12. China will eliminate price control mechanisms,44 with some excep-
tions (several hundred products, including tobacco, pharmaceuticals, 
and cereals) (WTO 2001c, Appendix 4).  
13. These commitments and their progress will be monitored by the 
WTO Transitory Safeguard Mechanism.  
Since then and until mid-2004, a series of issues in relation to China’s en-
try into the WTO have been examined (Cass / Williams / Barker 2003; 
USDC 2003; USGAO 2003; USITO 2003; Yang 2003):  
1. China will face its main challenges in the services sector (Mattoo 
2002; OECD 2002; Rumbaugh / Blancher 2004; USITC 1999) and in 
agriculture as a result of the new conditions for obtaining foreign in-
                                                          
43 Until 2002, Mexico imposed compensatory quotas on 1,310 Chinese products, particu-
larly in the yarn-textile-garment chain, although also on other items such as bicycles, 
footwear, cigarette lighters, toys, and pencils (SE 2002, 9).  
44 “China will allow market forces to determine the price of goods and services, in any 
sector, that are traded internationally, and will eliminate the practice of charging multi-
ple prices for such goods and services.” (WTO 2001c, 7) 
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vestment. At present, there are no quantitative estimates in this re-
gard.45  
2. Contrary to the rest of the countries that have joined the WTO, China 
did so without having brought a large part of its laws and internal 
norms and standards into line with those of the WTO, although it has 
undertaken important efforts in this regard since then.  
3. It is expected that the tariff reductions, which had already begun to be 
applied in the 1990s, will be further extended and the process of re-
placing quotas for tariffs will continue, particularly in agriculture.46  
4. Foreign companies will now have a clear legal framework that more-
over guarantees their interests.  
5. Since the 1990s, but increasingly with Beijing’s entry into the WTO, 
the Chinese central government launched a “quasi-privatization” 
process involving the activities of its ministries, through which func-
tionaries have apparently become businessmen and managers of 
companies and “quasi-state” institutions, although officials have not 
necessarily allowed the emergence of new companies nor increased 
the level of domestic competition (Brooks / Tao 2003; Gilboy 2004).  
6. Since 2002, relatively few disputes have arisen. Although still not 
formally presented before the WTO, the main disputes have involved 
a differentiated tax treatment between imported and domestic prod-
ucts. All have to pay a 17 % VAT, which can be reimbursed accord-
ing to criteria analyzed in chapter 2.2. However, and as will be dis-
cussed in the following chapter, imported microcircuits and semicon-
ductors do not have the possibility of a rebate and it is felt that they 
do not receive “national treatment” (USITO 2003, 12).  
7. Since China joined the WTO, institutions such as USITO (2003) and 
USTR (2004b) have emphasized that different standards – in the 
                                                          
45 Martin / Bhattasali (2004), for example, point to serious problems in the information, as 
well as enormous differences between the real tariffs and what was negotiated in the 
WTO.  
46 In 1982, the average weighted tariff was 55.6 %, which fell to 42.9 % and 12.7 % in 
1992 and 2002, respectively (Yang 2003). For the same period, the average tariff was 
reduced from 42.9 % to 12.3 % and will diminish to levels below 10 % in 2005 (Ian-
chovichina / Martin 2003; Rumbaugh / Blancher 2004).  
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technical field and particularly related to telecommunications – have 
been proposed by local governments. According to these institutions, 
the objective is to achieve the same industrial protectionism that pre-
viously prevailed (USITO 2003, 13).47  
8. With Beijing’s entry into the WTO, China was formally included in 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, whose fourth and final 
phase of quota liberalization concluded at the beginning of 2005 
(Dussel Peters 2004). Based on the transitory safeguard measures for 
a 15 year period and the unilateral measures that a group of countries 
can adopt up to December 31, 2007, the increase in Chinese exports 
under this agreement could be gradual. These strict and sectoralized 
temporary commitments are singular in the history of countries’ join-
ing the WTO.48  
9. In terms of electronics and information technologies, China became 
member of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) upon join-
ing the WTO. In addition to a significant tariff reduction on these 
products – import duties on which were on average 13 % in 2003 and 
will be eliminated for 2/3 of the products in the field – China agreed 
to liberalize the trade and distribution of services for electronic and 
high-technology products in three years. It should be recalled that up 
to 2002, these services were restricted to authorized companies.  
10. Finally, although not least in importance, uncertainty exists with re-
gard to the implementation of China’s commitments to eliminate quo-
tas, comply with the TRIPs, remove non-tariff barriers, government 
                                                          
47 In the case of electronics, for example, the development of new standards for cellular 
telephones, DVDs, and logistical administration systems, the motivation could be to free 
up the cost of the patent.  
48 In the safeguard process, when the request for consultations was received, China must 
maintain the shipment of textiles or textile products belonging to the product categories 
that are subject to the consultations at a level not higher than 7.5 % (6.0 % for the wool 
products category) of the amount shipped during the first 12 months of the past 14 
months before the consultation request was filed. If a satisfactory agreement between 
the parties involved is not arrived at during 90 days of consultations, the consultations 
can continue and the member country filing for the consultations can maintain the im-
port limits.  
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purchases, among others (ATMI 2001a/b; Businessweek 2002a; Pear-
son 2003; USGAO 2003, 2004a; USTR 2004a). 49 
Estimates – based on different methodologies and models – point to the 
main effects on China of its entering the WTO, among the most important 
of which are:  
1. The high growth in domestic demand and the country’s imports in the 
past few decades, as has been previously commented, is a question of 
growing interest on the part of transnational companies of goods and 
services. China’s concessions in these fields, and particularly in ser-
vices and agriculture, will increase the flows of FDI (Yang 2003).  
2. China’s entry into the WTO will deepen regional integration in Asia, 
as well as intra-industry trade and the patterns examined in the previ-
ous subchapter. The Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member states and south Asian countries will continue increasing 
their exports of raw materials in different stages of the production or 
manufacturing process, as well as parts and components to be manu-
factured and exported by China (Rumbaugh / Blancher 2004; Yang 
2003).  
3. In general, and considering that China has already substantially re-
duced its tariffs during the 1990s, the effects on income and the in-
crease in international trade are positive, and in some cases result in a 
growth in GDP of up to 5.8 % (François / Spinanger 2002). Rum-
baugh / Blancher (2004, 13).50 However, it should be pointed out that 
these effects can be underestimated, since the corresponding elasticity 
of trade does not incorporate significant structural changes, as could 
occur in the case of services. There are nevertheless important areas 
of agreement that clothing will be the main sector benefited by 
China’s joining the WTO, while negative effects are expected in agri-
culture and particularly in food, beverages, and tobacco. In the case of 
                                                          
49 The U.S. government reports that China has not sent information to the WTO Transitory 
Safeguard Mechanism on prices and subsidies (USTR 2004b, iii) and that it will in-
crease pressure to achieve an effective monitoring of Beijing’s commitments.  
50 In this case, of all the countries considered in the overall model, only two nations would 
have their GDP negatively affected: Taiwan (-0.34 %) and Mexico (-2.8 %). The case of 
Mexico is of importance, due to the greater negative effects, as a result of both the 
elimination of the ATC as well as the liberalization of services.  
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textiles, important increases in imports and domestic production are 
expected due to their use as inputs for the growth of clothing exports. 
With electronics, very few positive changes are expected in terms of 
GDP and employment (Ianchovichina / Martin 2003; Martin / Bhatta-
sali 2004, 50).  
4. Few of these estimates offer a detailed analysis of the possible direct 
effects of these changes and their impact on a sectoral level in other 
markets in Latin American countries. But those undertaking this 
analysis agree that the effects for China will be particularly important, 
and positive in terms of GDP, employment, and exports, in labor inten-
sive products such as textiles and clothing, leather and footwear and 
toys, among others (Ianchovichina / Martin 2003; OECD 2002, 142).51 In 
most of these models, the conclusion is reached that Mexico will be the 
main loser in terms of GDP and exports, while China will be the benefi-
ciary in the yarn-textile-garment chain and in electronics (Francois / 
Spinanger 2002). According to the most recent estimates, China could 
increase its U.S. market share from 16 % to 50 % with the elimination 
of quotas, while Mexico’s percentage participation would fall from 
10 % to 3 % and for the rest of Latin America the decline would be 
from 16 % to 5 %, with Central America and the Dominican Republic 
being particularly affected (Kyvic 2004).  
2.5 The U.S. market: complementary exports or compe-
titors? 
Based on the statistical information obtained by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, what are the characteristics of Central American, Chinese, and 
Mexican exports to the United States under the two digits of the Harmo-
                                                          
51 Hilaire / Yang (2003), based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model de-
veloped by the IMF, for example, feel that the CAFTA could have a positive effect on 
boosting regional GDP by 1.5 %, particularly due to the increase in clothing exports to 
the United States. However, in considering the liberalization of quotas in 2005, the posi-
tive effect diminishes substantially, since, they argue, exports would only increase by 
half of what is projected. In the same line of argumentation, Yang (2003) estimates that 
Latin America will be the main loser in the garment category with China’s entry into the 
WTO, calculating a -32.2 % loss in its exports through 2006. None of these models con-
siders Central America. 
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nized System? The following chapter will offer a detailed analysis of trade 
involving the yarn-textile-garment and electronics/PCs chains.  
Statistical Appendix 2 provides details on the trade and particularly import 
structure of the United States at two and 10 digits for the 1990–2003 pe-
riod. Among the main two-digit points are:  
1. With an average annual growth rate of 7.5 % for the period, U.S. im-
ports have undergone significant changes. The main exporters to the 
United States at the beginning of the 1990s – Canada, Japan, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Taiwan and France –
experienced a fall in market share from 1990–2003.  
2. Of the countries examined in the study, all posted average annual 
growth rates above the average for U.S. imports and have displaced 
nations such as Japan and the European Union during this period. 
Average annual growth in exports to the United States from Central 
America, China and Mexico was 13.0 %, 12.6 %, and 19.4 % for 
1990–2003, respectively. If in 1990, Mexico, China and Central 
America were in third, 12th, and 32nd place in terms of U.S. imports, 
in 2003 their ranking was 3, 2, and 25. That is, Mexico maintained its 
status, while exports from China and Central America to the U.S. 
market increased substantially. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
in 2003 practically all the countries saw their share of U.S. imports 
decline, including Central American nations and particularly Mexico, 
while China’s share increased from 10.81 % to 12.13 % (see chart 9).  
3. Production sharing processes – which allow for tariffs to only be 
placed on value added and not on U.S. produced parts and compo-
nents – have played an important role for certain countries –
particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean – and sectors in the 
United States (see charts in Appendix 2). While China benefited 
minimally from this tariff treatment, Mexico was the main benefici-
ary, followed by Central America and Caribbean countries. It should 
be noted, first of all, that production sharing processes have lost 
ground within U.S. total imports, falling from 8.23 % in 1990 to 
3.92 % in 2003. Another factor in the decline was the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other treaties with Central 
America and the Caribbean that grant greater tariff benefits to their 
exports (Dussel Peters 2004). Secondly, production sharing processes  
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took on a greater importance – and continue to do so in some cases – 
considering that in 1990, 40.44 % of Mexican exports and 46.91 % of 
Honduran external sales, for example, entered the United States 
through this program, although the respective figures fell to 5.02 % 
and 0.49 % in 2003. Thirdly, production sharing programs gave pref-
erence to processes with high U.S. value added, and this is particu-
larly the case with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The U.S. 
content of Latin American and Caribbean exports was, in most of the 
cases during the period, above 50 %, in some even higher than 80 %, 
while for China the corresponding figure was never greater than 20 % 
(see Statistical Appendix 2). Fourthly, most of the imports under pro-
duction sharing programs involved the yarn-textile-garment sector, 
and to a much lesser extent, in electronics.  
Chart 9: United States: total imports by selected countries (1990–2003) 
(percentage according to share in 2003) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 2. 
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Central America, China and Mexico’s export performance leads to the 
conclusion, at least initially, that they have all benefitted from growing 
U.S. imports from 1990–2003, although the strength of China’s sales have 
been very much greater than those of Central America and Mexico. 
Furthermore, China has displaced Mexico and has become the second 
larger exporter to the U.S. market since 2002.  
Based on the previous considerations, what does the U.S. import structure 
in the two digits of the Harmonized System from 1990–2003 tell us, both 
in terms of the value of its imports as well as the tariffs really paid on such 
purchases? The charts in Statistical Appendix 2 indicate that the five main 
product categories for U.S. imports – autos,52 auto parts, electronics, oil, 
and optical instruments and apparatus – together represented 55.53 % of 
total imports in 1990–2003. At the same time, although the really paid tar-
iff rate for exporting to the United States is relatively low and had tended 
to diminish – from 3.29 % in 1990 to 1.58 % in 2003 – major disparities 
exist on the level of product categories. Indeed, in 2003, garment paid tar-
iff rates above 11 %, while electronics were charged 0.70 % (see chart 10).  
Chart 11 contains the data to examine the issue of potential sources of con-
flict between Central American and Mexican exports and Chinese sales to 
the U.S. market. Based on the 10 main export product categories of Cen-
tral America and Mexico in 2003, several points stand out in this regard:  
1. In 2003, these 10 main export product categories represented 88.15 % 
of Central America’s exports and 83.77 % of Mexico’s foreign sales, 
while these same product categories only represented 30.29 % and 
52.27 % for China, respectively. This is important, since these initial 
results reflect a greater potential for conflict with Mexico and a 
greater prospect for a complementary relationship with Central 
America. 52.27 % for China, respectively. This is important, since 
these initial results reflect a greater potential for conflict with Mexico 
and a greater prospect for a complementary relationship with Central 
America. 
                                                          
52 The Wall Street Journal (Wonacott / White / Shirouzu 2004) emphasize that auto com-
panies such as GM and VW, among others, decided in 2004 to undertake substantial in-
vestments for more than 3.00 billion and 7.00 billion dollars, respectively, while Gen-
eral Motors expects that China, currently the world’s third largest auto producer for the 
company, will move into first place in 2025.  
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1. In the case of Central America, in 2003, its clothing exports (product 
categories 61 and 62) to the United States represented almost 60 % of 
its total overseas sales, which contrasts with less than 30 % in 1990. 
For these items, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter, Central America, China, and Mexico compete directly. In 
chapter 61 of the Harmonized Tariff System (clothing, knitted or cro-
cheted), for example, in 2003, Central America exports represented 
15.94 % of U.S. imports for such items, with the corresponding fig-
ures for Chinese and Mexican sales being 10.76 % and 9.85 %. More 
specifically, Mexican exports seemed to have lost strength since 2000, 
although the competition among the three countries/regions is signifi-
cant. While, for product category 61, Mexican exports pay a 0.73 % 
tariff, Central American and Chinese products are charged 5.97 % and 
11.27 %, respectively. In other product categories, such as number 
85 – electronics – during the period in question, Central America’s 
share of total U.S. exports increased more than five fold from 1990–
2003, although it is 30 times less than China’s percentage share. As 
opposed to these product categories, it is in others such as fresh fruit, 
coffee, fish, and shell fish, fossil fuels and sugars (product categories 
8, 9, 3, 27, and 17) in which the Central America presence in the U.S. 
market is important and does not significantly compete with China. In 
addition, U.S. tariffs in all these cases are very low. In the case of 
fresh fruit, citrus, or melons (product category 8), for example, the re-
gion’s exports posted average annual growth of 5.5 % and in 2003 
represented 22.32 % of U.S. imports for these items, while the corre-
sponding figure for China was 1.34 %.  
2. Mexican exports to the United States have increasingly centered on 
electronic, auto, and auto part products (product categories 85, 87 and 
84), representing around 55 % of such overseas sales to the U.S. in 
2003, while oil continued to account for 10 % of exports from 1990–
2003. Particularly in electronics and auto parts, and increasingly in 
auto sales, Mexico competes directly with China in the U.S. market. 
The electronics sector will be discussed in the following chapter, but it 
should be pointed out that during this period, Mexico and China’s av-
erage annual growth rate was 11.8 % and 23.1 %, respectively. If in 
1990, Mexican electronics exports represented 13.32 % of U.S. im-
ports of such products and they increased to 20.86 %, Chinese sales 
rose from 3.31 % to 18.26 % during the same period. It should be 
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noted in this regard that in 2003, Chinese electronic products paid a 
tariff that was six times higher than that charged to their Mexican 
counterparts. Chinese auto parts exports (product category 84) experi-
enced huge growth, an average annual increase of 37.6 % from 1990–
2003, which compares with 16.5 % in the case of Mexico. Mexico’s 
share of total U.S. imports of auto parts grew from 3.59 % to 10.18 %, 
while for China the increase was from 0.71 % to 17.52 %, in the proc-
ess completely overtaking Mexico and other competitors. In automo-
tive sector – product category 87 – Mexico has consolidated its posi-
tion as one of the main suppliers for the United States, representing 
15.46 % of U.S. imports for such items in 2003. However, China, with 
barely 1.41 % of U.S. automotive imports in 2003, is boosting its 
share by an annual average 31.9 %, double Mexico’s results from 
1990–2003. Also of significance is the case of furniture – product 
category 94 – which in 2003 represented 3.66 % of Mexican and 
7.75 % of Chinese exports. Although both economies have increased 
their U.S. market share, in 2003 the Chinese completely overtook 
Mexican exports, with 39.78 % of U.S. imports, while the corre-
sponding figure for Mexico was 17.02 %. In garment – as was ana-
lyzed in the case of Central America – the competition between 
Central America, China, and Mexico is stiff, although since 2000, 
Beijing seems to have significantly increased its presence, in con-
trast to the stagnation characterizing Central American and Mexican 
exports. Finally, although not least in importance, oil and other agri-
cultural products such as vegetables and certain roots – chapter 7 of 
the Harmonized Tariff System – do not compete with Chinese prod-
ucts and have a major presence in the U.S. market. In the case of 
vegetables and legumes, for example, Mexican exports represent 
more than 60 % of U.S. imports of such products between 1990–
2003. In all these cases, Mexico pays tariffs very much below those 
of China; in vegetables and legumes, for example, import duties 
were 0.8 % for Mexico and 8.57 % for China.  
The previous analysis, based on the 10 main export product categories for 
Central America and Mexico to the United States, reflects tariff policies 
that have particularly benefited Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Central 
America, while such import duties are much higher for China. By the same 
token, the results of this analysis indicate a high degree of competition in 
the main product categories for exports to the United States by Central 
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America and Mexico with China. This competition especially involves 
clothing, electronics and auto parts, but also items such as furniture, opti-
cal instruments and apparatus, among others. With some exceptions – 
clothing, knitted or crocheted for Central America and autos for Mexico –
the dynamic growth of Chinese exports and their increasing share of the 
U.S. market seems to have initiated a deep going process that began in 
2000 of Beijing displacing its main competitors. The process seemed to be 
particularly far reaching in the case of light industry,53 although with ex-
pectations that it will increase in other sectors such as autos and auto parts. 
On the contrary, in the energy product categories and agricultural and 
agroindustrial items, China’s presence is reduced and, considering the 
overall analysis of Chinese imports in these fields, growing competition 
with China in the U.S. market cannot be expected.  
2.6 Central American and Mexican trade relations with 
China 
In this subchapter, we will be utilizing statistics on Central America – which 
were provided by SIECA based on two and six digits of the Harmonized Sys-
tem (see Statistical Appendix 4) – and BANCOMEXT for Mexican trade, 
also in line with the 2 and 6 digits of the HS (see Statistical Annex 3).54  
Chart 12 indicates that for the 1994–2002 period, Central America’s ex-
ports and imports posted average annual growth of 8.0 % and 9.6 %, re-
spectively, while the corresponding figures for China were 75 % and 
                                                          
53 In this sense, the results are compatible with data examined by CNIME / Global Insight 
(2003), Global Insight (2004) and Shadlen (2004). CNIME / Global Insight (2003) 
noted a massive displacement through 2012 in toys, furniture, and food, and to a lesser 
degree in clothing, electronics, auto parts, and autos. Based on simple studies conducted 
by Global Insight (2004, 14 ff.), the conclusion is that the yarn-textile-garment chain 
has a high competition potential with China, electronics and software are within the 
limit, while Mexico’s auto, auto parts, and aerospace industry are relatively established 
and this will continue to be the case in the U.S. market.  
54 As it is indicated in the respective statistical appendixes, the information for Central 
America provided by SIECA does not include maquiladora data, which is of particular 
interest for analyzing trade with China in its domestic market. In 2002, different regis-
tration problems were noted among the Central American countries, and therefore it is 
not possible to combine the information by groups of countries. The information on 
Mexico breaks down the data in temporary and definitive trade.  
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26.9 %. Central American trade with China and Hong Kong doubled dur-
ing the period, reaching 525 million dollars or 2.1 % of imports and 1.2 % 
of exports in 2002. Of the nations in the region, it should be noted that 
only Costa Rica exports to China and Hong Kong, while all import from 
these countries. As a result, China and Hong Kong are posting a growing 
trade surplus with Central America, which reached 347 million dollars in 
2002, although this contrasts with a total trade deficit of almost 11.15 bil-
lion dollars for the same year.  
In line with the previous considerations, in what product categories have 
the region’s imports from China and Hong Kong been concentrated? 
Graph 5 shows that up until now, Chinese sales to Central America do not 
play a predominant role in any of the 10 main export product categories 
from 1994–2001, which together represented 59.73 % of Chinese exports 
to the region during the period. In several product categories, performance 
has been very dynamic – particularly in footwear, clothing, knitted or cro-
cheted, toys, and non-organic chemical products – although in none of the 
cases did such sales exceed 10 % of total imports under the respective 
product category in 2001. Even in the case of footwear, in which China’s 
presence in the region is greatest, exports represented 9.06 % of total im-
ports of such products in 2001.  
Graph 5: Central America: Imports from China in 10 main chapters (per-
centage over total respective imports) (1994–2001) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 4. 
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Thus far, the issue has not received much comment in the private and pub-
lic sectors in Central America, although there seems to be an increase in 
the perception of a threat to the region’s exports to the U.S. market.55 
Mexico’s trade is highly concentrated in the United States and in 2003 the 
U.S. market accounted for 88.78 % of its exports and 61.82 % of its im-
ports (see chart 13). The percentage of Mexican exports earmarked for the 
United States increased during the 1990s. Mexican exports to China and 
Hong Kong posted average annual growth of 26.3 % and 10.6 % for the 
1993–2003 period, respectively, and in the case of sales to China, per-
formance was double that of the country’s exports as a whole. Despite this 
dynamic, such sales represented barely 0.34 % and 0.16 % of Mexican ex-
ports in 2003. In 2003, Hong Kong and China together became the fifth 
most important recipient of Mexican exports,56 after the United States,  
 
                                                          
55 In addition to some references in newspaper articles, in 2003, the Revista INCAE, as an 
exception to the role, published several issues on the topic of China, although it did not 
directly link it with the Central American economy and/or specific cases of potential 
and/or real threats.  
56 For a series of successful experiences of companies that have exported to China – in-
cluding the Modelo brewery, Grupo Idesa Petroquímica and Canel's –as well as the lo-
gistical challenges that must be faced, see: http://www.bancomext.com (consulted in 
July 2004).  
Chart 13: Mexico: main trading partners (1993–2003) 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 3. 
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Canada, Spain, and Germany. The performance of Chinese exports to 
Mexico, however, has been much more dynamic, with average annual 
growth of 37.6 % from 1993–2003, with sales increasing from 386 million 
dollars in 1993 to 9.40 billion dollars in 2003. Since 2003, China has be-
come the second largest source of imports entering Mexico, after the 
United States. In 2003, Chinese products represented 5.50 % of the total, 
in addition to 0.30 % from Hong Kong. Thus, despite Mexico’s reduced 
trade with China, the latter has become the main country with which Mex-
ico has a trade deficit and its second largest trade partner.  
In what product categories of the Harmonized System have Chinese im-
ports been most prevalent? Chart 14 illustrates the rapid and deep penetra-
tion of Chinese imports in its domestic market for the 10 main product 
categories. The main points to be noted are:  
1. A very high concentration of Chinese exports in two product catego-
ries – auto parts and electronics – with average annual growth of 
62.1 % and 49.3 %. This is the highest growth in the 10 main product 
categories from 1993–2003 and they represented 68.32 % of Chinese 
imports in 2003. Although in the rest of the product categories, the 
amount is significantly lower, the very high average annual growth 
rate for all the product categories is surprising.  
2. Contrary to the case of Central America, imports from China indeed 
have managed to occupy a preponderant position in some product 
categories, particularly toys and manufactured leather goods, which in 
2003 accounted for 48.40 % and 31.10 % of Mexico’s total imports 
for these items. In other Mexico’s total imports for these items. In 
other product categories, such as auto parts and electronics, the share 
of Chinese imports is still reduced and does not exceed 10 %, but it 
has been experiencing a major increase.  
3. The two main product categories of imports from China are also the 
main generators of Mexico’s high trade deficit. In 2003, the deficit in 
auto parts and electronics topped 6.00 billion dollars or 68.08 % of the 
trade deficit with China.  
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In the case of Mexico, the penetration of Chinese imports has received ma-
jor attention in the communications media and, to a lesser extent, in differ-
ent specialized publications. The following is a summary of the different 
perspectives and viewpoints offered:  
1. In general, although not very systematically and without turning to in-
formational sources, business associations, the different levels of gov-
ernment, experts, and academic specialists, “concern” has been raised57 
in relation to the competition between Chinese and Mexican products in 
the United States58 and the penetration of Chinese exports in Mexico. 
Clearly, and particularly since 2000, activities established in Mexico 
and oriented toward exports to the United States – which represents 
90 % of their market – have lost their dynamism. From the end of 2000 
to April 2004, the maquiladora export industry, probably the sector 
most sensitive to fluctuations in the United States – saw its employ-
ment levels drop 18.95 % and 22.85 %of its factories have closed 
their doors, even considering the initial recovery since the beginning 
of 2004.59 According to initial studies, during this period of plant clos-
ings, 177 companies, or 33.8 % of the total number of enterprises, trans-
ferred their activities to China (John Christman, from Carrillo 2004). In 
manufacturing, the motor of growth of exports, since the end of 2000 to 
May 2004, Mexico has lost 14.44 % of its jobs.  
                                                          
57 CNIME / Global Insight (2003, 1) concludes that “Mexico will witness an erosion in its 
current market share of U.S. imports, unless a new strategic vision is implemented [...] 
many of Mexico’s competitors have rapidly been successful in obtaining market share 
of those goods that the United States has imported, while, depending on the series of 
goods, Mexico and not China is one of the competitor countries that has increased its 
penetration in the U.S. market in several of the product categories”. Also see: Carrillo / 
Gomis (2003); Global Insight (2004); Neme (2002); The Economist (2004).  
58 In addition, different sources point out “that Mexican products such as avocado, grapes, 
Mexican style food, etc. are not sold directly by Mexican companies” (García 2004, 18).  
59 In this regard, Rosen (2003, 25) points out that “So China is eating Mexico’s lunch, but 
more due to the Mexican inability to capitalize on successes and induce broader reform 
than to China’s lower wage workers per se [...] Mexico’s comparative disadvantages in-
clude an intrusive bureaucracy that is sometimes corrupt, sometimes simply hostile to the 
private sector; poor utilities and transportation infrastructure; under-investment in human 
development; and a less than dynamic industrial structure reflecting imperfect financial in-
termediation and residual statism. [...] A saving of two weeks in shipping time three weeks 
from China versus one from Mexico) is not alone going to rescue many maquiladora 
plants.” Also see: CNIME / Global Insight (2003) and O'Boyle (2003).  
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2. In Mexico, an important amount of Chinese imports are introduced as 
contraband, either through the “triangulation” of such products – par-
ticularly via the United States – their incorrect registration, the regis-
tration of such imports as temporary, while they are in fact earmark 
for the domestic market and/or illegal importation (Romero Hicks / 
Molina Medina, 2003). This is also the result of the high tariff rates 
and compensatory quotas that Mexico adopted since 2002 with 
China’s entry into the WTO.60 There are no current estimates on the 
possible quantification of this contraband, although statistics have 
been advanced for sectors such as textiles and clothing, as will be seen 
in the following chapter.  
For the time being, however, analyses on China’s economic effect on both 
the Mexican domestic market as well as on the United States have been 
not very systematic and have been polarized between emphasis on the 
Chinese threat and the enormous potential demand that a market of 1.3 bil-
lion consumers can represent.61  
3 Challenges and opportunities: the yarn-textile-
garment chain 
This chapter goes more deeply into the aggregate tendencies examined in 
Chapter 2, with the aim of concretizing the challenges and opportunities 
posed by China for the Central American and Mexican economies. In 
Chapter 2 there was a detailed examination of the extreme relevance of the 
yarn-textile-garment value chain62 for the three countries, especially with 
regards to its exports to the United States.  
 
 
                                                          
60 Paradoxically, clothing imported from China barely exceeded 35 million dollars in 2003.  
61 One of the few exceptions is the study conducted by Luna Martínez (2003), which pre-
cisely seeks to differentiate between the creation and displacement of trade, emphasizing 
that electronics is the sector in which both countries directly compete in the U.S. market.  
62 The yarn-textile-garment chain includes four segments: a) yarn or fibers, b) textiles, c) 
garments or clothing, and d) others (including accessories). These segments were util-
ized for grouping commercial information based on six and ten digits of the Harmo-
nized Tariff System (See Statistical Annex for respective countries).  
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The chapter begins with a global perspective on the yarn-textile-garment 
chain with the aim of understanding the main actors and companies in its 
segments, as well as recent and expected changes in its medium-term 
industrial organization. The second section goes more deeply into the 
conditions of the chain in China, emphasizing its policies as well as 
current structures and elements that we consider relevant for under-
standing the Chinese chain. Using the extensive Statistical Annexes as a 
base, the third section gives a breakdown of the segments and products in 
which Central America and Mexico compete with China, both in the 
United States and in their respective domestic markets.  
First, however, it is appropriate to present a context for the two chains that 
will be analyzed in detail in this chapter and the next in regards to their 
1985–2001 export performance in the world market. Chart 15 shows that 
for the yarn-textile-garment chain (in this case, for statistical reasons, yarn 
and textile are grouped together), there is increased Asian participation in 
the yarn-textile segment as well as in garments: In 2001 this amounted to 
48.58 % in yarn-textile and 54.75 % in garments. In both cases China’s 
performance is remarkable, with a significant increase in its world market 
share: in 2001 it was 12.48 % and 26.14 % in the respective segments. In 
this context, Central America and Mexico’s world market share has been 
low although there has been an substantial increase in this period; in the 
case of garments the percentage share in 2001 was 3.54 % and 4.36 %, 
respectively, reflecting a six fold increase from 1985–2001. 
In the case of Code 752 of the Uniform Classification for International 
Trade (UCIT) – office machines and electronic data processing – Central 
America’s world market share was 0.03 % in 2001. Although a general 
Asian predominance is also evident – in view of the drop in United States 
and European Union shares – China alone increased its percentage share 
from 0.04 % to 8.78 % during the period, while Mexico’s share rose from 
0.25 % to 4.53 %. From this perspective, the chain is highly dynamic for 
China and Mexico, and is concentrated in a sector marked by increasing 
global demand.  
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Chart 15: Market shares of exports by selected countries in the world 
market (1985–2001) (percentages) 
 1985 1990 1995 2001  1985 1990 1995 2001 
 (market share)  (share in exports) 
Office machines and automatic  
data processors \a       
ALADI 1,49 1,25 1,54 4,67  0,38 0,71 1,01 2,87 
   CACM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03  0,01 0,02 0,03 0,33 
   Mexico 0,25 0,94 1,41 4,53  0,20 1,66 2,39 5,53 
United 
States 42,33 24,83 18,56 12,71  4,68 4,86 4,29 3,37 
European 
Union 37,82 30,30 26,27 25,30  1,25 1,68 2,12 2,69 
Asia 15,87 41,04 51,15 53,22  0,83 3,66 5,12 5,83 
   China 0,04 0,33 2,60 8,78  0,03 0,27 1,60 4,50 
          
Yarns and threads, woven goods,  
garments made of textile fibers \b 
      
ALADI 2,40 2,08 2,30 2,89  1,37 1,62 1,47 1,17 
   CACM 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13  1,54 2,19 1,37 0,82 
   Mexico 0,36 0,45 0,81 1,44  0,64 1,09 1,33 1,16 
United 
States 4,92 4,88 6,13 8,50  1,21 1,31 1,38 1,49 
European 
Union 49,02 44,55 36,12 30,70  3,63 3,39 2,84 2,15 
Asia 35,17 40,91 46,87 48,58  4,09 5,01 4,56 3,51 
   China 7,99 8,67 10,49 12,48  14,17 9,80 6,26 4,23 
    
Clothing and accessories \c  
ALADI 1,44 1,62 2,70 5,20  0,82 1,41 2,17 3,29 
   CACM 0,37 0,79 1,99 3,54  4,03 14,34 27,41 36,11 
   Mexico 0,61 0,73 1,86 4,36  1,12 1,98 3,85 5,47 
United 
States 0,93 1,51 3,08 2,62  0,23 0,46 0,87 0,71 
European 
Union 35,29 32,13 23,48 16,56  2,63 2,75 2,32 1,81 
Asia 52,00 52,24 52,99 54,75  6,09 7,19 6,48 6,17 
   China 8,45 15,27 23,07 26,14  15,09 19,39 17,32 13,78 
\ a Refers to fraction 752 of UCIT 
\ b Refers to Code 65 of UCIT 
\ c Refers to Code 84 of UCIT 
Source: Self-compiled, based on TradeCan (ECLAC 2004a). 
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In the case of Code 752 of the Uniform Classification for International 
Trade (UCIT) – office machines and electronic data processing – Central 
America’s world market share was 0.03 % in 2001. Although a general 
Asian predominance is also evident – in view of the drop in United States 
and European Union shares – China alone increased its percentage share 
from 0.04 % to 8.78 % during the period, while Mexico’s share rose from 
0.25 % to 4.53 %. From this perspective, the chain is highly dynamic for 
China and Mexico, and is concentrated in a sector marked by increasing 
global demand.  
3.1 The global industrial organization of the chain 
The yarn-textile-garment chain has historically been one of the most 
highly regulated chains, and this is still the case. According to GATT, as 
well as NAFTA, CAFTA, and other free trade agreements, a large part of 
the norms and regulations have focused on this sector. Which aspects 
stand out, synthetically speaking, with respect to the trade norms that 
affect it, particularly pertaining to the United States?63 
In the first place, at the present time the products in this chain are subject 
to the provisions of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) agreed 
upon in the Uruguay Round of the WTO, in which four stages were 
established – in 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005, respectively, 16 %, 17 %, 
18 % and the remaining quotas would be lifted – for the elimination of 
quotas that restrict trade. Even though all quotas in the yarn-textile-
garment chain are supposed to be eliminated by January of 2005, it is 
important to consider that other trade barriers may exist, especially tariffs, 
but also antidumping norms that are relatively lax towards China, as 
analyzed in the second chapter.64 
                                                          
63 For a detailed analysis, see: Appelbaum (2003); Appelbaum / Gereffi (1994); Bair / 
Dussel Peters (2004); Bair / Gereffi (2002); Buitelaar / Rodríguez (2000); Canaintex / 
Werner International (2002); Dussel Peters (2004). 
64 During 2004 39 countries have endorsed the Istanbul Declaration, signed on March 12, 
2004, in which the respective countries ask that the WTO postpone the last and most 
sensitive quota liberalization in the chain. The ATMI (2004), for example, considers 
that China could attain a share of 65 %–75 % of the United States imports in the chain, 
in view of the fact that this is the share that it has attained in other products for which 
quotas were recently abolished.  
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In the second place, taking the particularities of the United States market 
into consideration, ever since the eighties the trade regime has created 
diverse programs with the aim of fomenting the maquiladora industry in 
other countries and exclusively taxing the value added of the final product 
(and not the United States inputs). The production sharing regime, the 807 
laws (now 9802), the Special Access Program, and the Caribbean Basin 
Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) in 2000, are among the measures that 
particularly benefited Mexico and the Caribbean Basin countries and had 
significant effects on the yarn-textile-garment chain (as will be seen in 
chapter 3.1.3.).65 
In the third place, the critical aspect – in NAFTA as well as in CAFTA, 
among other regimes – has to do with whether or not the processes carried 
out in the region – from cutting out a garment to processes such as 
serigraphy, embroidery, and the application of different kinds of washes 
and dyes, in Mexico and Central America – require the payment of tariffs 
since they are considered part of the “regional” norm of origin. Up until 
2004, including CAFTA norms, the United States Tariff regimen has not 
been very flexible and has not permitted inputs from other countries – such 
as cotton, yarn, or Asian textiles – to benefit from this tariff arrangement 
(known as the “yarn forward” rule of origin). Nevertheless, in 1994, 
NAFTA allowed processes carried out in Mexico to be considered as 
regional without requiring the payment of tariffs on their value. (Bair / 
Dussel Peters 2004).66 
In this normative context, what tendencies can be perceived in both the 
global and the United States industrial organization of the yarn-textile-gar-
ment chain? The chain is considered as one of the typical “buyer-led” or 
“buyer-controlled” organizations such as Wal Mart or K-Mart. Likewise, 
ever since the nineties different networks and segments of the yarn-textile-
                                                          
65 Evans / Harrigan (2004) emphasize that tariff measures favoring Mexico, Central Amer-
ica, and the Caribbean during the ‘90s effectively permitted a substantial increase in this 
chain’s exports to the United States and negatively affected Asian exporters. With the 
elimination of quotas in 2005 it is possible that the Asian countries will recover their 
lost share even though the authors point out that a geographical advantage still exists.  
66 Furthermore, and independently of the normative issue, it is important to consider 
whether the domestic production capacity of cotton, fibers, yarn, and textiles exists or 
not; if it doesn’t exist, the origin of “yarn forward” has no real benefit, although it could 
be beneficial when plants are installed in these processes.  
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garment chain can increasingly be distinguished, regardless of whether 
products are made of natural or synthetic fibers. In the first case, for 
example, there is a need for raw materials networks (cotton, wool, silk, 
etc.), component networks (yarn, cloth, etc.), garment production networks 
according to a specific market (in the United States’ case, there are links 
with Asia, Central America, and Mexico), export networks (via retail 
stores in the United States’ case), and sales in retail, department, and 
specialty stores, and huge commercial chains (Appelbaum / Gereffi 1994).  
In brief, there are three major actors in the chain, each with its respective 
networks: retailers, brand-name marketers, and manufacturers of brand-
name products. The final markets are characterized by a high degree of 
segmentation – in Europe as well as in the United States and Asia, for 
example, where they are broken down into men’s, women’s, or children’s 
clothing; sportswear; casual, or elegant apparel; or garments of different 
colors and styles, etc. – and according to the success of fabric stores, 
discount clubs, and outlets (Consolidated Stores, Costco, Dollar General, 
Family Dollar, K Mart, Target Corporation, and Wal Mart, to name a few) 
with respect to department stores (including JC Penney’s, Dillard’s, 
Neiman Marcus, May, Dayton-Hudson).  
Considering this process of the concentration of control of the chain by 
department stores, at least five additional aspects are relevant.  
First, there is a relative saturation of markets at a global level, despite 
exceptions made for specific segments. Thus, Canaintex and Werner 
International (2002) estimate that the world consumption of textiles, with 
average annual growth rates near 3 % in the sixties, will decline to less 
than 1 % during 1990–2020. The issue is significant since it implies much 
more competitive markets and strong pressure to diminish the cost of the 
garments.  
Second, since the beginning of the nineties – in Asia since the sixties67 – 
processes known as “full packaging” have become widespread. These 
processes – unlike those of the traditional maquiladora that receives inputs 
                                                          
67 This issue is highly relevant; Asia has had experience in “full packaging” processes ever 
since the sixties, which has allowed them to make significant advances in integrating the 
segments of the chain, as opposed to Central America and Mexico, where these pro-
cesses only go back as far as the nineties  (Bair / Gereffi 2002). 
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and previously cut cloth from the United States – imply that the buyers, 
via contracts and strict product specifications, transfer the logistics, 
organization, and production of the garments to the subcontractor. The 
process, which implies a learning process and territorial diffusion with the 
subcontractor, also generates important financing costs that may be up to 
7-10 times greater than those of the traditional maquiladora processes 
(Dussel Peters 2004). 
Third, textile production can generate as much as 50 % of the costs of the 
final product, depending on the specific product. The difference in price 
between the textiles made in China and in the United States can be around 
50 %; even including the costs of transport, quotas, and higher tariffs for 
the Asian garments, these continue to be more cost competitive than those 
of Mexico and Central America, which use United States inputs in order to 
benefit from preferential tariffs (Canaintex / Werner International 2002; 
Dussel Peters 2004). Additionally, the cost of labor in China and India in 
garment making is 56 % and 61 % less than in Mexico and Honduras 
(Canaintex / Kurt Salmon Associates 2002; Hightower 2004).68 
Fourth, the segment of the chain that defines the specific processes –
technological level, jobs and their quality, type of company, financing 
requirements, etc. – is crucial in understanding the potential for upgrading: 
in similar products, for example, whether one has a brand name or not can 
result in a price differential of 4 to 1 (Canaintex y Werner International 
2002, 143); the price difference between a dozen plain t-shirts and the 
same quantity with a silkscreen design is 2:1 (Dussel Peters 2004). 
Fifth, for several decades most of Asia has used full packaging processes 
and original equipment manufacturing (OEM); one of the main charac-
teristics of this upgrading process69 was a relatively rapid transition from 
the maquiladora process to full packaging processes. Other Asian 
companies, particularly the Japanese firms, continued to upgrade the value 
                                                          
68 Also see: http://www.cacs.gov.cn/new/ztbd/gyfzck/wgfy/wgfy03/wgfy0704-5.htm (con-
sulted in July 2004). 
69 The “triangulation of manufacturing” in Asia – a process that began in the seventies and 
eighties, in which buyers place orders with manufacturers, who transfer part of the or-
ders to other territories, including Mexico and Central America, and end up delivering 
the final products to the United States – has been significant in the learning process in  
Asia (Gereffi 2002, 15). 
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chain as they integrated OEM exportation processes into others like 
original brand manufacturing (OBM) and incorporated their knowledge, 
experience, and development in OEM into processes of design, sales, and 
marketing in both the domestic and global market. 
3.2 The chain in China 
With the urban reforms initiated in the 1980s, which included the textile 
and garment sectors, there was a push towards a higher degree of 
autonomy and towards the option of channeling all production to the mar-
ket that exceeded the goal set in central planning. These incentives were 
significant for understanding the increase in production that followed. 
Likewise, these reforms allowed for an increase in companies with other 
forms of ownership, particularly the rural companies, which began to form 
alliances with the State-owned enterprises (SOEs): they made use of cheap 
labor from rural areas as well as high investments with important tech-
nological levels in the textile industry of the SOEs (Liu Sun 1997; 
Quinliang 2004). In 1998 a series of economic reform measures were 
adopted that significantly affected the yarn-textile-garment value-added 
chain: The Council of State reduced public sector jobs by around 4 million 
at central, provincial, and local levels, which also led to a reduction in the 
ministries from 40 to 29. In the particular case of the textile and garment 
sector, the Ministry of the Textile Industry formed part of the Council of 
State. In 1998, however, the National Chamber of Exports and Imports of 
Textiles and Garments was created, with the aim of coordinating the 
activities of the companies. In other words, the coordination of companies 
in this chain, as well as that of policies and strategies is now based in an 
institution with public-private interests.  
As analyzed in detail in Chapter 2, the yarn-textile-garment chain is one of 
those that received the most subsidies during the 1990s (see chart 7); its 
percentage of the total subsidies that the central government granted to 
State-owned companies rose from 1.61 % in 1990 to 20.57 % in 1998. In 
order to enhance exports, the reimbursements given to the chain have been 
substantial.  
China is now the number one international producer and exporter of textile 
and clothing products. In official circles there is a consensus on the chain’s 
limitations, especially in regards to design, the development of brands, and 
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the manufacture of sophisticated materials for the manufacture of 
garments. China has specialized in the assembly stage and has a low 
capacity for designing its own fashions and brands, as well as for the final 
distribution of the products. In this context of seeking to upgrade the 
segments of the greatest value added, the Tenth Five-Year Plan for 2000–
2005 has set the following goals:  
1. Increasing the value added of the sector from 267.8 billion yuan in 
2000 to 430 billion yuan in 2005, or an increase of 60.6 %. 
2. Increasing the production volume of textile fiber from 12.1 million 
tons in 2000 to 14.25 million tons in 2005, and increasing the appa-
rent consumption per person from 6.6 kgs. to 7.4 kgs. for the period. 
3. Increasing exports from 52 billion dollars in 2000 to between 70 and 
75 billion dollars in 2005, in other words an average annual growth 
rate (AAGR) near 7 %. 
4. Modifying the structural relation between the segments of dresses, 
decorations, and industries from a proportion of 67 %, 20 %, and 
13 %, respectively, to 64 %, 21 %, and 15 % in 2005, which reflects 
an explicit effort to develop the diversification of the chain.  
5. Increasing labor productivity from 25,000 yuan per worker in 2000 to 
35,000 yuan in 2005. 
6. Reducing energy consumption for every 10,000 yuan of production by 
15 %. 
7. Using recycled water in production for 30 % of current consumption 
by 2005; in the prints sector, reducing water consumption for every 
100 meters from 3.6 tons to 3.0 tons. 
In order to reach the goals that have been set, the Chinese government will 
apply a series of measures70: 
1. Reinforcing global productive capacity and avoiding duplication of 
investments, particularly in the saturated sectors.  
                                                          
70 Also see the China National Textile Industry Council (CNTIC), http://www.cnfti.org. 
cn/ecnfti.htm. 
 Enrique Dussel Peters 
 German Development Institute 72
2. Guaranteeing the stability of the surface area sown in cotton, with the 
goal of maintaining production at a level surpassing 4.5 million tons.  
3. Providing incentives for technological progress by fomenting all 
4. iances between companies and research centers and establishing 
development centers for the large companies (see the investment 
schemes examined in chapter 2). 
5. Diversifying exports with a better product structure by means of the 
consecutive application of the competitive advantage derived from a 
cheap and abundant labor supply.  
6. Continuing to pursue a sustainable development strategy.  
What is the state of the yarn-textile-garment chain in China? In 2000 there 
were 18,900 state companies and companies with other forms of owner-
ship71 with a sales volume higher than 5 million yuan; with total assets of 
977,300 million yuan, they generated tax revenue of 267,800 million yuan 
in value added taxes that represented 11.9 %, 8.3 % and 11.3 %, respec-
tively, in the entire manufacturing industry. Employment was around 13 
million (see chart 16).72 
In the context of China’s membership in the WTO and the elimination of 
quotas in the chain, official figures from 2003 reflect a rise in investment 
in this sector of 80.4 % as opposed to the 26.7 % registered at the national 
level. It is important to mention that the performance of fixed investment 
observed in the textile and garments sector was in fifth place in 2003, after 
the sectors of iron, aluminum, cement, and automobiles, with growth rates 
 
                                                          
71 According to the USITC (1999, 8–5), at the end of the 1990s China had around 40,000 
garment companies, of which 42 % were TVEs, 42 % with FDI, 7 % private, and 6 % 
SOEs. According to the same source (USITC 2004, E17), the number of establishments 
fell from 45,600 to 21,144 during 1997-2001, while the number of workers in these 
companies fell from 10.7 million to 7.9 million. 
72 According to other employment sources, in 2002 there could have been close to 15 mil-
lion (CNTIC 2004) and even as many as 18 million (Vallés Costas 2004). As a refer-
ence point for the following paragraphs, the maquiladora industry in Central America in 
2003 had 383,245 employees (Remy 2003) and in Mexico 600,000 employees (Vallés 
Costas 2004), which is to say, they represent between 5.5 % and 7.6 % of the employees 
in China in the sector. 
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Chart 16: Textile and Garments Industry in China (2000) 
 
 Total Per employee 
Number of companies 18,900  
Number of employees 13,000,000  
Total assets (millions of yuan) 977,300 75,200 
Value added (millions of yuan) 267,800 20,600 
Profit and tax  
(billions of yuan) 
57,880 4,400 
Fiber production (millions of tons) 12.1 0.9  
Synthetic fiber production (millions 
of tons) 
6.9 0.5  
Clothes (millions of pieces) 16,500 1,269,000 pieces 
Exports (millions of dollars) 52,100 4,000  
Source:  National Reform and Development Commission of China, (consulted in 
July, 2004). 
of more than 90 % of the production in the 1970s to less than 30 % in the 
mid-1990s, marking massive joint investments between the SOEs and 
TVEs (Moore 2002, 160). 
According to diverse analyses and company reports, China’s main benefits 
and advantages in the yarn-textile-garment chain now consist of (see chart 17): 
Chart 17: Cost comparison in $ (2004) 
 MEXICO CHINA 
Salary per hour 2,35 0,4 
Raw materials (Yarn NE 20/1) 1,22 0,88 
Dye/Chemicals 0,06 0,03 
Energy ($ / 1000 pounds) 6,5 2,3 
Water 0,05 0,02 
Transport to US ($ per pound) 0,08 0,16 
Construction ($ per square foot) 52 12 
Depreciation of equipment (years) 12 10 
Bank interest rate 4,50% 2% 
Income tax 32% 33% 
Source: Hightower (2004). 
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1. Having gained experience in full packaging processes since the 1980s 
and, also having generated an important supply system, especially in 
textile production: since the 1990’s China accounts for more than 
25 % of the global spinning machines (USITC 1999), whose share has 
increased since then.73 Furthermore, the country has integrated a good 
many of the segments of the value chain: raw materials (cotton and 
fibers); accessories; thread, yarn, and textile manufacturing; and the 
processing of these products into garments, rugs, and industrial 
textiles (USITC 2004, E5–E10). China now has the national and 
global supply and input companies necessary to make almost all 
products, while Mexico, for example, concentrates on only a few 
products (jeans and T-shirts), as does Central America (Hightower 
2004). Around 60 % of production in the garment industry is exported 
and is mainly concentrated in the Guangdong province.74 
2. It is crucial to understand Hong Kong and China’s thoroughgoing 
commercial and productive integration: During the 1990s and even 
before its integration into China in 1997, Hong Kong companies had 
already transferred a substantial portion of their lower value added 
segments to China, and particularly to the SOEs (Quinliang 2004; 
USITC 1999). This experience has allowed China to substantially 
increase the technological level of its plants, and also to improve sales 
and distribution channels both internally and abroad. Even though this 
process is still in its first stages, international buyers increasingly find a 
small group of internationally known brands, as well as a high degree of 
innovation and design (Gao / Woetzel / Wu 2003; USITC 2004). 
3. As opposed to other Asian countries, China has highly competitive 
maritime transport times, taking between 12 and 18 days to reach the 
East Coast of the United States, while other Asian countries may take 
three times as long to arrive. (USITC 2004, E9). 
                                                          
73 In 2002 China had around 22.8 % of all spinning machines and had acquired more than 
50 % of them during 2000–2002. On the contrary, the installed capacity in Mexico rep-
resented less than 2.3 % (Hightower 2004). 
74 In the garment industry segment, there are a series of actors, including: a) Chinese com-
panies with Hong Kong capital that export most of their production, b), the SOEs that 
sell their production for internal consumption, and c) the privatized SOEs or TVEs that 
are mainly oriented towards the internal market and make up the most significant part of 
this strata of enterprises (USITC 2004, E9). 
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4. The success of China’s exports in Japan and Australia is extremely 
important, a sign that the country can offer and export garments of the 
highest quality; since it has eliminated its import quotas with China, 
Australia imports practically all of its garments from China. (Appel-
baum 2003). 
In spite of China’s growing percentage share in diverse markets and its 
global expansion, there is a concern about the future potential of its yarn-
textile-garment chain in international markets, in view of existing con-
ditions and structures as well as recent investment efforts. On one hand, as 
analyzed in Chapter 2, even though the conditions of membership in the 
WTO will probably allow for the elimination of quotas by 2005, they also 
include antidumping measures and other relatively lax practices that work 
explicitly against China.75 In the second place, China has significantly 
reduced its reimbursements with respect to exports, especially in the case 
of the yarn-textile-garment chain,76 with the objective of giving preference 
to other sectors, as will be seen in the next chapter. In the third place, 
China will also be faced with competition from other countries, including 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, some of which have a cheaper work force 
than China does.77 Fourth, the price of the inputs required in the chain, 
particularly that of cotton, has increased significantly, as a result of 
adverse climatic conditions.78 In the fifth place, according to the Tenth 
                                                          
75 From the perspective of the countries that have to abide unilaterally imposed quotas, 
Kathuria and Bhardwaj’s analysis (1998) shows that in the case of India, as a counter-
measure, the Indian government used subsidies as an incentive for exports to those na-
tions where restrictions via quotas existed. These countries have to contend with gener-
alized agricultural subsidies in the United States and the European Union, as well as ad-
ditional subsidies to cotton producers approaching $ 3.706 billion dollars in 2001/2002 
(BM 2003), on top of quotas and high tariffs. 
76 In the case of exports in this chain, the reimbursement rate was reduced from 17 % to 
13 %, http://www1.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsid=201140001836, 
(consulted in July, 2004). 
77 According to these official sources, India, as well as China, will be a winner in the lib-
eralization of international trade. See: http://www.cacs.gov.cn/new/cybg/cybg04/cybg 
0211-1.htm and http://www.cacs.gov.cn/new/ztbd/gyfzck/wgfy/wgfy03/wgfy0704-5.htm, 
consulted in July, 2004; USITC (2004, E11). 
78 At the end of 2003, the price per pound of cotton in international markets registered a 
growth rate of 38 % in comparison with the level reached at the beginning of the same 
year, arriving at 0.75 dollars. The price of oil has increased significantly, and, moreover, 
the prevailing electrical energy scarcity in China must be considered. All these factors 
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Five-Year Plan for the Textile and Garment Industries, the state companies 
had operated at a loss on the aggregate level during the nineties: in 1997 
this amounted to 10,600 million yuan79; according to other estimates 
during 1994–1996 the 4,031 textile companies of 1997 generated around 
$ 1 billion dollars in losses (USITC 1999, 8–8). Other authors estimate 
that around one third of the SOEs have recently operated at a loss 
(Hightower 2004). Sixth, China’s garment industry must now import 
around 63 % of its total textile consumption (USITC 2004),80 in case 
garment exports increase, a similar increase in textiles is expected. Finally, 
the textile industry and the SOEs, particularly, require significant 
technological advances; despite massive lay-offs and the process of 
modernization undertaken as of the mid-nineties, as well as the build-up of 
an excessive capacity, 90 % of the machinery in the cotton sector was 
more than 10 years old in 2001 (USITC 2004). 
3.3 China’s trade structure 
The following implications regarding the international commercial struc-
ture of the yarn-textile-garment chain are drawn from Statistical Annex 2: 
1. With an AAGR of 118.2 % during 1996–2002, exports in this chain in 
2002 attained a percentage share of 16.94 % of all exports in 2002. 
Considering possible triangulations of this chain’s exports via Hong 
Kong, the three primary recipients of Chinese exports – Japan, Hong 
Kong, and the United States – represented 23.55 %, 20.03 %, and 
10.61 %, respectively, with a diminishing tendency in the case of 
Japan and a rising tendency in the other two cases. Mexico has 
become the tenth most important recipient, with 1.52 % of Chinese  
 
                                                                                                                         
generate pressures on production costs in this sector. See: http://www1.cacs.gov.cn/De-
faultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsId=201140001836, http://caitec.mofcom.gov.cn/ arti-
cle/200405/20040500218394_1.xml and http://www.cacs.gov.cn/new/ztbd/gyfzck/ wgfy/ 
wgfy03/wgfy0704-7.htm (consulted in July, 2004). 
79 As a result of these measures, it is estimated that around 1.4 million employees in this 
sector were relocated. See: http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new_product/drcexpert/showdoc. 
asp?doc_id=124853 (consulted in July, 2004). 
80 This information, also used by official Chinese sources, is not corroborated by the 
commercial information presented further on.  
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exports in 2002. This export structure of the yarn-textile-garment chain 
is of the greatest importance given that, unlike Central American 
countries and Mexico, it reflects a relatively high level of export 
diversification, in which United States exports represent less than 1/3 
of the exports in this chain, even if all exports from Hong Kong in 
2002 are included.  
2. The imports for this chain have been very low, and during 1996–2002 
accumulated $ 155 dollars or 0.009 % of total imports. 
3. As a result the chain is highly profitable for China, given that in 
1996–2002 alone it generated more than $ 187 billion dollars or 
86.52 % of China’s export surplus during the period. Even 
considering the chain’s low level of imports, China records a trade 
surplus with all the nations that it deals with in this chain – Japan, 
Hong Kong, and the United States being the main recipients.  
Likewise, by segment, the chain reflects the following series of charac-
teristics: 
1. Despite a reduction in total imports, 89.64 % of the 1996–2002 
imports are in the textile segment.  
2. Graph 6 8 and Statistical Annex 2 reflect impressive growth in the 
Chinese exports of this chain, with an AAGR of 79.1 % during 1996–
2002. It is interesting to point out that even though the garment 
industry occupies a primordial place in the chain – with 75.53 % of 
the exports during 1996–2003 – its share has diminished; significant 
growth in yarn and textile exports can be seen, with an AAGR of 
164.4 % and 174.1 %, respectively. As will be examined further on, 
this tendency reflects a process of relative diversification of Chinese 
exports within the chain. 
3. Considering China’s 25 most important export products in this chain, 
the results reflect a relatively low level of concentration, given that 
they represent 42.01 % of the exports of the chain in this period. 
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Graph 6: China: Exports in yarn-textile-garment chain (1996–2002) 
 (millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statiscal Annex 2. 
3.4 The United States market: complementary or 
competitive exports? 
The United States market is of the greatest relevance for the exports of the 
yarn-textile-garment chain from Central Americaand Mexico; in 2002 
these represented levels higher than 95 % and 92.73 % of their exports in 
the chain, respectively, while only at 10.61 %81 for China. In which seg-
ments of the chain have the respective countries specialized in the United 
States market?  
Statistical Annex 5 is a detailed presentation of the performance of the 
exports from these three countries to the United States during 1990–2003 
in the yarn-textile-garment chain. Graph 7 is an overall reflection of the 
dynamic between the countries in question. On one hand, it shows that 
Central America, China, and Mexico were the principal exporters to the 
United States during this period – with an AAGR of 20.4 %, 13.3 %, and 
23.3 % respectively – and in 2003 represented 34.44 % of the total imports 
in the United States chain. Furthermore, a distinction is made between two 
periods: a) 1990–2000, when United States imports increased, with an 
                                                          
81 In the case of China it is important to remember that most of its exports are re-exported 
via Hong Kong. 
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AAGR of 12.1 %, and b) 2000–2003, with an AAGR of 3.3 %. During the 
first period, the exports from Central America and Mexico were very 
dynamic and significantly increased their percentage share in total exports 
to the United States, rising to 9.43 % and 13.49 % in 2000; since then, 
however, they have fallen to 9.19 % and 10.25 % in 2003, respectively. On 
the contrary, while China’s growth dynamic was lower than that of the 
countries considered in the first period, with an AAGR of 10.9 %, in the 
2000–2003 period it rose to 21.8 %. Since 2001 it has displaced Mexico 
and Central America, becoming the United States’ principal importer in 
this chain; in 2003 its percentage share was 14.99 % – with Hong Kong, 
19.92 % – much higher than that of its competitors.  
Graph 7: United States: Imports in yarn-textile-garment chain (1990–2003) 
(millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 5. 
Likewise, Statistical Annex 5 allows for a detailed analysis by country of 
the difference in the application of tariffs to United States imports. On one 
hand, an overall reduction is foreseen in tariff rates actually paid – based 
on the sum total of imports – on imports of this chain, a drop from 
18.64 % to 10.88 % in 2003.82 While Latin American countries have been 
the main beneficiaries of the tariff regime during this period, Asian 
                                                          
82 This means that even in the face of the drop in the tariff rate, the United States took in 
$ 8.422 billion dollars in tariffs on imports in the yarn-textile-garment chain in 2003. 
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countries paid much higher rates: of this chain’s main exporters to the 
United States, Mexico has benefited the most – its tariff rate fell from 
18.12 % to 0.66 % during 1990–2003 – while that of Central America83 
diminished from 18.93 % to 10.88 %. On the contrary, China y Hong 
Kong are the countries with the highest tariff rates, 11.88 % and 17.46 % 
in 2003, respectively, which is to say, they are 1,694 % and 2,537 % 
higher than the Mexican rate. 
These tendencies are reflected in the fact that even if Central America, 
China, and Mexico increased their percentage shares in United States 
imports in much the same way from 1990–2000, this trend changed during 
the second period: China alone had a 71.36 % rise in its share of United 
States imports in this chain (see graph 8). 
Graph 8: United States: Share in increases in imports in yarn-textile-gar-
ment chain ((1990–2003) (percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 5. 
In which segments of the chain do the countries in question participate? 
Chart 18 reflects the main characteristics of imports in the chain as well as 
their composition:  
1. While Central America and Mexico have specialized in garment 
exports – with 99.18 % and 86.94 % of their exports coming from this  
 
                                                          
83 It is important to consider that big differences exist in tariff arrangements in the region: 
in 2003 Honduras paid a tariff of 3.16 % on its exports, while Guatemala paid 11.48 %. 
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 chain in 2003 – China has diversified its exports considerably: those 
in the garment industry have diminished their percentage share in the 
total amount exported from 77.82 % to 62.52 % during 1990–2003, 
and the export of other goods, particularly accessories and inputs 
required for making clothes and other products like rugs (see 
Statistical Annex 5), has increased during 1990–2003, with an AAGR 
of 21.2 %, comprising 33.45 % of China’s exports to the United States 
in this chain. This performance has allowed the segment of 
accessories or “other” Chinese exports in 1990–2003 to almost double 
the total United States imports and reach 40.64 % in 2003; it reflects 
the previously analyzed capacity of generated supply and the quest for 
diversification fomented by the previously identified policies.  
2. During the 2000–2003 period, a period of stagnation in United States 
imports, China almost doubled the AAGR with respect to 1990–2000 
in all its segments, with the exception of yarn: in the garment 
segment, for example, the AAGR was 17.5 %, while that of Mexico 
was 2.5 % and 5.8 %. 
3. In the garment segment, Central America, China, and Mexico are “tied” 
in 2003, with 11.54 %, 11.87 %, and 11.29 % of United States im-
ports, respectively. Nevertheless, Central American garment exports 
stagnated in 2000–2003, those of Mexico dropped, and those of China 
rose substantially. 
4. The tariff rate paid by China in the garment segment was 12.59 % in 
2003, 2.1 times higher than Central America and 16.8 times higher 
than Mexico. 
Finally, at the 10digit level of the Harmonized System, the United States 
imports from the countries analyzed exhibit the following tendencies (see 
Statistical Annex 5): 
1. Central America and Mexico reflect relatively high coefficients in the 
concentration of the 25 main export products out of the total exported 
to the United States in the yarn-textile-garment chain; in both cases its 
is near 60 % in 2003, while for China it is 35.39 % (see graphic 11). 
The issue is relevant, given that the export dynamic in the case of the 
first countries depends on a relatively reduced group of products at 10 
digits of the Harmonized System.  
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Graph 9: United States: Share of 25 main products in the total imports of 
the yarn-textile-garment chain (1990–2003) (percentage) 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 5. 
2. Charts 61 to 84 in Statistical Annex 5 analyze, at the 10 digit level of 
the Harmonized System, the 3 principal export products to the United 
States and the 5 principal competitors, respectively. Even though each 
fraction requires a detailed study, even for a company, a couple of aspects 
stand out. First, that the three main Chinese products only compete with 
those of other Asiatic countries like Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Sri Lanka, among others. Second, that the three main 
Central American export products to the United States compete with 
those of China, Hong Kong, Turkey, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, 
and other Central American countries. In the principal Central American 
export product – fraction 6110202075 (Sweaters, jerseys, pullovers, cardi-
gans, vests and similar articles, either knitted or made of wool or fine 
animal hair) – that generated exports of 723 million dollars or 10.16 % of 
the total exports of this chain in the region in 2003, a strong competition 
between Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, Mexico, and Turkey can be 
observed (see graph 10). The situation is much the same for the main 
Mexican products: they basically compete with those of Central 
American and Asian countries. In all these cases at the tariff fraction 
level, the high tariffs paid by the Asian countries stand out.  
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Graph 10: United States: 5 main competitors in imports of item 6110202075 
(1990–2003) (percentage over total imports) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 5. 
3.5 Central American and Mexican trade relations with 
China 
As previously analyzed according to Central American information 
sources, Central America has an extremely low level of aggregate bilateral 
trade with China, yet an important dynamic exists. Statistical Annex 4 and 
Chart 19 give a detailed presentation of the main commercial charac-
teristics of the yarn-textile-garment chain for the region and each of its 
countries from1994–2002: 
1. During this period Central America didn’t export to China. 
2. Even so, China increasingly attracted regional imports and, in con-
junction with Hong Kong, attained 9.71 % of the imports in this chain 
in 2002, starting out from 4.20 % in 1994. China’s AAGR was 40.8 % 
during the period. 
3. Costa Rica and Guatemala are the main importers in the Chinese 
chain, with a regional share of 75.84 % in 2003, especially in the 
segments of textiles and garments. In the case of Guatemala, for 
example, the imports of China and Hong Kong generated 19.39 % of 
all the imports in the chain in 2003. 
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In the case of Mexico – whose information source makes a distinction 
between maquiladora and non-maquiladora activities – trade with China 
increased its weight during 1993–2003. Yet 91.94 % of the exports in this 
chain were oriented towards the United States in 1993–2003, showing an 
upswing in the period. On the other hand, Mexico, didn’t export products 
in this chain to China, and its exports to Hong Kong came to $ 190 million 
dollars, or 0.22 % of all exports. 
Nevertheless, the presence of the Asian countries, especially China, has 
been very dynamic in the chain’s imports to Mexico. Graph 11 shows that 
the United States is the main exporter to Mexico during this period. On the 
other hand, despite high tariff rates – and also as a result of antidumping 
measures – Chinese exports increased, with an AAGR of 20 % during 
1993–2003, attaining a percentage share of 4.58 % of Mexican imports in 
2003 (or 7.96 % including Hong Kong). 
Graph 11: Mexico: Imports in the yarn-textile-garment chain by selected 
country (1990–2003) (percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 3. 
Despite Mexico’s important trade surplus in the garments segment of the 
total chain, it presents a growing trade deficit in the textile segment. For 
the 1993–2003 period, the surplus rose to $ 29.846 billion dollars and the 
deficit in textiles, to $ 25.772 billion dollars (see Statistical Annex 3). As a 
result, the trade surplus in the chain has gradually decreased to a low of 
$ 645 million dollars in 2003, in contrast to $ 1,480 million in 1997. If this 
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tendency continues, Mexico could become a deficit country within a short 
time in the chain (see graph 12).  
Graph 12: Mexico: Trade balance in yarn-textile-garment chain by segments 
(1993–2003) (millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 3. 
The information presented above, however, is insufficient for under-
standing the massive penetration of imports from this chain into Mexico. 
According to recent estimates, 58 % – around $ 9.5 billion dollars – of 
Mexico’s domestic garment consumption is now illegal, with most of the 
goods coming from Asia and China. These same sources (CNIV 2004; SE 
2003; Vallés Costas 2004) estimate that only 20 % of all domestic 
consumption is locally supplied, while around 22 % is legally imported. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, these illegal imports may enter via the 
triangulation of merchandise, through changes in tariffs – in other words, 
new clothing is imported as used clothing under another tariff fraction – 
aided by the lack of inspection by United States customs agents,84 and/or 
                                                          
84 The USGAO (2004b) recognizes the existence of massive illegal imports of textiles that 
are not dealt with, at this time, by the United States Customs service, which is a cause 
for concern in view of the approaching opening in 2005. The Office highlights the lack 
of an automated system, the lack of inspections and incoherent practices at different the 
entry points, the legal possibility for temporary importers to  change the destination of 
the merchandise without informing Customs agents, and the long periods of time taken 
for the goods to arrive at their legal destination, all of which particularly affects Mexico.  
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illegally due to robberies and illegal and/or informal sales. Antidumping 
measures generate powerful incentives for this process.  
4 Challenges and opportunities: the PC chain 
The PC chain85 was selected because of its important export dynamic in 
Mexico during the nineties and because it is a relevant sector in the 
electronics industry. At the beginning of Chapter 3 there was an 
explanation that Code 752 of the UCIT – office machines and electronic 
data processing – concentrates its global exports in Asia, with a share of 
53.22 %, which is similar to that of the garment industry. Likewise, Chart 
15 reflects that China’s world market share, which increased from 0.04 % 
in 1985 to 8.78 % in 2001, is much lower than that recorded in the yarn-
textile-garment chain. In this chain, Central America’s market share is 
minimal – 0.03 % in 2001 – while that of Mexico increased from 0.25 % 
to 4.53 % in the period. By contrast, the market shares of the United States 
and the European Union fell from a level of near 80 % to less than 40 %.  
The structure of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter 3: it begins with a 
global perspective on the chain and then, in the second part, emphasizes 
the Chinese government’s fomentation policies regarding the chain. The 
third section approaches the chain’s commercial structure in China, the 
competitive/complementary relations existing among the exports to the 
United States by the three countries considered here during 1990–2003, as 
well as the bilateral trade relations of China with Central America and 
Mexico.  
Unless it is absolutely necessary, references or explanations of data 
sources will not be given in this chapter so as not to repeat what has 
already been stated in Chapter 2.  
                                                          
85 Specific PC activity consists of three segments: a) storage devices, b) electronic com-
puters, and c) other peripheral equipment (AEA 2003). In Statistical Annexes 3 and 5 
the sector and its respective segments are defined, at 6 and 10 digits of the Harmonized 
Tariff System. 
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4.1 The global industrial organization of the PC chain 
Unlike the yarn-textile-garment chain, the PC and electronics chains, have 
gone through an important trade liberalization process ever since the 
nineties. Even though non-tariff barriers persist, they are minimal or next 
to nothing, like the tariffs themselves. These are some of the basic factors 
that allow for the transfer of segments of the chain in the industrialized 
countries to other territories on the global level.  
This process of the transfer of segments of the PC chain has been 
accelerated during the nineties by United States companies as well as 
European and Japanese firms (Dedrick / Kraemer 1998). Another charac-
teristic of this chain – unlike the yarn-textile-garment chain – is the grow-
ing presence of producer-led company networks: thousands of companies 
at the global level are organized into production and supply tiers around 
OEM (original equipment manufacturing) companies or brand-name 
companies like IBM, HP, Apple, Ericsson, Toshiba, Dell, Sony, Acer, and 
Siemens, among others.  
The main features of the PC chain are summarized as follows: 
1. In general, the computer industry is highly capital intensive, yet there 
are important differences displayed according to the segment; this 
implies high entry and exit barriers for the respective companies.86 
These barriers, particularly high in the production of parts and com-
ponents such as semiconductors, DRAMs, monitors, and others – where 
a plant installation is the result of several years of research and 
development – imply that an initial investment can amount to several 
billion dollars.  
2. The electronics industry and the PC chain are characterized by a high 
degree of innovation: it is estimated that every 18–24 months, the 
number of transistors in a chip is doubled, a trend known as Moore’s 
Law (Yu 1998). This process is characteristic of this industrial 
organization and helps in understanding the high degree of competi-
tion in all segments of the chain, as well as the speed, volatility, and 
                                                          
86 Known as Rock’s Law, the cost of building a semiconductor plant doubles every four 
years, from around $ 100 million dollars in the mid-eighties to around $ 3 billion dollars 
at the current time, to more than twice this amount in 2007. 
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reduced cycle time of the innovation process, the technology itself, 
and the depreciation of the production of generations of products, 
including the PCs themselves.  
3. Even though scale economies and increasingly standardized processes 
and products play a crucial role in the value chain, there is also a high 
degree of diversification of the final products (and, consequently, of 
the required processes), with increasing territorial and cultural modal-
ities. These divergent dynamics87 require diverse strategies on the part 
of business leaders in the respective value chains, and, in many cases, 
allow for the creation of important market niches.  
4. The PC value chain can be broken down into the following general 
segments, which go from lesser to greater added value: a) Assembly 
and sub-assembly processes for parts and components b) Procurement 
of parts, components, products, and processes with OEM and ODM 
(original design manufacturing) companies, c) Manufacture of parts 
and components, d) Engineering and design of products and 
processes, e) Research and development of products and components. 
Moreover, there is a series of segments consisting of sales and dis-
tribution services and support services, which generates a high level 
of value added. Recent studies and analyses stress that the most 
important part of the value added in the electronics industry is 
generated through software, which means that a change can be per-
ceived in the industry’s center of gravity towards design standards and 
knowledge-intensive services (Ernst 2000). Each segment requires 
highly sophisticated enterprises with their respective supply circles 
and sub-segments.  
5. In the computer industry, the transfer of segments in the value chain 
has become an extremely widespread practice, first in the United 
States in the eighties, and later in Japan and Europe. For the three 
producers, Asia has become the main source of parts and components, 
and shows increasing strength in R&D. At the present time, the 
transfer of segments of the chain has been profound in the most highly 
                                                          
87 Some authors (Lüthje 2004) emphasize that the industry’s industrial organization is in-
creasingly “modular”: parts and components, as well as services, are obtained from 
CMs and on the market, while the final product configuration follows OEM specifica-
tions.  
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labor-intensive segments, particularly the assembly and sub-assembly 
of parts and components, but increasingly so in the manufacture of 
parts and components, including the manufacture of semiconductors, 
as in Asia and Costa Rica.88 
6. The industrial reorganization led by the brand-name companies has 
been significant since the eighties and has deepened the vertical 
structure. In general, these companies control the standards pertaining 
to parts, components, products, and processes, as well as the supply 
companies in different circles, also known as “Wintelism” (Borrus / 
Zysman 1998), in which a company like Microsoft imposes its 
standard on operative systems and software, while Intel does the same 
with microprocessors and hardware.89 In a parallel fashion, they have 
transferred (completely, in some cases), the segments linked to the 
manufacture of products to national and global suppliers. Companies 
like IBM and HP, among many others, no longer participate in 
manufacturing processes or fabless companies. Since the nineties the 
electronic contract manufacturers (CMs) have emerged, and, in the 
context of the “full packaging” referred to in the previous chapter, 
they take complete responsibility for production of parts and com-
ponents, and even the assembly of the final product (Solectron, 
Flextronics, SCI-Sanmina, and Celestica, among others, with sales 
higher than $ 10 billion dollars en 2001 (Lüthje / Schumm / Sproll 
2002).90 These company networks – with a percentage share of 
                                                          
88 Dutheil (1998), in a study for the electronic products and semiconductors company ST 
Microelectronics – 40 % property of the Chinese company SEG High-Tech and 60 % of 
the French company St. Microelectronics, with plants at a global level – has observed 
that its plant, in comparison with another in Muar (Malaysia), the Shenzhen plant, pre-
sents lower productivity levels, higher indirect cost levels, and salary levels that are al-
most 30 % lower.  
89 Zysman (2003, 7) comments: “Consider the PC, the personal computer. Where in the 
value chain would you want to be? Do you want to be the producer of the final product, 
the box, even if, like Gateway or H.P., the box carries your logo? Or would you prefer 
being the producer of the constituent elements, the components of the system such as 
the chip, the screen, and the operating system? The value added is in the components, 
the subsystem, and in that sense that standards to which they must be built.” 
90 Lüthje (2004) analyzes this kind of company in detail. Asia is the global leader, concen-
trating its CM company activities in Malaysia and China; Mexico in North America; 
and Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Rumania for Europe. Even though the 
CMs specialize in basic, standardized manufacturing processes, the final assembly, 
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between 15 % and 20 % of the global added value in the informational 
technology chain – compete in order to offer their services to the 
OEMs, which concentrate on the chain’s organization and logistics, its 
parts, components, respective companies, and particularly on the 
development of future generations of technology. A basic element of 
the logistics of this global value chain is that its weakest segment 
determines the behavior of the entire chain; in other words, a sup-
plier’s error, independently of the complexity and/or cost of the pro-
cess or product, can delay the final product or even cause its failure.  
7. The value chain led by these big brand-name ETNs or OEMs now 
function in “real time; the old “just in time” industrial organization is 
no longer sufficient or functional. This shift is also the result of the 
fact that many companies like Dell offer to send their final products 
within 48 or 72 hours in the United States directly to the client, 
thereby reducing the number of inventories and intermediaries in the 
chain. As a result, the segments of the value chain communicate with 
each other by means of electronic systems in real time, as they also do 
with their suppliers. The response speed of the segments, in addition 
to costs and nearness to markets, are important aspects for the estab-
lishment of the respective segments, and particularly of the manu-
facture and the final configuration of the products. The competition 
between countries in integrating themselves into diverse segments of 
the computer value chain is very intense. Asia has been particularly 
successful in increasing its share in the manufacture of parts and 
components, as well as in their assembly (Dedrick / Kraemer 2001; 
Kraemer / Dedrick 2002).  
8. At a global level, the electronics industry, especially the CMs and the 
producers of parts and components, increasingly use labor agencies 
for various reasons. On one hand, the CM businesses don’t require the 
payment of the same salaries and services as their workers do, 
resulting in significant reductions in remuneration. In the second place, 
they guarantee worker attendance – in most cases social security is 
                                                                                                                         
software application, and equipment testing, important differences exist with regards to 
plant location. The Product Introduction Centers, especially in industrialized countries, 
for example, design prototypes and begin with production lines, concentrating the large 
part of the highest value added activities.  
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minimal or non-existent – with less rotation, and prohibit unionization 
(CAFOD 2003; Woo 2001). 
9. Several different authors (Dedrick / Kraemer 1998; Ernst 2004) point 
out that one of the main tendencies in the PC and electronics 
industries since the nineties has been the genesis of Asia as a massive 
export platform (see chart 15). China, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
have percentage shares of more than 25 % of the world production in 
the manufacturing of electronic products based on late international 
knowledge91 as suppliers for OEM companies and the CMs them-
selves. 
10. Since the end of the year 2000 the computer industry has been im-
mersed in a severe crisis. On one hand, there is a widespread excess 
supply of parts and components, as well as final products, which has 
led to drops in their respective prices. The integration of several 
countries, especially Asian, into diverse segments of the value chain, 
has intensified this excess supply. On the other hand, and inde-
pendently of structural causes, the recession of Japan and the United 
States since 2001 has also intensified this performance. Since the end 
of 2003 the chain would seem to have initiated a recovery process, led 
by the increase in demand in the United States (Runiewicz 2004) in 
office and computer equipment, estimated at 15 % for 2004, with an 
intense competition process between companies like Dell and HP 
(Bank / McWilliams 2004). In addition, it is estimated that there will 
be a continuation of the intensification of the transfer of segments and 
jobs in the informational technology and electronics industries, 
increasingly in services (ITAA 2004). 
                                                          
91 Ernst (2004) points to the relevance of the concept of “late innovations” in the case of 
these countries –excluding Japan– since they have been able to innovate in highly com-
plex technological knowledge industries, even with significant deficiencies relative to 
the OEMs and R&D in industrialized countries. So innovation is not limited to “cutting 
edge” technologies and centers of excellence.  
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4.2 The chain in China 
a) Policies to promote high technology 
In 1988, in the face of accelerated renovation of sciences and technology 
at the world level, and in the context of the diversification and reorien-
tation of the export structure (see chapter 2), the central government 
implemented the “China Torch Program” with the aim of fomenting the 
development of new, high technologies and their respective applications in 
the industries. One of the main components is that of constructing high-
tech industrial parks and establishing support centers for high tech 
industries, a responsibility of the Chinese Science and Technology Com-
mission (formerly the Ministry of Science and Technology). 
In the Ninth Five-Year Development Plan (1996–2000) the policies 
covered all kinds of computers, but particularly the PC with the intention 
of increasing the Chinese components and the capacity to produce peri-
pheral equipment like monitors, printers, hard discs, and to establish 
several large companies in this segment. With this aim in mind, large 
companies like IBM, HP, Toshiba, and Compaq were invited to make joint 
investments with Great Wall, Legend, Trontru and Stone and Star, among 
others (Kraemer / Dedrick 2002). 
In line with the Tenth Five-Year Development Plan that covers the 2001–
2005 period, the high-tech sector is considered as strategic. The need to 
foment the development of high-tech industries was identified in order to 
achieve competitive advantages at the national level through a variety of 
actions, including92:  
• Carrying out large-scale projects with the following concrete aspects: 
a high-speed information network, integrated circuits,93 biological 
technologies, state of the art airplanes, and rocket transporters. 
                                                          
92 It should be mentioned that since 1997 China has doubled its expenditure in R&D to 
$ 13 billion dollars and has established three new regions for electronic production  (the 
Zhujiang Delta, the Yangtze Delta in Jiangsu and in Beijing) (USDC 2003). 
93 In the case of semiconductors, the plans are to increase production from $ 2 billion in 
2000 to $ 24 billion in 2010. 
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• Promoting the development of digital electronic products, new printers, 
materials, and electronic equipment, renovated Chinese medicines, and 
satellite applications.  
• According to the goals set for the software sector, sales will reach 250 
billion yuan (around $ 30.5 billion dollars), the national production 
share will rise to 60 % of aggregate supply, and exports will increase 
to $ 5 billion dollars, which will represent 3 % on the international 
market. 
Parallel to this initiative, numerous central government actions are planned 
to promote the software industry. Since it was created in 1998, the Minis-
try of the Information Industry has actively fomented the software sector. 
In 2000, a sectorial integral development program was published for the 
first time in China (MII 2000), designed and applied jointly by the minis-
tries of Finance, Information Industry, Commerce, and the Customs De-
partment. Since then, the development of the high-tech sector, especially 
in the area of software and computer-related products, has formally begun 
to receive the benefits offered by the government in its respective efforts. 
Another measure, at least equally as relevant, is the initiative of creating a 
software degree in 35 universities beginning in 2002, which means that 
tens of thousands of students will graduate annually with this specialized 
degree as of 2005–2006. Since 1999 the China Torch Program – with 
funds that have varied annually between around $ 125 million dollars in 
1999 to half of that in 200394 – is highly relevant because it reflects the 
Chinese government’s effort to intensify the industrialization process it 
has been going through since the seventies. Its general goal is to support 
companies devoted to research and its application in the industries of new 
materials, biology, electronics and information; the integration of 
machinery and electronics; and ways of fomenting the use of high-tech 
processes and products in Chinese companies. According to their size, 
technological level, sales perspectives, etc., the projects are classified at 
the local and national level, respectively. In 1999 the program was 
explicitly oriented towards fomenting high-tech exports.95 
                                                          
94 See: http://www.innofund.gov.cn/innocomm/, with various communications in 2003, 
consulted in July, 2004. 
95 Recently, for example, it fomented the establishment of 91 companies with Program 
support in Zhejiang Province, obtaining additional guarantees for around $ 800 million 
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Thus, in 2000 the first list of high-tech products for export was jointly 
formulated by the ministries of Commerce, Technology, Information 
Industry, and Finances, together with the Development and Reform Com-
mission, the General Customs Administration of China, and the Revenue 
and Licensing Administration. The list of products was newly revised in 
2003. A revision and evaluation of the list and achievements is to be 
carried out annually. 
Based on the Torch Program, the high-tech sector in China is made up of 8 
industrial branches, 1,875 products and 808 tariff fractions.96 The 8 in-
dustrial branches consist of:  
a) The electronics and information industry 
b) The software industry 
c) The airlines and aeronautical industry  
d) The electronics and machinery industry 
e) Medicines and biological medicinal equipment  
f) New materials 
g) New energy sources and energy-saving products  
h) Other (environmental conservation products)97 
One of the Program’s explicit objectives – based on expectations for 2020 
(see chapter 2) – is to increase Chinese high-tech exports from 25 % to 
40 %.98 Of the list, the products related to the production of computers and 
software represent the most dynamic areas during the last 3 years. Accord-
ing to statistics, the IT (informational technology) products achieved an 
cumulative growth rate higher than 30 % during 2000–2003 and now 
represent around 90 % of the Chinese exports in the high-tech sector.  
                                                                                                                         
dollars for 4,550 high-tech companies. See: http://www.innofund.gov.cn/innocomm/, 
consulted in July, 2004. 
96 For the complete list of the 808 fractions, see Chart 4 of Statistical Annex 1.  
97 For the Ministry of Science and Technology, the list is made up of nine sectors, given 
that the rest are divided into two: environmental, planetary, and oceanic conservation; 
and modern agriculture. Nevertheless, the institutions handle the same mass of fractions.   
98 For more on this theme, see document: http://kjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200404/20040 
400204504_1.xml, consulted in July, 2004. 
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The most important instruments for applying these political proposals are 
listed as follows:  
1. High-tech industrial parks have been selected as a base for fomenting 
exports of products with a high technological content. From 1999 
until now, 25 parks have been selected in Beijing, Tianjin, Shangai, 
Shenzhen, and Suzhou. 
2. An important part of the Export Development Fund (a fund of the 
central government) has been designated for the high-tech sector, and 
the amount increased gradually year by year.  
3. High-tech companies can also turn to the Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprise Incursions into International Markets.  
4. The Chinese Export-Import Bank grants credits at preferential rates 
established by the Central Bank of China to the high-tech sector.  
5. Incentives are given to the Chinese Export Security Company to grant 
a preferential rate to companies that export high-tech products.  
6. Customs stations are to give preference to high-tech export products.  
7. As emphasized in Chapter 2, the fiscal stimulus policies basically 
consist of value added tax refunds to export companies in this 
sector. In addition to general incentives, local governments have 
applied complementary measures so that companies can get their 
tax refunds sooner. For example, the Beijing city government 
offers a credit for a sum of up to 50 % of the tax refund at an 
interest rate of 0 %. The Beijing city government also applies a 
policy of a special stimulus for export companies: 1 Renminbi cent for 
every dollar received under the heading of general merchandise exports 
and 2 Renminbi cents for software exports.  
During 1988–1999 an objective of the program was to enhance the 
establishment of industrial parks, among other projects.99 According to the 
size, technological level, and sales, among other variables, the projects 
were classified according to the respective government level. From 1988 
                                                          
99 For a current list of high-tech parks in China, and some of their characteristics in terms 
of the number of companies, jobs, gross income, net profit, taxes collected, and exports, 
See Charts 5 and 6 and Statistical Annex 1. 
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to 1999, a total of 18,888 projects were undertaken, 5,045 of them at the 
national level. As of the year 2000, 53 industrial parks had been es-
tablished and measures were taken to promote 20,796 companies with 
exports exceeding $ 18,58 billion dollars and 2.5 million employees (see 
chart 20). Of the total personnel working in the high-tech industrial parks, 
more than 500,000 are scientists, 52,103 have Masters Degrees, and 9,358 
have Doctoral Degrees, and 5,615 have studied abroad. 
Chart 20: Evaluation of the China Torch Program, 1991–2000 
 1991 1993 1996 2000 
Number of 
companies 
2,587 9,687 13,722 20,796 
Production /a 8,730 56,360 230,030 920,930 
Exports /b 160 540 4,300 18,580 
Employment /c 0.1 0.5 1.3 2.5 
/a Billion yuan 
/b Billion dollars 
/c Million persons 
Source: Self-compiled, based on figures from the Ministry of Science and Technology of 
the Peoples Republic of China, http://www. most.gov. cn/gxjscykfq/index.htm 
b) The chain’s condition 
In 2003, 17,506 companies in the electronic industry recorded sales of 
around $ 218.7 billion dollars that contributed $ 48.6 billion dollars to the 
GDP. External sales, on the other hand rose to a total of $ 142.1 billion 
dollars, with a growth rate of 51.4 % in 2003; representing 65 % and 
32.4 % of the total of the manufacturing sector and of Chinese exports. 
Employment rose from 2.9 million to 4.1 million, with a growth rate of 
38.4 % (see charts 21 and 22). 
Chart 21: The electronics industry in China: number of companies and sales 
effected, 2000–2003 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Number of companies 6,893 7,522 9,065 17,506 
Number of employees 
(Millions) 
2.9 3.0 3.3 4.1 
Sales effected 
(Billions of yuan) 
989 1,188 1,400 1,880 
Source: Self-compiled, based on figures from China’s Ministry of Information 
Industry. 
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Chart 22: Electronics and information industry exports, 2000–2003 
  2001 2002 2003 
1. Total (1) 266,160 325,570 438,370 
Exports 
(millions of 
dollars) 
2. Electronics and 
information industry 
(2) 65,020 92,040 142,090 
3. Total 6.8 22.3 34.6 Growth rate 
4. Electronics and 
information industry 17.8 41.6 54.4 
Percentage 2/1 24.4 28.3 32.4 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on figures from China’s Ministry of Information 
Industry. 
Chart 23 indicates the growing orientation towards exports of electronic 
production, given that with regards to the majority of products, exports 
increase more than domestic sales. Furthermore, the performance is truly 
spectacular in both markets: in products like personal computers, domestic 
sales increased almost 100 % in 2003, while exports increased 55.5 %, and 
in several sectors even more.  
Chart 23: Production and sales effected of the main electronic articles 
(2003) 
Production Sales effected Exports  
 
 
Volume(
millions)
Growth 
rate 
Volume(
millions)
Growth 
rate 
Millions 
of dollars
Growth 
rate 
Total /a 12,915.6 37.7 12,745.7 40.5 28,880 61.1 
Cellular telephones 186.4 54.5 183.2 56.1 7,380 39.4 
Digital telephones 58.1 39.0 53.8 34.6 450 81.8 
Color televisions 65.2 30.3 65.0 23.8 2,560 16.6 
Personal computers 32.2 98.0 30.8 98.9 2,200 55.5 
Printers 73.3 56.2 73.7 55.2 9,570 62.4 
Color 
transmissions 
90.5 16.1 89.1 15.7 750 17.7 
Integrated circuits 12,410.0 37.5 12,250.0 40.5 5,970  165.7 
/a The total may not coincide with the total due to round offs. 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on figures published by the Chinese Ministry of 
Information Industry. 
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The foreign capital companies have played a crucial role during the last 20 
years because of their participation in sector growth.100 In 2003, there were 
4,026 companies with foreign investment registered in the electronics in-
dustry, representing 23 % of the sector’s establishments. Nevertheless, 
with regards to the indicators of effected sales, tax collection, income 
obtained, value added, and share of total exports by the electronics 
industry, the foreign capital companies contributed more than 50 %, 
67.5 %, 57.9 %, 52.0 % and 82.7 %, respectively. Chart 24 reflects the 
significant incidence and weight of exports according to the type of 
ownership and generally reflects the remarkable export growth under all 
categories, including private, collective, and SOEs. Nevertheless, it is 
notable that the 100 % foreign companies have been the most dynamic, in 
the case of computers, components, and peripherals, with an AAGR of 
56.1 % during 1993–2003.101 As a result, the 100 % foreign companies 
have displaced the companies with other kinds of ownership in the three 
sectors – attaining 75 % of the exports of computers, components, and 
peripherals in 2003 – although in all cases they have increased signi-
ficantly in absolute terms: in the case of the SOEs, for example, their share 
in the exports of computer, components, and peripherals diminished from 
64 % to 15 % during 1993–2003, although it increased from around $ 200 
million dollars to more than $ 2.5 billion dollars in 2003.102  
For the moment, Chinese electronics and SOEs companies have not had an 
outstanding direct international presence. This tendency, nevertheless, could 
be reverted before long for various reasons (Sigurdson / Long 2003). On 
one hand, the sector has continued to display a significant dynamism, even 
in the face of industry-wide problems during 2001–2003, particularly with 
regards to domestic dynamics. This process has allowed for an increase in 
the share of Chinese companies in the internal telecommunications market, 
among other sectors, and, in a parallel fashion, for the accumulation of 
                                                          
100 Of the exports and imports of high-tech products, foreign companies had percentage 
shares of 84.6 % and 72.3 %, respectively, in 2003 (Rosen 2003). 
101 Taiwanese companies such as Acer, Quanta, Arima, Hon Hai, FIC, and GVC, among 
others, have transferred a significant part of their assembly segments to China since the 
early nineties (Kraemer / Dedrick 2002). 
102 These tendencies are also congruent with a growing tendency for FDI to participate in 
100 % foreign projects; such transactions now participate with more than 50 % of FDI 
(Woetzel 2004). 
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significant earnings to be invested in joint-investment processes or in the 
acquisition of companies in China or abroad. On the other hand, several of 
the large Chinese companies in this category have opted for making joint 
investments and participating in joint projects – in the case of the China 
Putian Group more than 90 joint investments with 47 companies – that 
will bear fruit in the next few years both in the strengthening of their own 
brands via new technologies and in the commercialization of their 
products.  
According to annual report of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII 
2004), the software sector has increased production from 59,300 million 
yuan (approximately 7.2 billion US dollars) in 2000 to 160 billion yuan in 
2003 (approximately 17 billion dollars). Other indicators in the sector also 
showed impressive figures: 8,582 companies devoted to manufacturing 
approximately 18,000 registered software products were established and 
identified. Furthermore, jobs were directly created for more than 5000,000 
people and indirectly created (in the areas of application, research, and 
education) for another 400,000 people, of whom 250,000 work on systems 
development. At the same time, software exports registered a value of $ 2 
billion dollars. Of the total companies registered in 2002, 1,100 obtained 
an annual income higher than 10 million yuan, or 398 companies more 
than in 2001; those with annual incomes higher than 100 million yuan 
increased from 200 to 368. In the same period, the foreign capital 
companies (including those of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao) repre-
sented 13.7 % of the registered companies and generated 17.7 % of the 
sector income. 
Finally, since the nineties, China has become the main center for mass 
assembly and production, including diverse peripheral products for PCs, 
with greater technological complexity recently. All the main United States, 
European, Japanese, and Taiwanese CMs now have plants in China, 
particularly in Shangai, Nanjing, Beijing, Dongguan, and Shenzhen. 
Guangdong,103 particularly, has increasingly become the center of these ac- 
                                                          
103 The region benefits from Hong Kong’s logistics and infrastructure and a population of 
between 30 and 40 million inhabitants. These businesses mainly employee migrant 
workers – registered in their region of origin, they have second class status in real terms – 
through public or private employment agencies, with a requirement of official registra-
tion with local authorities. Despite this system (hukou), the rotation in the plants is be-
tween 25 %–40 % annually; the workers live at the company’s plant and earn salaries of 
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Chart 24: China: Exports by type of ownership (1993–2003)  
Source:  Self-compiled, based on Gilboy (2004, 39). 
tivities, with more than 15 plants of the main CMs and at least around 
85,000 employees (Lüthje 2004). These plants can employ more than 
60,000 workers in one location, while other CMs have established a 
strategy of plants with a greater degree of specialization and a smaller size. 
Nevertheless, one highly relevant aspect is that China has increasingly 
integrated processes of higher value added and, in the case of the CMs, has 
replaced Hong Kong as an operation center of these companies, con-
sidering massive investments of Hong Kong and Taiwanese companiesin 
Guangdong. Chinese companies such as Huawei, CSMC Technologies 
Corporation, ZTE, or TLC, among others, are important associates and brand 
                                                                                                                         
between $ 60-$ 100 dollars (operators), including extraordinary work days, while the 
starting salaries for engineers and technicians are around $ 250 dollars. Surprisingly 
enough, incentives are not generally offered for productivity, given that the dormitory 
and food costs amount to 30 % to 50 % of the cost of a worker, in addition to the salary. 
The 2 or 3-day training session for operators is held in the companies themselves, while 
the higher level personnel train in universities owned by the company and/or electroni-
cally or digitally. In general, there are no unions whatsoever in this segment of foreign 
enterprise (Lüthje 2004 and Brooks 2004 on the issue of hukou). 
Billions of dollars AAGR
1993 2003 1993 2003 1993-2003
Industrial machinery 4.2 83.0 100 100 34.8
   Collective 0.0 2.5 1 3 50.4
   State-owned company (SOC) 2.7 12.5 64 15 16.6
   Joint production 0.1 2.5 3 3 34.8
   Joint investment 0.6 12.5 15 15 34.8
   Foreign company (100%) 0.7 51.5 17 62 53.4
   Private 0.0 2.5 0.2 3 76.7
Computers, components, peripherals 0.7 41.0 100 100 50.2
   Collective 0.0 0.4 0 1 --
   State-owned company (SOC) 0.2 2.5 26 6 29.7
   Joint production 0.0 0.8 4 2 40.2
   Joint investment 0.1 6.2 19 15 46.7
   Foreign company (100%) 0.4 30.8 51 75 56.1
   Private 0.0 0.4 0 1 --
Electronics, telecommunications equipment 12.3 89.0 100 100 21.9
   Collective 0.1 2.7 1 3 36.0
   State-owned company (SOC) 6.6 16.0 54 18 9.2
   Joint production 0.9 2.7 7 3 12.0
   Joint investment 2.8 24.9 23 28 24.3
   Foreign company (100%) 1.8 38.3 15 43 35.4
   Private 0.0 4.5 0 5 --
Percentage
Economic Opportunities and Challenges posed by China for Mexico and Central America 
German Development Institute 103 
name suppliers of these CMs and reflect the upgrading process of acti-
vities carried out in China, although concentrated in one relatively small 
group of companies with CM requirements. Other companies like Hisense, 
Langchao, Stone, Great Wall, Founder, Legend, and Tsinghua Tofang 
have been able to rank as electronic brand name companies104 (Lazonick 
2003; USDC 2003) with significant investments in R&D.105 Since the 
nineties, companies established in China in other sectors like semi-
conductors – 8 in 2002, of which 5 were Chinese joint investments (4 of 
them with a Chinese majority) with Philips, Alcatel, NEC, and CMSC and 
3 of 100 % foreign capital – have been able to rank in semiconductors with 
cutting edge technology within only one generation (USGAO 2002). 
4.3 China’s trade structure 
Among the main aspects of China’s commercial structure in the PC chain, 
the following trends stand out (see Statistical Annex 2): 
a) PC exports, with an AAGR of 35.6 % during 1996–2002, represented 
10.24 % of all Chinese exports, or $ 33,360 million dollars in 2002. 
This impressive performance is particularly concentrated in four 
recipients in 2002: Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, and Holland, 
with a share of 28.34 %, 23.30 %, 11.36 %, and 8.38 %, respectively. 
The exports to Mexico have been the most dynamic of all the 
                                                          
104 The type of ownership of the main brand name countries in China is unique: the leader, 
Lenovo (formerly Legend), is intimately connected to the Academy of Sciences; the 
main governmental research institution, Founder, to the University of Beijing; and Great 
Wall came from the Ministry of the Electronic Industry. Local and provincial govern-
ments, however, play a direct role in the supply of infrastructure, financing, and other 
supports for attracting this kind of company (Kraemer / Dedrick 2002). 
105 Sigurdson / Long (2003) present a detailed analysis of the cases of Huawei, ZTE, 
Datang Telecom Industry Group, Putian Group, Huaqiang Group, and Lenovo. One no-
table feature of all these cases, in addition to the fact that they are large groups with ac-
tivities in the electronics industry, is the significant search for and adaptation of new 
technologies via joint investments or purchases from companies in foreign countries – 
in November, 2003, TCL announced a joint investment with Thomson of SA, with a 2/3 
share in the new company and an annual television set production of around 18 million 
units, considerably more than Sony or Panasonic (Sigurdson 2004) – a growing orienta-
tion towards higher added value segments and towards external markets.   
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countries considered, with an AAGR of 102 % during 1996–2002, 
reaching a total of $ 293 million dollars en 2002. 
b) The chain’s imports have been even more dynamic than its exports, 
with an AAGR of 243.7 %, and a total of $ 16.279 billion dollars. 
With the exception of the United States, whose exports to China 
represented 12.36 % in 2002 and a strong downward trend during 
1996–2002, only Asian countries are listed within the 10 principal 
suppliers. Mexico has significantly increased its participation al-
though at levels still lower than those of other Asian countries, and 
captured 2.42 % of Chinese PC imports in 2002.  
c) As a result, the trade balance in the chain presents a pattern similar to 
China’s general trade balance: a significant surplus with Hong Kong, 
the United States, and Japan, as well as with European countries, and 
a substantial deficit with the rest of the Asian countries, from which it 
imports parts and components for export (see grapc 13). As a result, the 
PC chain’s trade surplus increased $ 5.363 billion dollars in 1996, to 
$ 17,082, or 56.14 % of the trade surplus obtained in 2002. Thus, both 
the yarn-textile-garment chain and the PC chain are the most significant 
with regards to the surplus generated for the Chinese economy.  
Graph 13: China: Cumulative trade balance in PC chain for selected coun-
tries (1996–2002) (millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 3. 
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Chart 25 reflects a pattern of commercial specialization of the chain, by 
segment. On one hand, it is interesting that China has increasingly 
specialized in its exports under the segment of “other computer peripheral 
equipment,” attaining 72.79 % of the exports in the chain in 2002. Thus, of 
the 14 main products exported at 6 digits of the Harmonized System (see 
Statistical Annex 2), only the first three participated with more than 80 % 
in the chain in 2002. Surprisingly, China has an excess surplus in all the 
segments in the chain.  
Chart 25: China: total trade balance in PC chain (1996–2002) (millions of 
dollars) 
 
Source: Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 2. 
4.4 The United States market: complementary or 
competitive exports? 
As is true in the yarn-textile-garment chain, the United States market is the 
most important one for Central America and Mexico, with shares of 
46.77 % and 90.41 %, respectively in 2002 and 2003, and 23.30 % for 
China.106 Graph 14 reflects, in aggregate terms, the Asian predominance in 
                                                          
106 Central America exported $ 10 million dollars to the United States in 2003 in the chain; 
thus, it is not considered here.   
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United States imports: of the main exporters in 2003, with the exception of 
Mexico and Ireland, all are Asiatic. While Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
South Korea have seen a significant drop in their share during 1990–2003, 
China and Mexico have benefited. Nevertheless, during the 2001–2003 
period, there was a qualitative change: after a decade of two digit growth 
of the United States imports in the PC chain, since 2001 the dynamic was 
negative and exhibited stagnation. It is in this context that the participation 
of all the main exporters diminished, with the exception of China and 
Malaysia. During the 2001–2003 period China increased its percentage 
share from 13.84 % to 29.14 %. Unlike the yarn-textile-garment chain, in 
the PC chain since the late nineties, tariffs have been reduced to their 
lowest levels for all countries, without exception (see Statistical Annex 5). 
With regards to the United States import structure, by segments of the PC 
chain, since the mid-nineties this has changed substantially: while 
electronic computers increased their percentage share from 13.1 % to 
30.8 % during 1997–2003, the computer storage equipment decreased 
from 35 % to 18 %, while the category of other computer equipment 
remained unaltered with around 52 % during the period. 
Graph 14: United States: Imports in PC chain (1990–2003) (percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 5. 
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56.82 % of all Mexican exports in the chain in 2003, while China’s 
participation in this segment is very low; on the contrary, China has spe-
cialized in the “other computer peripheral equipment” segment. Despite this 
apparent complementary relation, the former structure underwent 
significant changes in 2001–2003. In 2003 alone, Chinese exports 
registered a spectacular increase of 56.1 %, and in the electronic computer 
segment, of 335.6 %. As a result, China’s market share in this segment 
increased from 4.23 % in 2001 to 28.19 % in 2003, while that of Mexico 
dropped from 26.95 % to 20.05 %. This rapid adjustment would seem to 
indicate a direct displacement of Mexican exports by Chinese exports in 
the United States market. In the segment of other computer peripheral 
equipment, tendencies similar to those dating from 2001 can be discerned, 
although in this case China has had a higher share than Mexico since the 
nineties.  
Statistical Annex 5 presents the results of the main export products at the 
10 digit level of the Harmonized System, as well as those of the main 
competitors with their respective 3 main export products. On one hand, a 
high degree of concentration of the 25 main products is notable: for both 
Mexico and China these 25 products represent more than 95 % of the 
chain’s exports to the Unites States in 2003. Of the three main Mexican 
products, Mexico competes directly with China in two of them: in one, 
Mexico has been supplanted by China (fraction 8471603500), while in the 
other (8471500085) Mexico supplants China. In the third fraction (84713 
00000) Mexico has suffered significant losses in its share of the United 
States market with regards to Taiwan and Malaysia. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that as of March of 2004, an important 
debate and ongoing process was initiated between China and the United States 
regarding the value added tax applicable to integrated circuits. China – in line 
with the incentives analyzed in Chapter 2 – reimburses part of this tax of 17 % 
to producers established in China, if and when they comply with a series of 
requirements. The United States importers – whose exports to China rose to 
$ 2.02 billion dollars in 2003, paid around $ 340 million dollars in tariffs, 
which can’t be reimbursed. The issue is highly relevant, specifically with 
regards to the incentives utilized in the high-tech sector, but also in relation 
to the logic of incentives utilized by the government in its different 
initiatives. It is hoped that solutions will be reached in this controversy 
before the WTO in the year 2004.  
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4.5 Central American and Mexican trade relations with 
China 
Chart 27 – which, due to the method of collecting of statistical infor-
mation, includes semiconductors belonging to the Intel company in Costa 
Rica107 – reflects the fact that exports are mainly concentrated in Costa 
Rica in 2002, at a percentage of 99.60 %. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that this company’s exports would seem to be relatively diversified, 
given that less than 50 % of Intel’s exports go to the United States. Con-
sidering that the company initiated these processes in 1998, the exports 
reflect drastic fluctuations during the period. 
In the case of imports, Costa Rica is also predominant, with 56.54 % of the 
region’s imports in 2002. Likewise, the United States is the principal 
exporter of PC chain products to Central America, with a percentage share 
of more than 85 % during 1994–2002. The share of China and Hong Kong 
together was 1.78 % in 2002. 
The commercial relation between Mexico and China in the PC chain is 
much deeper than China’s relation with Central America. The results of 
Statistical Annex reflect that China, in less than 5 years, has become the 
main exporter to Mexico and the second recipient of Mexican exports in 
the chain in 2003. In both cases, the dynamic has been extremely rapid: 
the AAGR of Mexican imports from China was 107.5 % – in other words, 
more than double each year – during 1993–2003, and was 314.3 % during 
1996–2003. More than 80 % of the Chinese exports fall under the category 
of “other computer peripheral equipment”. Nevertheless, the trade balance 
with China has been increasingly negative (see graph 15), while the 
surplus trade balance with the United States is what allows for a continued 
surplus in the total balance of the chain. 
                                                          
107 As previously explained, the definition of the chains comes from a group of fractions at 
10 digits of the Harmonized System. In the case of Central America and each of its 
countries, China, and Mexico, however, the only trade information available is at 6 dig-
its. One of the implications of his problem, which must be solved in the next phase of 
the Project, was that some activities like those of semiconductors are included in the ap-
plication of this aggregation method.  
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Even though the region and the chain itself have initiated a recovery 
through the upgrading of the chain – Jalisco now has 27 design centers and 
several companies such as Solectron SCI-Sanmina, Flextronics, Pemstar, 
and Jabil that have even recuperated some projects Finally, it is important 
to point out that the decrease in Mexican export activity in the United 
States market – as analyzed in the previous chapter subdivision and also in 
the general information on maquiladoras in Chapter 2 – has been gener-
ated directly, in part, through competition and the highly competitive 
nature of the chain in China. Based on the information from Cadena 
Productiva de la Electrónica A.C. (Cadelec), the Department of Economic 
Promotion of the State of Jalisco, and the companies themselves, during 
2001–2003, the electronics industry showed a decline of 21,217 in direct 
employment and 23,880 indirect employment, as well of investment 
projects of $ 514 million dollars by companies that outsourced their 
activities to China, for the most part, and/or outsourced their production 
lines to that country (see chart 28). 
linked to PC and telecommunications products like cards and electronic 
cabinets, significant problems still persist with regards to their competi-
tiveness with Asia and, particularly, with China. As a result, after achiev-
ing double digit growth rates in the export of PC and telecommunications 
products, reaching a peak in 2001 with $ 10.529 billion dollars, these 
exports fell to $ 7.872 billion in 2003. 
Graph 15: Mexico: Trade balance in PC chain by principal country 
(1993–2003) (millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Self-compiled, based on Statistical Annex 3. 
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Chart 28: Jalisco: Project losses in electronics industry ( 2001–2003) 
Source: Self-compiled, based on CADELEC and SEPROE. 
5 Conclusions 
In the first chapter, this document points out that in the current 
globalization process, territories are integrated into the world market 
through specific segments of value chains and company networks, with 
important conceptual consequences as well as consequences for economic 
policy. The specific segment is of the greatest importance in understanding 
the potential for endogeny or polarization in the territories, as well as 
characteristics in variables such as the processes and products effected, the 
generation of jobs and their quality, intra and interfirm relations, the 
development of R&D, the potential for diffusion and for generating 
learning processes, and the population’s living conditions. By the same 
token, the generation of competitive conditions for the productive sector, 
in view of the insertion of the territory in specific segments, generates 
opportunities and systemic policy challenges that go beyond exclusively 
macro or microeconomic visions. As a result – and part of the current 
debate and growing consensus on going “beyond macroeconomic funda-
mentals” –, international and multilateral institutions, as well as a number 
of different schools of thought regarding the theory of economic develop-
ment, have promulgated a battery of instruments and policies for improv-
ing levels of competitiveness, territorial insertion in the globalization 
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process, and improvement in the living standards of the population, 
including macro, meso, and microeconomic aspects. 
The rest of the document presents a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic 
and economic policy changes that China has experienced and examines the 
opportunities and challenges existing among the Central American, Chinese, 
and Mexican economies in other markets and in the internal markets of 
Central America and Mexico.  
The first section of Chapter 2 reflects the profound socioeconomic and 
territorial transformations experienced by the People’s Republic of China 
in the last three decades. The socioeconomic performance has been signi-
ficant and the short and medium-term perspectives are positive.108 At the 
present time, China has not only become the “world factory,” but also one 
of the main sources of income for the transnational corporations. Several 
different scenarios, analyses, and estimates regarding the GDP, FDI, and 
trade in China confirm vigorous short and medium-term growth. Despite 
these important advances – as well as those in the terrain of combating 
poverty and increasing consumption – the chapter highlights significant 
socioeconomic and territorial challenges that China will have to face in the 
short, medium, and long-run. Among the important are the widespread 
polarization in income, especially at the territorial and household levels, 
including growing disparities between urban and rural regions. Others 
include difficulties in the restructuring of the SOEs and the generation of 
jobs in the face of the expected process of massive displacement of the 
population in the agricultural sector, as well as problems in the finance 
sector and that of environmental issues. The effects of membership in the 
WTO on agriculture and services are uncertain, although this status could 
intensify some of the previously examined tendencies. Thus, in the long 
run – that is to say in this generation – it is not expected that salaries will 
increase significantly. 109 
                                                          
108 Since 2003 there has been a debate on the “overheating” of the Chinese economy and 
the apparent need to diminish its domestic demand and its growth rate (Samuelson 
2004; The Economist 2004). Despite measures to diminish the growth rate in sectors 
like construction, it is not expected that the growth rate of the GDP will fall below 7 %.  
109 Reynolds (2003) analyzes this aspect, pointing out that in the face of a reserve army of 
nearly 140 million people with jobs in the agricultural sector, low salaries, at least in ru-
ral areas, will continue to affect the rest of the economy.   
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Despite the previously mentioned aspects, it is of the greatest relevance to 
understand an aspect not reflected in the large part of the Latin American, 
Central American, and Mexican bibliography: that the Chinese reforms 
carried out since the end of the seventies are extremely thoroughgoing, 
involving numerous institutional and political changes extending beyond 
the economic and commercial spheres. 
The economy and international trade of China have gone through an 
intense, accelerated, industrialization process based on the accumulation of 
capital, parallel to an orientation towards exports and the implementation 
of programs that favor import substitution and a higher technological level 
of production and international trade through a multiplicity of State 
policies. Even though direct incentives for foreign investors are now 
reflected in the possibility of obtaining added value tax reimbursements, it 
is important to note that agriculture, industry, the SOEs, and FDI have 
historically obtained massive incentives of great importance from the 
central, provincial, and local governments, incentives that are now 
noticeably diminished. Consequently, in 2004 it is possible that instru-
ments for direct intervention will not be found despite the fact that they 
were used massively for several decades. 
The remarkable institutional effort made in China since the seventies is 
examined in detail in both the yarn-textile-garment chain and the high-tech 
chain in chapters 2 and 3. On one hand there has been a high degree of 
decentralization of resources and personnel, with direct interference on the 
part of provincial governments in granting incentives to the SOEs and 
FDI, to mention a few examples.110 On the other hand, important efforts to 
channel massive investment into infrastructure, anti-poverty programs, and 
education, as well as to sectors and companies engaged in the industrial-
ization process, reflect the depth of the new economic structures and their 
potential for integration into the world market. According to extremely 
                                                          
110 With the aim of continuing these institutional efforts to attract high-value-added and 
high-tech companies, China recently launched two interesting projects. One is the “One 
Stop Shop”, a unique kind of window for coordinating mechanisms between the various 
levels of government and diminishing times and costs for national and foreign busi-
nesses. The other is a program called “Business Parks for Returning Students” in the De-
velopment Zones for New and High-technology Companies, in consideration of the spe-
cific needs of Chinese and foreign people, including access to prestigious schools, as well 
as the provision of infrastructure and fiscal benefits (CNIME / Global Insight 2003). 
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diverse estimates on the impact of China’s entry into the WTO, China’s 
international trade will continue to display high growth rates in the long 
run, despite the strict commitments the country agreed to follow.  
From this perspective, and considering socioeconomic, territorial, and 
ecological limitations, most studies conclude that China will be able to 
continue with this growth trajectory. Nevertheless, as manifested in the 
majority of the analyses referred to in Chapter 2, growth based on high 
investment coefficients presents high levels of inefficiency and other short 
and medium-term difficulties: the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) 
– defined by the relationship between the investment coefficient over the 
GDP and economic growth – reflects an important drop since the nineties, 
which implies a continual rise in the investment coefficient in order to 
maintain high growth rates.111 Two issues have stood out in the debate on 
the viability of this process. First, the possibilities for an “overheating” of 
the Chinese economy and its possible inflationary effects.112 In 2004 the 
Chinese authorities have taken diverse measures to reduce this potential 
threat, and, at least in the short run, they don’t foresee factors that affect 
the long-term growth route. Second, – as analyzed in Chapter 2 – a 
number of multilateral petitions have indicated the need to adjust the 
exchange rate. In this regard, however, even a moderate rise would not 
substantially affect the productive and commercial structure; moreover, 
overseeing institutions have said any number of times, as recently as 2004, 
that monetary policy and the exchange rate itself have permitted the 
growth of imports and Chinese exports, as well as macroeconomic 
stability in Asia. In addition, as is argued throughout Chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
the competitiveness of the Chinese economy in the chains examined is 
more far-reaching than an exchange rate that could already be undervalued 
                                                          
111 Various authors (Fu 2004; Zheng / Hu 2004) indicate that, surprisingly, employment has 
been the main source of economic growth in the last decades, while the returns on capi-
tal have diminished and exports have not contributed significantly to the increase in 
productivity of all factors (Perkins 2001). This observation is highly relevant, given that 
in the future, in order to maintain high growth rates in the GDP, the Chinese economy 
should continue with high investment coefficients / GDP, unless it substantially im-
proves its efficiency (Kwan 2004). 
112 In June, 2004, as compared with the same month in 2003, FDI increased by 14 % and, 
in that month alone, reached $ 7.97 billion dollars, while exports increased 46.5 % and 
imports 50.5 %, resulting in a monthly surplus trade balance of $ 1.84 billion dollars 
(Innes / Lee 2004). 
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at around 20 %. The conditions in the finance sector – in view of its 
liberalization in 2007 –, however, and its relationship with the SOEs could 
alter medium-term growth.  
The aggregate and disaggregate study of China’s commercial structure, as 
well as of China’s relations with Central America and Mexico make it 
possible to come to concrete conclusions regarding the subject of the 
opportunities and challenges posed by China. 113 The Chinese commercial 
structure, as well as its productive apparatus, reflect an important 
structural change: while in the early eighties raw materials and oil held a 
50 % share of the exports, in the early nineties, garment production, with 
massive investments in textile plants, became the motor for the growth of 
exports. Since the mid-nineties, however, the principal export chapters 
were chapters 84 and 85 – auto parts and electronics – and in 2002 they 
were more than 50 % higher than labor-intensive exports (garments, toys, 
and shoes, among others). This structural commercial change – although 
China still maintained a trade deficit in these two chapters of more than 
$ 10 billion dollars and a surplus of more than $ 60 billion dollars in 
garments, shoes, and toys in 2002 – is also reflected in trade relations with 
its main trading partners: with countries like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 
China imports electric parts and components with increasingly high trade 
deficits, while the United States114 and the European Union are recipients 
of electronic products, auto parts, and garments, among others, with 
increasingly high trade surpluses. In view of this performance and dynam-
ic, China has become a highly relevant actor in Asian commercial 
integration during the last decade. On the other hand, during 1992–2002 
Chinese imports have presented a spectacular performance in their demand 
for energy and raw materials, both agricultural and agro-industrial 
(legumes, vegetables, food and drink, etc.) and mining products and others 
with a certain level of transformation involved (plastics, metals, fertilizers, 
organic chemical products, etc.). 
                                                          
113 Seen in the context of the relatively complementary nature of the commercial structure 
between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the aggregate analy-
sis of ECLAC (2004b). 
114 Gilboy (2004) points out that the commercial relation between the United States and 
China has been very beneficial for the United States, permitting increased efficiency, 
reduced costs, and savings of more than $ 100 billion dollars since 1978. 
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Based on the commercial analysis, the performance of Chinese, Central 
American, and Mexican exports in the United States market – a high 
priority for Central America and Mexico – reflects a high level of 
competition.115 Even though they are not the only competitors, they are 
among the most dynamic of Mexico’s and Central America’s principal 
export categories: auto parts, electronics, and garments. With the excep-
tion of the automotive chapter – although it is also expected that China’s 
share in this category will continue to rise in the face of massive invest-
ments by foreign companies – the main chapters in the United States 
market appear to be affected. In the case of Mexico, companies formerly 
established in Mexico have made significant decisions to move to Asia 
and China. The big exceptions to this process of competition in the United 
States market are the agricultural, agro-industrial, and raw materials 
chapters. 
As of now there are no detailed analyses on the penetration of Chinese 
imports into Central America: the statistical information reveals that even 
though they have increased dynamically, they still reflect very low shares 
with respect to total imports. In the case of Mexico, on the contrary, China 
has been the second most important importer since 2002, with almost $ 10 
billion dollars and an AAGR of 26.3 % during 1993–2003. These imports 
are not only concentrated in auto parts and electronics, but also register a 
high percentage share in certain sectors – such as toys and shoes – and 
China has recently become the principal importer under these categories.  
As a result, unlike other Latin American countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, which have found channels for exporting agricultural 
and agro-industrial products to China (ECLAC 2004b), the Central Ameri-
can and Mexican exports under these categories has been minimal. This 
low level is due to the fact that their pattern of productive and commercial 
specialization during the nineties mainly was mainly concentrated on the 
transformation of imported products and their export to the United States, 
and much less on agriculture, agro-industry, and other inputs in great 
demand in China.  
                                                          
115 The aggregate study in Chapter 2 concludes, as does Watkins (2002), that this is a 
“head to head” competition in other markets, but also in Mexico’s domestic market, 
and less so in Central American markets.  
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The case of the yarn-textile-garment chain is paradigmatic for under-
standing the profound socioeconomic changes that China has undergone 
during the last decades: since the mid-eighties the chain became the motor 
of the industrialization process and the main export category in the 
Chinese economy until the mid-nineties.116 The case of the chain in 
question is relevant because it manifests the depth and breadth of the 
institutional changes and the variety of instruments used by the central and 
provincial governments: while the Ministry of the Textile Industry, as an 
organ of the Council of State, coordinated and assigned resources to the 
SOEs and coordinated industrial policy regarding this sector until the late 
nineties, as of 1998, the National Chamber of Exports and Imports of 
Textile and Garment Products, together with the central government 
implemented fomentation mechanisms with greater subtlety and discre-
tion, with the aim of avoiding controversies with the WTO and other 
trading partners. Nevertheless, for decades, up until 2004, the Chinese 
government, through different initiatives, has directly provided incentives 
in the form of subsidies to the textile sector with the objective of 
promoting the yarn-textile-garment chain as a whole and creating a base of 
national and foreign support and supply companies; it has been successful 
in this endeavor according to the analyses of extremely diverse national 
and international institutions. One of the primary goals in this regard is the 
restructuring of the SOEs producing textiles.  
Chapter 3 helps to concretize the complementary or competitive aspects 
among the Central American, Chinese, and Mexican economies in this 
chain. On one hand, it is important to understand the magnitude of China’s 
chain with respect to Central America and Mexico: in terms of jobs the 
relation was approximately 37.5:1.5:1, in terms of installed textile capacity 
the relation with Mexico was 10:1, in terms of the chain’s exports, the 
relation was 7.2-1.3-1 in 2002; moreover, in the first case there was an 
established, competitive supply network. According to the policies 
established for 2000–2005, China proposes to continue with the export 
diversification process in the chain and to go beyond garment making. The 
latest figures pertaining to its export dynamic with the United States and 
investment in the chain in 2003 – 83 % with respect to the previous year 
                                                          
116 The analysis of Meng / Wang / Li (2000) presents an interesting summary of how this 
process has transformed entire regions, such as Shenzhen, one of the highest growth re-
gions in the chain and in other manufactured products.  
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reflect a strategy that is coherent in terms of these objectives. The third 
quota liberalization stage in the United States market since 2002, in which 
China substantially increased its share at the expense of Latin American 
and Asian countries, is significant in view of the fact that all the models 
and estimates present China as the main winner in the last phase of the 
quota liberalization cost in 2005, and Central America and Mexico as 
losers, particularly Mexico. Since 2002 China has crowded out Central 
American and Mexico from the second and first place positions in this 
chain’s exports to the United States; as explained in Chapter 3, however, 
there was a “tie” in the garment segment in 2003, which is of the greatest 
relevance for Central America and Mexico. Recent decisions made by 
various companies would seem to intensify this worrisome performance.117 
With regards to the domestic effects of the chain, China’s performance has 
been dynamic in its exports to Central America and Mexico, considering 
that these countries don’t export products from the chain to China: in 
2002, China and Hong Kong had a 9.71 % percentage share of Central 
America’s imports and 4.58 % of Mexico’s in 2003, although it is 
estimated that the percentages for illegal imports are higher. 
Most Central American and Mexican studies, which are still scarce, do not 
start out from these facts and from China’s tremendous level of 
preparation – more than two decades – for entering the WTO. At the least, 
China clearly expects to continue with the growth dynamic that it 
displayed before joining the WTO, considering that this provided an 
opening in sectors like agriculture and services (see chapter 2). This is 
China’s bet and its long-term strategy. On the other hand, even though the 
conditions are a cause for concern, it is important to mention that both 
exports and jobs in the maquiladoras in the chain have maintained a 
                                                          
117 In June, 2004 the Sara Lee corporation informed that as part of its global consolidation 
process, it would close 5 plants, 3 of them in Mexico, 1 in Honduras, and another in the 
United States, at a loss of 2,525, 1,300, and 350 jobs, respectively; its operations in 
Mexico would be transformed into distribution centers. The Canadian company Gildan 
Activewear, very important due to the fact that it is one of the “vertically organized” 
companies with recent investments in a textile industry (Dussel Peters 2004), announced 
the closing of its plant Progreso/Honduras as of September, 2004, leading to the firing 
of 2,200 workers. 
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relative stability during 2000–2003 in Central America, in contrast to the 
plunge in jobs in Mexico.118  
There are several relevant short and medium-term aspects regarding the 
chain in Central America and Mexico. First, in the face of the recent 
recovery of United States manufacturing, it will be important to evaluate 
the way in which the chains are behaving in both countries and with 
respect to China. Second, companies like Hilasal in El Salvador (Rodrí-
guez Ocampo / Sequeira 2003) and Koramsa in Guatemala (Wall Street 
Journal 2004), among many others, show that Central American and 
Mexican companies need to make a greater effort to increase productivity 
and efficiency. Geographic proximity and a lower reaction time, as well as 
cultural knowledge and historical experiences are relevant advantages, 
although they are not absolute. Last, Chinese companies have had 
interesting and important experiences in Central America – especially at 
Comayagua in Honduras (Dussel Peters 2004) – and Mexico, where they 
have made the highest Chinese foreign investment in a textile plant.119 These 
experiences would seem to be a starting point for concretizing possible 
short, medium, and long-term joint investments and mutual cooperation.  
The PC chain, on the other hand, has initiated a rapid process of the 
territorial transfer of segments, starting with those connected to assembly 
and transformation processes, although increasingly extending to 
engineering, systems design, software, and research. The high level of 
capital intensity and the short cycle of product life imply a relatively high 
degree of uncertainty for all the actors in the chain, including the OEMs 
and CMs that control the chains. 
China has made enormous efforts towards integration into the world 
market in high-tech products and processes since the late nineties. While 
the yarn-textile-garment chain was paradigmatic for the labor-intensive 
industrialization process during the seventies and eighties, the Chinese 
government, in its different initiatives, has bet on high technology for the 
next decade. Although still in its initial state, fomentation of high-tech 
                                                          
118 From 2000 to 2003 the maquiladora chain in Mexico lost almost 100,000 jobs, or 
32.3 % of all jobs in the sector.  
119 The Sinatex SA de CV company, located in the city of Obregón, Sonora, has existed in 
Mexico since 2001 and has invested around $ 96 million dollars for the production of 
fibers and textiles 
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processes and products includes countless instruments and mechanisms: 
the China Torch Program, the focalized attraction of companies and 
individuals to industrial parks, the massive creation of curriculum for the 
generation of software in educational institutions, as well as financial 
incentives and tax reimbursements, among many others. Likewise, the co-
operation between different ministries or departments is interesting with 
similar objectives – in other words, the “horizontalization” of public insti-
tutions in order to arrive at solutions of major problems in the chains –, as 
is the cooperation and competition for attracting this kind of company 
among provincial and local institutions, and a long-term vision, at least 
unto 2020. Considering the aspects analyzed in Chapter 4 and the instru-
ments used by the government in its diverse initiatives, microprocessors 
have become the most important controversy between China and the 
United States in the WTO in 2004, given that from the perspective of the 
United States companies, these are not able to reimburse the value added 
tax paid for their exports to China; the consequences of this controversy 
can be highly significant for the central government’s broad incentive 
scheme for fomenting and coordinating economic policy.  
Although still in its initial phase, the 2003 results have been notable in the 
PC chain. On one hand, they have generated a significant investment 
dynamic, considering that at the present time around 4.1 million people 
and approximately 1/3 of all Chinese exports are linked to the electronics 
and information industries. Even though these dimensions are still 
relatively small for China, they are very large for their Central American 
and Mexican counterparts; in Mexico, there were 95,000 jobs in assembly, 
machinery, and electric and electronic equipment in the maquiladora 
companies at the end of 2003, which is to say 2.3 % that of China, and the 
gap in terms of jobs with other electronics groups in Guadalajara, Tijuana, 
and Ciudad Juárez is even wider. All these experiences – including those 
of China, Costa Rica, and Mexico – seek to upgrade the PC value added 
chain in order to obtain greater benefits from global integration.  
The success pf the transformation process towards high-tech products and 
processes in China, however, is not guaranteed at this time. One aspect 
that differs from the Chinese strategy of the eighties with regards to the 
yarn-textile-garment chain is that the high-tech sector is now led by 
foreign companies, a small group of Chinese suppliers, and a group of 
brand-name Chinese companies that is still small. The capacity for 
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coordination and planning on the part of the central government in the face 
of the expected loss of jobs in the state businesses is very low and is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty.  
Although the majority of the productive plant of PC companies established 
in China have specialized in massive assembly processes and products that 
are relatively simple, it has recently integrated more complex segments in 
engineering and design services (Businessweek 2002c; Lazonick 2003; 
Lüthje 2004; Sigurdson / Long 2003; Sigurdson 2004).120 From this per-
spective, the medium and long-term strategy of China’s central govern-
ment is to integrate FDI into capital-intensive processes and products, with 
the software, design, and infrastructure provided by China. The growth 
and expectations of the internal market are, unlike those of many other 
nations, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, a great incentive 
for foreign and national businesses: since 2002 China has become the 
second PC market at the global level, only topped by the United States, 
with an AAGR estimated at 26 % for 2002–2006 (USDC 2003).121 
The case of the PC chain makes it possible to concretize the depth of the 
competition among the Central American, Chinese, and Mexican 
economies. As previously analyzed, Central America has no significant 
share in the chain. Nevertheless, China and Mexico compete directly in the 
chain, both in the United States market and in the internal Mexican 
market. In both markets, particularly during 2001–2003, China has 
displaced Mexico: the market share in the United States market in the 
electronic computer segments rose from 4.23 % to 28.19 %, while the 
Mexican share fell from 14.34 % to 10.87 %. Likewise, in 2000–2003 
alone China increased its share in the Mexican market from 4.01 % to 
29.09 %, thus becoming the number one exporter in the PC chain. As 
formerly analyzed, Chinese competition with Mexico in this segment 
                                                          
120 Kraemer / Dedrick (2002) highlight numerous limitations in this upgrading process, es-
pecially the lack of scale economies, the specialization in standardized PCs, and the 
segmentation of regional markets in China. Nevertheless, companies like Legend have 
increasingly concentrated their activities in software, internet services, and information 
applications, as well as computer equipment (see also MIGA 2003). 
121  In the internal PC market the Chinese companies lead in sales, with Legend, Founder, 
and Great Wall, among others, obtaining percentage shares of more than 50 % (Kraemer / 
Dedrick 2002; USDC 2003). 
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generated losses of more than 21,000 direct jobs and investments 
estimated at around $ 500 million dollars during 2001–2003. 
In qualitative terms, it is notable that China and Mexico, until the mid-
nineties, had been integral parts of the production networks of Asian and 
United States businesses, especially. Since then, however, China has 
engaged in an active integration into European markets and, particularly 
into the United States market, affecting trading partners like Mexico.  
Two aspects are relevant in this context. In the first place, even though 
direct competition between China and Mexico in the PC chain has gener-
ated worries and significant losses in the Mexican economy, in certain 
products – as detailed in Chapter 4 for the United States market – Mexican 
exports would seem to have come out ahead in the competition with 
Chinese products. In the second place, the large part of the competition 
between China and Mexico is the result of intrafirm strategies and of PC 
networks that have decided to open or close plants and/or eliminate/ 
amplify production lines for new products.  
It is important to consider that in the current debate on the challenges 
posed by China for Central America and Mexico, as well as for Latin 
America and the Caribbean in general, China now directly participates and 
competes in their respective domestic markets and in other markets, as is 
detailed in this document. In the case of Mexico, it has been its second 
most important trading partner since 2003. China’s entry into the WTO 
and the elimination of quotas in the yarn-textile-garment chain permit 
assurances that these tendencies will deepen the significant productive and 
commercial shifts at the global level and in Latin America. China’s 
integration into the world market and its intensification will also generated 
pressures towards lower prices and will affect most of the commodities 
exported by Central America and Mexico, particularly to the United 
States. From the regional perspective it is indispensable to deepen the 
analysis of other value chains and the challenges or complementary 
aspects generated by China, with the aim of measuring short, medium, and 
long-term policies for fomenting competition in the productive apparatus 
and concretizing cooperative projects in the face of China’s demand for 
specific products (see Statistical Annex 2) and the existing competition in 
other fractions. 
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